【正文】 aries of the pany) between two neighboring node enterprises and the mutual capital transmission. The interior harmonizing mechanism of the pany can take the administrative order as the primary measure, but the node enterprises in the value chain are independent each other, and the authority mechanism is deficient to harmonize the relationships among them. Gulati and Singh (1998) thought that the encouragement mechanism, the standard operation program, the dispute solution, the nonmarket pricing system, and other proper measures can be the control mechanisms to manage the relationships among panies in the value chain. In addition, Thompson (1967) thought that the mutual dependence and uncertainty about the activities in the node enterprises were stronger, and they more need to harmonize and manage these relationships. Therefore, to harmonize the relationships among node enterprise in the value chain, the mutually dependent activities and the capital transformations among panies should be first harmonized and managed, and the management measures are related with the cooperative relationships (such as merger relationship, series relationship and reciprocal relationship) among node enterprises in the value chain and the uncertainty of the activities engaged by these panies. Because the enterprises in the value chain are independent each other, the cooperation is mainly to form the contract by the negotiation. The contract is the agreement achieved by people who actualize the cooperation and benefit distribution. To sign a contract must pay corresponding cost, and because of the diversity of the contract form, to achieve different contract will consume different transaction costs and induce different cooperative effects. But in the game process, there are still some decisive risk factors which will raise the cost for the enterprise. First, for both sides in the cooperation, (1) the enterprises participating in the cooperation generally possess certain strength and certain stability for the development strategy, but they can not eliminate the costs induced by the adjustment and adaptation for the cooperation when the management strategy changes largely, (2) though the cooperation emphasizes sharing information, but the cooperation members can not realize plete information sharing in the cooperation because of their respective benefits, and the cooperator can not know the other’s information sufficiently, and the phenomenon of information asymmetry will occur, and the cooperators will continually 10 select their partners in the cooperation process, so the additive cooperation selection cost will occur, (3) in the implementation process of the cooperation, cooperators may adopt the opportunism behaviors, and the “moral risk” may occur, so the enterprise certainly adopt corresponding measures to keep away, and the cost to prevent the risk occurs, (4) in the game process of the cooperation, because both sides are inclined to keep their private information, poke others’ information and prevent information loss, the information technology and the safety risk about the information emerge as times require, so the cost of information safety will occur. Second, as viewed from the exterior economic environment, (1) in the value system, the disagreement of benefits will certainly induce the petition which may be from cooperators or exterior, and the any petition will bring certain uncertainty and petitive cost for the management and cooperation of the enterprise, (2) in the cooperation, the enterprise inevitably needs the information transmission among enterprises, because the “information channel” is easily influenced by the exterior jamming factors, and the “information distortion” will bring risk loss for the cooperative enterprises, (3) in the business cooperation across regions and countries, the differences in the customs and cultural backgrounds will bring risk costs for the cooperation. Though enterprises all hope to reduce the transaction cost by the cooperation, but in the cooperative game process, the costs still may happen. The generation of these costs is induced by a series of uncertain factors including the uncertainty of the decision of the core enterprise, the uncertainty of the exterior cooperative enterprise brought by the uncertainty of the core enterprise’s decision, the uncertainty of the exterior cooperative enterprise’s subjective behaviors and the uncertainty of the management environment, and these uncertainties bring prevention costs and risk costs for the cooperation among enterprise and directly influence the efficiency of the cooperation. 1 基于合作價(jià)值鏈的成本管理的研究 摘要 現(xiàn)代企業(yè)間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)已不再是單個(gè)企業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，而是價(jià)值鏈與通過(guò)合作增強(qiáng)企業(yè)網(wǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力之間的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。D process of the product as soon as possible, but answer for the product quality, production cost and optimization as the chief principals, and they should ensure to provide corresponding systems and ponents in time. Establishment of objective cost The basic principle of the objective cost method is to confirm the objective profit of the enterprise accruing to the price in the consumption market or the final consumers’ payment price, and calculate the cost by the reverse operation to depose the objective cost to confirm the supply cost or the production cost of various ponents. The objective cost of the core enterprise is supplier’s upper limit of the price. The operation program under the new mode is to first confirm the capitals of the core enterprise, then tell the suppliers what they should do, and finally wait suppliers’ answer whether they should bargain on according to the price proposed by the core enterprise. In the past, the core enterprise forced the suppliers to depreciate continually and never considered suppliers’ benefits. In the new mode, the core enterprise will