【正文】 2020, Airbus pushed back the launch of the new aircraft three times, ultimately leading to the departure of its CEO and a projected earnings shortfall of more than 4 billion euros. Iridium, a pany backed by Motorola, experienced an infamous failure related to operational risk. The highprofile satellite phone venture was launched in late 1998 with widespread media coverage, yet it failed within a year. The pany was not able to get enough satellites in orbit quickly enough, causing customer demand to fall far below expectations. These stories illustrate some key points about risk from a manager39。中文 6259 字 外文資料翻譯 Why the Mindset Matters More Than the Model. Peter Bernstein Forecasting used to be straightforward. Over the years, by the end of the first quarter, managers usually had a fairly reliable sense of how the business was shaping up and whether targets would be met, missed or exceeded. Confidence in quarterly and annual predictions was so high that ing in above or below by even the smallest amount was considered a surprise and set off moves in stock prices. This year, however, things have cha nged. Companies like Unilever, Union Pacific and Visteon are declining to make any predictions at all for their performance over the months ahead. In other words, all bets are off. According to pany reports, the problem is not that these firms are reluctant to provide a gloomy outlook. Instead, the panies say they just don39。s perspective. The first is that traders, economists and academics think about risk very differently than do most business managers. For the former, the key issue in risk is variance the expected spread of possible outes. But that is not how managers think about it. For them, the biggest issue in risk is the potential for loss. As a result, they ask, What39。s existing position or investments and analyzing what could go wrong. However, organizations need to look beyond the boundaries of the firm and consider what is happening elsewhere. In recent years, businesses around the globe have bee increasingly interdependent, which brings great benefits in both efficiency and innovation but also increases panies39。ve understood the underlying factors, when really we39。s MichelKerjan shares the sentiment. We have to be careful not all the models were bad. What we are really seeing now is a need to integrate decisionmaking processes into the evaluation. These things are not at the margin。換句話說，一切預測都是徒勞的。然而，正如媒體廣泛披露的，其中的很多模型并沒能準確預測到目前這場全球性經濟危機，也沒能讓公司為這場危機做好準備，現在，華爾街正在為完善這些系統(tǒng)付出巨大的努力。 ” 賀林談到，在很多公司中，高管都需要明白，當驅動某一模型運轉的假定條件發(fā)生變化以后會發(fā)生什么情況，隨后，應該將這些可能出現的情況告知董事會。有些銀行面臨的風險比它們自己想象的要大得多，而其他大部分銀行則根本不清楚自己面臨的風險如何，它們無法自信地評估自己以及其他機構的金融資產狀況。另一個例子是，得到摩托羅拉公司支持的銥星系統(tǒng)公司（摩托羅拉公司于 1987 年提出的低軌全球個人衛(wèi)星移動通信系統(tǒng)，與現有通信網結合，可實現全球數字化個人通信。