【正文】 defense of qualified immunity. The officialcapacity conduct is different。 it is the act of an agent representing the principal. The public servant, as an agent, carries out the official edict of the government he represents. To the extent that the edict has caused a constitutional tort, the tortious conduct will be imputed to the entity that issued it, although under some circumstances the public servant who implemented it may also be held liable. In Kentucky v. Graham, the Supreme Court made this distinction sharply in the context of damages law suits. Personalcapacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government official for actions he takes under color of state law. Officialcapacity suits, in contrast, generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an officialcapacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is not a suit against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity. Thus, while an award of damages against an official in his personal capacity can be executed only against the official?s personal assets, a plaintiff seeking to recover on a damages judgment in an officialcapacity suit must look to the government entity itself. Distinction between officialcapacity and personalcapacity conduct An examination of 167。 but it applies to them in personal capacity. The Court was more explicit about this point in Hafer: “The Eleventh Amendment does not bar personalcapacity suits under 167。 1983 to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it”, and determined that Hafer?s action represented a “personal” abuse of authority under color of state law. To eliminate any lingering ambiguity between official and personalcapacity suits, O?Connor explained: “the phrase ?acting in their official capacity? is best understood as a reference to the capacity in which the state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts the alleged injury”. “State officers sued for damages in their official capacity are not ?persons? for purposes of the suit because they assume the identity of the government that employs them”. By contrast, officers sued in their personal capacity e to court as individuals. As we discussed in chapter 2, when the public servant is sued in his personal capacity, he has a right to assert the defense of qualified immunity. When he is sued in an official capacity, however, he cannot assert the defense of qualified immunity. As the Supreme Court in Owen v. City of Independence explained, a damages claim against a public official in the official capacity is essentially the claim against his government employer. Since Monell already held that under 167。 具體點(diǎn)的 答案就是 ： 今天“一個(gè) 有合理能力的 ”公務(wù)員“應(yīng)該知道控制他或她行為的法律”。 就像 詹姆斯 所認(rèn)為的 ，公務(wù)員在 進(jìn)行 決策或采取其它行為的時(shí)候應(yīng)遵循憲法。與此相反，憲法并沒(méi)有涉及 到 純粹的私人關(guān)系和活動(dòng)，除了 1）禁止奴 隸制和強(qiáng)迫勞逸（第十三修訂） 2）限制了一類有限的私人實(shí)體的行為，這些實(shí)體被認(rèn)為是為憲法目的而活動(dòng)的國(guó)家（“政府”）人。 實(shí)現(xiàn)在憲法方面公共服務(wù)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力至少需要 兩種類型的具有意義的研究和努力。他們解釋了公務(wù)員及其 雇主 因違反個(gè)人憲法權(quán)利的潛在責(zé)任，也說(shuō)明了憲法程序 的正當(dāng)進(jìn)程，自由言論 ，隱私以及平等保護(hù)等所要求的 。宣誓是一種 作出承諾的行為。 任何保證的底線是“損害賠償或全無(wú)”。 快速回到 今天，法院意識(shí)到一個(gè)針對(duì)當(dāng)?shù)卣?機(jī)構(gòu)無(wú)限制的損害賠償行為 的原因 以及針對(duì)聯(lián)邦和各州政府行為的 有限制的損害賠償行為的原因。根據(jù)上級(jí)答辯責(zé)任原則，代理人的侵權(quán)行為可替代地歸罪于他代表的當(dāng)事人 ?，F(xiàn)在看來(lái)足以指出，通過(guò)成文法和普通法的傳統(tǒng)，個(gè)人及官員問(wèn)責(zé)制是屬于不同流派的，并且需要單獨(dú)分析。個(gè)人 身份行為與 官方 身份 行為之間的區(qū)別（盡管不容易做出區(qū)分）對(duì)法律責(zé)任的研究至關(guān)重要。 官方 身份 行為是不一樣的，它是代表 當(dāng)事人的 代理人的行為。 個(gè)人 身份 訴訟尋求將個(gè)人責(zé)任強(qiáng)加給那些根據(jù)國(guó)家法律的色彩而 采取 行動(dòng)的政府官員。因此，當(dāng)一個(gè)官員以個(gè)人身份作出損害賠償，執(zhí)行判決時(shí)只可以針對(duì)官員的個(gè)人財(cái)產(chǎn) ，一個(gè)尋求在官方 身份 訴訟賠償判決中恢復(fù)的原告必須期待政府實(shí)體本身。由于 對(duì)官 方身份的訴訟不是針對(duì)個(gè)人的，而是針對(duì)一個(gè)可能承擔(dān)了對(duì)他前任的 訴訟的 某個(gè)職位身份 ，一個(gè)當(dāng)?shù)氐恼畬?shí)體也許逃避不了責(zé)任只因?yàn)樵谶@個(gè)職位上的承租人已經(jīng)改變了。哈弗一旦贏得了選舉就解雇了員工，因?yàn)榫拖袼暶鞯模麄円呀?jīng)通過(guò)政治贊助促成了他們的就業(yè)。另一方面，哈弗為她的行動(dòng)辯護(hù)，她聲稱她的決定是“官方”性質(zhì)的，而第十一修正案禁止了