【文章內(nèi)容簡介】 in oversubsidization Repayment ratios are quite low in a number of loans schemes. While there is room for some element of subsidy in most schemes, heavy government builtin subsidies provided through large hidden grants— the major source of recovery losses— cannot always be justi?ed. Whether or not a loans scheme should be subsidized and, given that a subsidy is in place, whether or not the size of the government builtin subsidy is excessive, will depend on the main objectives that the loans scheme is intended to serve. In a recent paper, one of the authors identi?ed no less than eleven separate objectives that have underscored loans schemes around the world (Ziderman 2021). For purposes of the present discussion, however, we restrict our focus to the three more pervasive purposes of loans schemes. These are: cost sharing (ine generation)。 social objectives (improving equity and access for the poor)。 and easing student ?nancial burdens. In practice, any given scheme may incorporate more than one objective. Costsharing is the central, albeit indirect, objective of many loans schemes. Student loans facilitate greater costrecovery through the raising of tuition fees and other university costs, in so far as they counter deleterious effects on enrollment, and especially on the access of disadvantaged groups. Social Targeting is explicitly and directly concerned with accessibility of the poor. Where targeted speci?cally at disadvantaged groups, loans schemes (particularly where substantially subsidized), can lead to greater access of the poor to university education, thus contributing to social equity. Thirdly, the Student Independence model is found typically in a number of wellestablished schemes in Western Europe. The objective of loans provision in this case (usually covering living expenses only, because tuition fees are minimal) is to ease student ?nancial burdens during study。 these burdens may be present even for betteroff students. For example, in Nordic countries students are regarded as ?nancially independent of their parents。 they should not be forced to rely upon parental ?nancial support which might not be forthing. In loans schemes where either cost recovery or student independence constitutes the central objective, the case for heavy builtin student loan subsidies is not strong. In both of these cases, the intended effect of student loans is to reduce the ?nancial burden on students during study and to delay fee payment (through borrowing) until after graduation, when payment is more readily made from the expected enhancement of earnings that the additional education makes possible. In these cases, the level of builtin subsidy is often excessive。 the aim should be nearfull loan recovery. It is only where loans schemes are aimed directly at social targeting that a clear case for sizeable builtin subsidies can be made. In many countries the relatively low enrolment of poor and disadvantaged youth in tertiary education (and also in nonpulsory secondary education) is a cause of social concern. Increasing the access to university education among these segments of the population has bee a major element in educational and social policy. While the cause of low access of the poor is multifaceted, ?nancial constraints evidently play a major explanatory role. There is now a broad consensus on the need to offer clear ?nancial incentives to poor, potential students, not only to overe the burden of fee payment and living expenses but also to offset both parental resistance to reductions in family ine and the fear that the bene?ts of the educational process may not be sizeable. The provision of ?nancial aid therefore may be regarded as a necessary though not suf?cient condition for achieving greater participation of the poor. The traditional, and most effective, method of enhancing the educational access of the poor has been through the provision of meanstested grants to cover tuition fees and usually living expenses as well。 however, a widespread grants scheme is likely to be expensive. The use of loans, rat