【正文】 2020, Airbus pushed back the launch of the new aircraft three times, ultimately leading to the departure of its CEO and a projected earnings shortfall of more than 4 billion euros. Iridium, a pany backed by Motorola, experienced an infamous failure related to operational risk. The highprofile satellite phone venture was launched in late 1998 with widespread media coverage, yet it failed within a year. The pany was not able to get enough satellites in orbit quickly enough, causing customer demand to fall far below expectations. These stories illustrate some key points about risk from a manager39。中文 6259 字 外文資料翻譯 Why the Mindset Matters More Than the Model. Peter Bernstein Forecasting used to be straightforward. Over the years, by the end of the first quarter, managers usually had a fairly reliable sense of how the business was shaping up and whether targets would be met, missed or exceeded. Confidence in quarterly and annual predictions was so high that ing in above or below by even the smallest amount was considered a surprise and set off moves in stock prices. This year, however, things have cha nged. Companies like Unilever, Union Pacific and Visteon are declining to make any predictions at all for their performance over the months ahead. In other words, all bets are off. According to pany reports, the problem is not that these firms are reluctant to provide a gloomy outlook. Instead, the panies say they just don39。s perspective. The first is that traders, economists and academics think about risk very differently than do most business managers. For the former, the key issue in risk is variance the expected spread of possible outes. But that is not how managers think about it. For them, the biggest issue in risk is the potential for loss. As a result, they ask, What39。s existing position or investments and analyzing what could go wrong. However, organizations need to look beyond the boundaries of the firm and consider what is happening elsewhere. In recent years, businesses around the globe have bee increasingly interdependent, which brings great benefits in both efficiency and innovation but also increases panies39。ve understood the underlying factors, when really we39。s MichelKerjan shares the sentiment. We have to be careful not all the models were bad. What we are really seeing now is a need to integrate decisionmaking processes into the evaluation. These things are not at the margin。換句話說，一切預(yù)測都是徒勞的。然而，正如媒體廣泛披露的，其中的很多模型并沒能準(zhǔn)確預(yù)測到目前這場全球性經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)，也沒能讓公司為這場危機(jī)做好準(zhǔn)備，現(xiàn)在，華爾街正在為完善這些系統(tǒng)付出巨大的努力。 ” 賀林談到，在很多公司中，高管都需要明白，當(dāng)驅(qū)動某一模型運(yùn)轉(zhuǎn)的假定條件發(fā)生變化以后會發(fā)生什么情況，隨后，應(yīng)該將這些可能出現(xiàn)的情況告知董事會。有些銀行面臨的風(fēng)險比它們自己想象的要大得多，而其他大部分銀行則根本不清楚自己面臨的風(fēng)險如何，它們無法自信地評估自己以及其他機(jī)構(gòu)的金融資產(chǎn)狀況。另一個例子是，得到摩托羅拉公司支持的銥星系統(tǒng)公司（摩托羅拉公司于 1987 年提出的低軌全球個人衛(wèi)星移動通信系統(tǒng)，與現(xiàn)有通信網(wǎng)結(jié)合，可實現(xiàn)全球數(shù)字化個人通信。對他們來說，最大的風(fēng)險是損失。周全考慮每一種風(fēng)險的技能都各不相同，但是除非你對風(fēng)險擁有全面認(rèn)識的能力，否則，你就會遇到大麻煩。因為情況變化得越來越快了，所以，我們也需要更快做出決定，但是，往往沒有可供我們依據(jù)的信息。 “ 因為知道風(fēng)險的歷史狀況，所以，我們會據(jù)此做出投資決策。 “ 不是 25 個環(huán)節(jié)，而是他們認(rèn)為很重要但公司尚未察覺的三個環(huán)節(jié)。 達(dá)能公司負(fù)責(zé)風(fēng)險管理、控制和審計的副總裁菲利普 同時，我們將繼續(xù)依靠全球所有重要企業(yè)風(fēng)險狀況的年度更新數(shù)據(jù)。實質(zhì)上的獨立是指內(nèi)部審計人員在精 神上必須保持必要的獨立性，應(yīng)以公正的態(tài)度，避免利益沖突，在開展內(nèi)部審計工作時，保持誠實的信念，遵守職業(yè)道德準(zhǔn)則，在整個審計過程中不做出重大的妥協(xié)。 “ 我要告誡公司高管們，不要仰賴因其外表頗具迷惑性而極具吸引力的模型。 如果操作得當(dāng)，針對特定公司的評估同樣很有效。我們知道，這個過程不可能成功預(yù)測到所有可能發(fā)生的風(fēng)險，但是，我們當(dāng)然希望自己能成功控制住重大的風(fēng)險。 ” 所以，針對風(fēng)險管理的新思考最終成了更具戰(zhàn)略意義的討論，并將風(fēng)險管理經(jīng)理塑造成了戰(zhàn)略家，反之，戰(zhàn)略家也被轉(zhuǎn)變成了風(fēng)險管理者。 “我們必須小心謹(jǐn)慎 ——并不是所有的模型都很糟糕。這些并不是邊邊角角的工作，它們就是中心所在。 ” 羅森茲維格談到。 “ 不言而喻的最重大主題就是 收益問題，以及某個行業(yè)收益的傾斜度問題。 海遜，基于自己在公司總部以及在各種地區(qū) ——比如，阿爾及利亞、阿塞拜疆、印尼、利比亞和越南等地 —— 運(yùn)營地方企業(yè)的經(jīng)驗，為我們提供了佐證。這就是我稱之為 ‘ 規(guī)范化研究的幻覺 ’ 的現(xiàn)象 —— 如果數(shù)據(jù)的數(shù)量給人以深刻的印象，那么，我們就會忘記，它們的潛在質(zhì)量可能很糟糕。 伯恩斯坦預(yù)測了很多公司今天所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。審計規(guī)范是審計人員的行為規(guī)范和工作準(zhǔn)則，不僅可以控制和減少審計風(fēng)險，而且也是衡量審計人員法律責(zé)任的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。他談到，盡管企業(yè)仍在利用規(guī)模很小的一組模型評估某些風(fēng)險，不過， “ 我們很少使用數(shù)學(xué)模型。 ” 此外，新技術(shù)和新工藝現(xiàn)在正在不斷涌現(xiàn)。通常情 況下，我們會關(guān)注已知的結(jié)果，之后，以事件發(fā)生的可能性為一個軸，以事件所產(chǎn)生的影響為另一個軸，做出一個完美的圖表，這就是 ‘ 風(fēng)險管理 版本 ’ 。 ” 為了解決這一難題，米歇爾 克嘉看到，有些公司已經(jīng)超越了傳統(tǒng)的風(fēng)險管理策略，那些策略主要專注于內(nèi)部風(fēng)險，這種管理方式可稱為 “ 風(fēng)險管理 版 ” ，從本質(zhì)上說，它關(guān)注公司的現(xiàn)有地位或者現(xiàn)有的投資，并對可能出現(xiàn)的問題進(jìn)行分析。的確，從經(jīng)濟(jì)角度而言，所有企業(yè)從根本上說都在根據(jù)自己的核心能力承擔(dān)風(fēng)險。 第二個關(guān)鍵點在于，風(fēng)險管理并沒有靈丹妙藥。這個備受矚目的衛(wèi)星電話機(jī)構(gòu)成立于 1998 年年末，媒體給予了連篇累牘的報道，然而，還不到一年，這個公司就失敗了。比如，本月早些時候，美國的食品業(yè)巨頭嘉吉公司就遭受了人們通常稱之為 “ 主權(quán)風(fēng)險 ” （也稱為 “ 國家主權(quán)風(fēng)險 ” ，指一個國家的政府由于政策 改變而不能履行合約的風(fēng)險。固有風(fēng)險是指在假定與內(nèi)部會計控制無關(guān)的情況下，被審計單位整體財務(wù)報表和各賬戶余 額或某項業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)生重大差錯的可能性，即由于被審計單位經(jīng)濟(jì)業(yè)務(wù)的特點和會計核算工作本身的不足而形成的審計風(fēng)險。因此，對公司來說，目前這場危機(jī)也提供了對過去的風(fēng)險管理手段重新考察的機(jī)會。這就意味著有越來越多的經(jīng)理不愿意就企業(yè)的未來做出判斷并據(jù)此付諸行動了，至少暫時如此。t think about [them] and integrate [them] with the strategic decision process, you don39。s what I call the Delusion of Rigorous Research if the quantity of data is impressive, we forget the underlying quality may be bad. On the other hand, welldesigned efforts to look ahead even three to five years can be stunningly prescient. Consider the annual Global Risks Report, published by the World Economic Forum in cooperation with Citigroup, Marsh amp。t even know about. Indeed, it is the systemic nature of the current crisis and how widespread the impact has been that caught most people by surprise. We were trained to solve problems with clear questions and clear scientific knowledge, says MichelKerjan. Knowing the historic risk profile, we made investment decisions. But historic data does not shape the future anymore, given how rapidly the world is changing. We usually look at the known issues and make a nice diagram with probability on one axis and impact on the other. That39。s Herring. But what we have found is that major shocks and problems do not e that way. For instance, in the financial world, you would see trad