【正文】 前面部分說(shuō)明 ,對(duì) FVA 的討論充滿爭(zhēng)議 ,這些爭(zhēng)議不會(huì)耽誤進(jìn)一 步審查，但需要更多的經(jīng)濟(jì)分析。 第二個(gè)問(wèn)題是可能會(huì)引起法律風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。國(guó)際貨幣基金組織 ,2020)披露，這種差距遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)貸款價(jià)值與 銀行公允價(jià)值。 許多人質(zhì)疑，可觀察輸入 (即 1 級(jí)和 2 級(jí) )FAS 157 中的重點(diǎn)和現(xiàn)存的 SEC 指導(dǎo)讓 公司 很難 偏離市場(chǎng)價(jià)格 ,即使這些價(jià)格低于基本面或引起傳染效應(yīng) (如Bigman 沃利森 2020,德斯蒙德 ,2020)。事實(shí)上 ,Et al(2020)對(duì) HCA的問(wèn)題相當(dāng)明確。這樣的調(diào)整已經(jīng)存在。為了達(dá)到有序交易的價(jià)格標(biāo)準(zhǔn) (如國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則委員會(huì)專家咨詢委員會(huì)2020)，實(shí)體必須對(duì)可視價(jià)格作出重大調(diào)整?！霸诨钴S市場(chǎng)，當(dāng)報(bào)價(jià)相同資產(chǎn)或負(fù)債是可用的 ,他們必須被用作衡量公平價(jià)值 (一級(jí)輸入 )。根據(jù)現(xiàn)有的經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù) , 在當(dāng)前的情況下很難確定 FVA 的角色和作用。例如 ,管理者可以使用偏離值 ,以避免市場(chǎng)蕭條和減值損失。但 FVA 在美國(guó) GAAP 和 IFRS 并不適用。首先 , 爭(zhēng)議主要是由關(guān)于什么是新的、不同的 FVA 的困惑以及 FVA 的最終目的導(dǎo)致的。 關(guān)鍵詞 :市值計(jì)價(jià)；公允價(jià)值會(huì)計(jì)；金融機(jī)構(gòu)；流動(dòng)性；金融危機(jī)；銀行；順周期循環(huán) 引言 最近的金融危機(jī)已 經(jīng)把焦點(diǎn)集中在公允價(jià)值會(huì)計(jì) (FVA),并導(dǎo)致了關(guān)于政策制定的一些爭(zhēng)論，這些政策主要涉及美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì) ,歐洲委員會(huì)以及銀行和會(huì)計(jì)世界各地的監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)。這個(gè)辯論給 FVA 的發(fā)展和努力把 FVA 延伸到其他領(lǐng)域的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)制定者帶來(lái)非常大的挑戰(zhàn)。 Szeg246。 Goldman Sachs, 2020。 畢 業(yè) 設(shè) 計(jì)（論 文） 外 文 參 考 資 料 及 譯 文 譯文題目： 公允價(jià)值會(huì)計(jì)的危機(jī) : 正確理解最近的辯論 學(xué)生姓名： 學(xué) 號(hào)： 專 業(yè)： 會(huì)計(jì)學(xué) 所在學(xué)院： 商學(xué)院 指導(dǎo)教師： 職 稱： 講師 2020 年 3 月 10 日 The Crisis of Fair Value Accounting: Making Sense of the Recent Debate* Christian Laux GoetheUniversity Frankfurt and Christian Leuz The University of Chicago Booth School of Business amp。 IMF, 2020).16 While this expected feature of secondbest standards is one explanation for the criticism of FVA during the crisis, it is clearly also possible that extant rules and guidance are too restrictive (even from a secondbest perspective) and that we would have been better off giving managers more flexibility in the is in essence the view that the House Financial Services Committee adopted in a hearing on MTM accounting rules on March 12, 2020. As a result of this political pressure, the FASB relaxed the conditions for moving assets into Level 3 in April 2020. Moreover, the financial statements of . banks for fiscal 2020 show that banks have been able to move assets into the Level 3 Category as the financial crisis unfolded, so it was clearly not impossible to move to models (see also IMF, 2020). But it is of course possible that banks did not move enough assets into the Level 3 category to prevent contagion effects. In the end, we need more research on this A second implementation problem may arise from litigation risk. Deviations from market prices under existing FVA standards require substantial judgement by the preparers and the auditors. However, managers, directors and auditors face severe litigation risks as well as substantial legal penalties, including prison terms, which recently have been increased by the SarbanesOxley Act of 2020. In this environment, managers, directors, and auditors are likely to weigh the personal costs and risks associated with deviations from market prices differently than investors. For example, it is conceivable that a manager is reluctant to use an appropriate model based fair value that is higher than an observable price from a very illiquid market, especially when there is substantial downside risk for the economy or the firm, as there typically is in financial crises. From a litigation risk perspective, guidance as to when deviations are appropriate is likely to play an important role, especially in litigious environments and when enforcement is strong. Thus, it is possible that, once we recognize the litigation aspect, improvements in the standards’ implementation were (and perhaps are still) needed. However, as litigation serves as an important enforcement mechanism, there are tradeoffs as we highlighted earlier in this section for SEC enforcement. This second implementation problem also highlights that it is important to evaluate accounting standards within the context of the institutional environment in which they Conclusion and suggestions for future research The preceding sections illustrate that the debate about FVA is full of arguments that do not hold up to further scrutiny and need more economic analysis. Moreover, it is important to recognize that standard setters face tradeoffs, and in this regard FVA is no exception. One example is the tradeoff between relevance and reliability, which is at the heart of the debate of when to deviate from market prices in determining fair values. Another example is that FVA recognizes losses early thereby forcing banks to take appropriate measures early and making it more difficult to hide potential problems that only grow larger and would make crises more severe. But this benefit gives rise to another set of tradeoffs. First, FVA introduces volatility in the financial statement in “normal times” (when prompt action is not needed). Second, full FVA can give rise to contagion effects in times of crisis, which need to be addressed – be it in the accounting system or with prudential regulation. In our view, it may be better to design prudential regulation that accepts FVA as a starting point but sets explicit countercyclical capital requirements than to implicitly address the issue of financial stability in the accounting system by using historical costs. It is an illusion to believe that ignoring market prices or current information provides a foundation for a more solid banking system. But we admit that the tradeoff between transparency and financial stability as well as the interactions between accounting and prudential regulation needs further analysis (see also Landsman, 2020). A related issue is the question of how investors respond to additional disclosures that firms provide in times of crisis. There are a few studies that examine firms’ responses to transparency crises and their economic consequences (., Leuz and Schrand, 2020). The current crisis provides an interesting setting to further explore these issues further. An analysis of European banks’ annual r