【正文】 nor explained: “the phrase ?acting in their official capacity? is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury”. “State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not ?persons? for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that employs them”. By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity e to court as individuals. As we discussed in chapter 2, when the public servant is sued in his personal capacity, he has a right to assert the defense of qualified immunity. When he is sued in an official capacity, however, he cannot assert the defense of qualified immunity. As the Supreme Court in Owen v. City of Independence explained, a damages claim against a public official in the official capacity is essentially the claim against his government employer. Since Monell already held that under 167。 it is the act of an agent representing the principal. The public servant, as an agent, carries out the official edict of the government he represents. To the extent that the edict has caused a constitutional tort, the tortious conduct will be imputed to the entity that issued it, although under some circumstances the public servant who implemented it may also be held liable. In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court made this distinction sharply in the context of damages law suits. Personalcapacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Officialcapacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an officialcapacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official?s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an officialcapacity suit must look to the government entity itself. Distinction between officialcapacity and personalcapacity conduct An examination of 167。 1983 does not apply to state officials in their official capacity。在參觀專門為美國(guó)憲法 設(shè)立的博物館的過(guò)程中他們可以得到些什么？憲法與公共管理又有什么關(guān)系呢 ？美國(guó)人事辦公室總監(jiān)凱科爾斯詹姆斯給出了 這樣一個(gè)簡(jiǎn)短的答案： 對(duì)管理人員的訪問(wèn)是一個(gè)更為廣大計(jì)劃的 其中 一部分，它使聯(lián)邦雇員 堅(jiān)持著 “提高認(rèn)識(shí)和尊重”的誓言。憲法規(guī)定了公務(wù)員 與客戶、消費(fèi)者、下屬員工、囚犯、僅限于公共精神衛(wèi)生設(shè)施的病患、 承包商 等的往來(lái)。這本書的第一、二部分提供 了分析和必要 信息去了解憲 法法律如何影響一個(gè)合理公務(wù)員的工作表現(xiàn)。在很大意義上說(shuō)，宣誓是在道德和法律上做出了 承諾，公務(wù)員都要在憲法條款范圍內(nèi)進(jìn)行公共事務(wù)的行為。這一部分是由于主權(quán)豁免的普通法原則，也有一部分是由于一些具體的，授權(quán) 的 立法的缺失。在現(xiàn)實(shí)世界里，個(gè)人與官方的界限往往是模糊的并且經(jīng)常在法庭上被爭(zhēng)議。然而，對(duì)于公共服務(wù)和自我保護(hù)的利益，在哈洛訴杰拉德的案件中建立的普通法原則已經(jīng)給公務(wù)員提供權(quán)利去主張 有限制的豁免權(quán)的防御 。這不 是針對(duì)官員個(gè)人 的訴訟，因?yàn)?真正 處于利益關(guān) 系中 的政黨是一個(gè)實(shí)體。在賓夕法尼亞州審計(jì)長(zhǎng)的辦公室的若干雇員控告了新當(dāng)選為賓夕法尼亞州國(guó)家審核員的芭芭拉哈，在 1983 年訴訟中，她以個(gè)人身份終止了他們的事務(wù)， 這個(gè)行為違反了第十四條修正案 。 最高法院法官奧康納提出一個(gè)一致的意見(jiàn)（法官托馬斯沒(méi)參加），“ 1983 年國(guó)會(huì)頒布法律去執(zhí)行第十四修正案的規(guī)定，針對(duì)那些持有國(guó)家權(quán)威徽章并且代表某一種身份的人，無(wú)論他 做了權(quán)責(zé)范圍內(nèi)的事 或是濫用了權(quán)力”，并確定 下來(lái) 哈弗的行動(dòng)代表了“個(gè)人的”在國(guó)家的法律色彩下的權(quán)威的濫用。 出處：李永學(xué)，戴維 G 正如我們之前我們討論的，當(dāng)公務(wù)員以他的個(gè)人身份被起訴，他有權(quán)利主張有 限制的豁免權(quán)的 防御。 員工以哈弗的個(gè)人身份起訴了她，尋求她的補(bǔ)償，而不是國(guó)家的補(bǔ)償。判例法已經(jīng)確定，對(duì)一個(gè)公務(wù)員的官方身份的訴訟在本質(zhì)上和對(duì)他所代理的政府雇主的訴訟是一樣的。在肯塔基訴格雷厄姆的案件中，最高法院使這種區(qū)別在損害賠償?shù)姆稍V訟中更急劇地體現(xiàn)出來(lái)。官方 身份行為 是公務(wù)員作為代理人或者主要代表 的行為 ，即政府所期望的行為。官員問(wèn)責(zé)制適用于當(dāng)一個(gè)公務(wù)員扮演代理人，即政府的角色時(shí)， 造成了個(gè)人憲法權(quán)利的剝 奪。 個(gè)人責(zé)任 在美國(guó)，所有 被 選舉的或者任命的公務(wù)員進(jìn)入公共服務(wù)領(lǐng)域都 要宣誓 他們將維護(hù)美國(guó)的憲法。一個(gè)自然的推論是，由于憲法法律在公共服務(wù)中起著重要的作用，所以制定法律的法官也有著同等的重要性。今天，憲法全面規(guī)定著美國(guó)政府的公共服務(wù)。 1983 liability. In an unanimous opinion (with Justice Thomas not participating) the Supreme Court, per Justice O?Connor, observed that “Congress enacted 167。 public servants must know it to be petent employees. A corollary is that because constitutional law plays a major role in the public service, so do the judges who make that law. Achieving pete