【正文】 in China’s Grand Strategy, Security Strategy, and Military Strategy 1 Developments in China’s Military Forces 2 Developments in PLA Military Doctrine 5 International Military Exchanges, Exercises, and Interaction 6 Efforts to Acquire Advanced Technologies to Enhance China’s Military Capabilities 6 Taiwan’s Defense Capabilities and CrossStrait Stability 7 Chapter Two: Understanding China’s Strategy 8 Overview 8 Strategy with Chinese Characteristics 8 Insights on China’s Strategy and Priorities 9 Factors Shaping Pathways to China’s Future 13 Chapter Three: China’s Military Strategy and Doctrine 16 Overview 16 Military Strategic Guidelines 16 Toward a Comprehensive View of Warfare 19 Secrecy and Deception in PLA Military Strategy 19 Asymmetric Warfighting 20 Chapter Four: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 22 Overview 22 Emerging AntiAccess/Area Denial Capabilities 22 Strategic Capabilities 24 Space and Counterspace 27 Power Projection – Modernization Beyond Taiwan 29 Chapter Five: Resources for Force Modernization 31 Overview 31 Military Expenditure Trends 31 China’s Advancing Defense Industries 33 Looking to the Future: Trends and Projections 38 中國(guó)最大管理資源中心 第 9 頁(yè) 共 120 頁(yè) Chapter Six: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait 40 Overview 40 China’s Strategy in the Taiwan Strait 41 Beijing’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan 41 Special Topic: Human Capital in the PLA Force Modernization 45 Overview 45 Emphasizing Reform 45 Looking to the Future 48 Appendix: China and Taiwan Forces Data 50 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 中國(guó)最大管理資源中心 第 10 頁(yè) 共 120 頁(yè) Figures 1. China’s Territorial Disputes 11 2. China’s Critical Sea Lanes 12 3. The First and Second Island Chains 25 4. Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles 26 5. Regional Conventional Missiles 30 6. Defense Expenditures of the PRC: 1996 2020 32 7. 2020 Military Budgets of China and Regional Powers 33 8. 2020 to 2020: PRC Increase in Modern Systems 34 9. Taiwan Strait SAM and SRBM Coverage 42 10. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces 50 11. Major Ground Force Units 51 12. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces 52 13. Major Air Force Units 53 14. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces 54 15. Major Naval Units 55 16. Inventory of PLAAF SurfacetoAir Missile Launchers 56 17. China’s Missile Force 56 Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 中國(guó)最大管理資源中心 第 11 頁(yè) 共 120 頁(yè) Glossary of Acronyms AEWamp。 Lieutenant General Zhao Keshi, Nanjing MR。C as well as intelligence collection and maritime surveillance, and the KJ2000, based on the Russian A50 airframe. Ground Forces. The PLA has about million ground forces personnel, with approximately 400,000 based in the three MRs opposite Taiwan. China is upgrading these units with modern tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery. Among the new capabilities acquired by PLA ground forces are 。 and Lieutenant General Zhang Youxia, Shenyang MR. These new manders reflect the PLA’s modernization priorities and efforts to promote officers who are younger, better educated, and trained according to the PLA’s evolving professional military education guidelines. . Regarding Taiwan, President Hu’s 17th Party Congress speech did not emphasize military threats, but affirmed the importance of continuing China’s military modernization and urged the Party to “accelerate the revolution in military affairs with PLA characteristics [and] ensure preparations for military struggles….” . Hu’s speech also included an offer to hold consultations with Taiwan, based on Beijing’s One China principle, toward “reaching a peace agreement.” Taiwan President Chen Shuibian rejected the offer. Military Power of the People’s Republic of China 中國(guó)最大管理資源中心 第 17 頁(yè) 共 120 頁(yè) . In an August 2020 speech celebrating the 80th anniversary of the founding of the PLA, President Hu called for accelerating the modernization of weapons and equipment, enhancing personnel training, and strengthening bat skills through “ coordinated development between national defense building and economic construction.” China began to use this language in the late 1990s, reflecting the CCP’s strategy of balancing economic growth and military modernization, as opposed to privileging one over the other. . In December 2020, China announced the elevation of Hainan Province’s Xisha Islands office to a countylevel office named “Sansha City,” which would hold administrative jurisdiction over the Paracel and Spratly island groups, and Macclesfield Bank – claims disputed by Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan, and Vietnam. A PRC spokesperson asserted that China has “indisputable sovereignty” and effective jurisdiction over the islands of the South China Sea “and the adjacent waterways.” In reaction to China’s declaration, hundreds of Vietnamese protesters demonstrated outside the Chinese embassy in Hanoi. Developments in China’s Military Forces China’s longterm, prehensive transformation