對他們來說，最大的風險是損失。周全考慮每一種風險的技能都各不相同，但是除非你對風險擁有全面認識的能力，否則，你就會遇到大麻煩。因為情況變化得越來越快了，所以，我們也需要更快做出決定，但是，往往沒有可供我們依據的信息。 “ 因為知道風險的歷史狀況，所以，我們會據此做出投資決策。 “ 不是 25 個環(huán)節(jié)，而是他們認為很重要但公司尚未察覺的三個環(huán)節(jié)。 達能公司負責風險管理、控制和審計的副總裁菲利普 同時，我們將繼續(xù)依靠全球所有重要企業(yè)風險狀況的年度更新數據。實質上的獨立是指內部審計人員在精 神上必須保持必要的獨立性，應以公正的態(tài)度，避免利益沖突，在開展內部審計工作時，保持誠實的信念，遵守職業(yè)道德準則，在整個審計過程中不做出重大的妥協。 “ 我要告誡公司高管們，不要仰賴因其外表頗具迷惑性而極具吸引力的模型。 如果操作得當，針對特定公司的評估同樣很有效。我們知道，這個過程不可能成功預測到所有可能發(fā)生的風險，但是，我們當然希望自己能成功控制住重大的風險。 ” 所以，針對風險管理的新思考最終成了更具戰(zhàn)略意義的討論，并將風險管理經理塑造成了戰(zhàn)略家，反之，戰(zhàn)略家也被轉變成了風險管理者。 “我們必須小心謹慎 ——并不是所有的模型都很糟糕。這些并不是邊邊角角的工作，它們就是中心所在。 ” 羅森茲維格談到。 “ 不言而喻的最重大主題就是 收益問題，以及某個行業(yè)收益的傾斜度問題。 海遜，基于自己在公司總部以及在各種地區(qū) ——比如，阿爾及利亞、阿塞拜疆、印尼、利比亞和越南等地 —— 運營地方企業(yè)的經驗，為我們提供了佐證。這就是我稱之為 ‘ 規(guī)范化研究的幻覺 ’ 的現象 —— 如果數據的數量給人以深刻的印象，那么，我們就會忘記，它們的潛在質量可能很糟糕。 伯恩斯坦預測了很多公司今天所面臨的挑戰(zhàn)。審計規(guī)范是審計人員的行為規(guī)范和工作準則，不僅可以控制和減少審計風險，而且也是衡量審計人員法律責任的標準。他談到，盡管企業(yè)仍在利用規(guī)模很小的一組模型評估某些風險，不過， “ 我們很少使用數學模型。 ” 此外，新技術和新工藝現在正在不斷涌現。通常情 況下，我們會關注已知的結果，之后，以事件發(fā)生的可能性為一個軸，以事件所產生的影響為另一個軸，做出一個完美的圖表，這就是 ‘ 風險管理 版本 ’ 。 ” 為了解決這一難題，米歇爾 克嘉看到，有些公司已經超越了傳統(tǒng)的風險管理策略，那些策略主要專注于內部風險，這種管理方式可稱為 “ 風險管理 版 ” ，從本質上說，它關注公司的現有地位或者現有的投資，并對可能出現的問題進行分析。的確，從經濟角度而言，所有企業(yè)從根本上說都在根據自己的核心能力承擔風險。 第二個關鍵點在于，風險管理并沒有靈丹妙藥。這個備受矚目的衛(wèi)星電話機構成立于 1998 年年末，媒體給予了連篇累牘的報道，然而，還不到一年，這個公司就失敗了。比如，本月早些時候，美國的食品業(yè)巨頭嘉吉公司就遭受了人們通常稱之為 “ 主權風險 ” （也稱為 “ 國家主權風險 ” ，指一個國家的政府由于政策 改變而不能履行合約的風險。固有風險是指在假定與內部會計控制無關的情況下，被審計單位整體財務報表和各賬戶余 額或某項業(yè)務發(fā)生重大差錯的可能性，即由于被審計單位經濟業(yè)務的特點和會計核算工作本身的不足而形成的審計風險。因此，對公司來說，目前這場危機也提供了對過去的風險管理手段重新考察的機會。這就意味著有越來越多的經理不愿意就企業(yè)的未來做出判斷并據此付諸行動了，至少暫時如此。t think about [them] and integrate [them] with the strategic decision process, you don39。s what I call the Delusion of Rigorous Research if the quantity of data is impressive, we forget the underlying quality may be bad. On the other hand, welldesigned efforts to look ahead even three to five years can be stunningly prescient. Consider the annual Global Risks Report, published by the World Economic Forum in cooperation with Citigroup, Marsh amp。t even know about. Indeed, it is the systemic nature of the current crisis and how widespread the impact has been that caught most people by surprise. We were trained to solve problems with clear questions and clear scientific knowledge, says MichelKerjan. Knowing the historic risk profile, we made investment decisions. But historic data does not shape the future anymore, given how rapidly the world is changing. We usually look at the known issues and make a nice diagram with probability on one axis and impact on the other. That39。s Herring. But what we have found is that major shocks and problems do not e that way. For instance, in the financial world, you would see trad