【正文】 the issue of dividends, empirical researchers of dividend policy often use Jensen’s article for motivating tests of the free cash flow hypothesis of dividend empirical evidence on the three hypotheses are mixed, as we observe in Table I. Dividend policy thus continues to remain a puzzle. We can however enumerate some interesting stylized facts. In Table II we pile the stylized facts as they emerge from a study of the empirical literature. 5. Conclusion We have seen that the empirical evidence is equivocal about the existing theories of dividend policy. Research has discovered a large number of stylized facts but the explanation of dividend policy in an integrated framework still eludes us. In his PhD dissertation, Bhattacharyya (2020) explains dividend policy by using the asymmetric information paradigm. However, unlike the signalling models (where the informed manager/insider uses the dividend as a signalling device), he posits dividend policy as a ponent of a screening contract set up by an uninformed principal. In signalling models, hidden information is the source of informational asymmetry. In the dissertation, he uses a richer source of informational asymmetry – that due to moral hazard (because the effort exerted by agent is not observable) and that due to hidden information (because the productivity of agent is not observable). He assumes that the manager wants to maximize his wealth and the principal recognizes this a nd sets up a discriminating contract to utilize the skill of the agent in the productive enterprise. He finds that contrary to the findings of the dividend models based on the signalling paradigm, dividend – conditional on cash availability – bears an inverse relationship to managerial type. That is, for a given level of available cash, the manager with lower productivity declares a higher dividend than that declared by a manager with higher productivity. He concludes that his model can be used to explain many of the empirical findings obtained by other researchers. An interesting corollary of his model is that when we include costly private effort and differences in productivity, the relationship between dividend and managerial type shifts from being monotone increasing to monotone decreasing. This relationship shows that incorporation of costly effort and difference in productivity modify the result (Miller and Rock, 1985) obtained. Miller and Rock study a model which does not include managerial effort. Another interesting implication of this dissertation is that dividends can be shown to be relevant in the presence of moral hazard and hidden information, even when the agency contract is optimally chosen. The free cash flow conjecture posits that higher dividends are better because higher dividend removes free cash from the hands of the managers。 艾倫和邁克爾（ 1995） 的結(jié)論是 “在達成一致意見前，進行更多的有關(guān)股利分配主題的實證和理論研究是必需的”。 2 、股 息和稅收的客戶群無關(guān) 有關(guān)于描述 股息 的文章有 林特納（ 1956） 所提供的 ，該 領(lǐng)域 股利理論模型幾乎可以肯定 的 是米勒和 莫迪里阿尼（ 1961）的經(jīng)典論文，但 其中 也 首次提出了股利無關(guān) 理論 。 這一特定的偏愛紅利可以確定 ,邊際稅率所面臨的投資者。 米勒和斯科爾斯表明 ,適量借款利息總額可以抵作的股利收益在某種程度上 使 應(yīng)納稅所得額減少到零。 客戶稅假說使用的是不完善的市場微分紅利課稅和資本收益來解釋股息難題。股息仍然是無關(guān)的 ,從這個意義 上 來說 ,兩公司類型能夠提高額外的 X 美元 ,一個新問題 是 支付額外的 X 美金作為股息 是 沒有信號的效果。 在約翰和威廉姆斯 （ 1985）， 和 威廉斯 （ 1988）， 鑒別稅務(wù)股利分配與資本收益扶持信號均衡 。 布倫南 和 賽克 （ 1990） 集中在不同問題 上比較其他 信號 類型的 股利政策 文章 。 杰森 (1986)基于委托 代理框架 提出典型的實證文獻試圖測試信號平衡針對一個以 紅利 為 提前 的合理選擇。需要 面 向資本市場 就需要管理人員加強自律 ,從而縮減 監(jiān)控新產(chǎn)品 的 經(jīng)理 的 成本。 結(jié)論 我們已經(jīng)看到 ,利用 實證證據(jù)來對股利政策理論進行解釋 存在模棱兩可的問題。也就是說 ,為了保持一個固定 的可觀的現(xiàn)金 ,管理層會用以降低生產(chǎn)力來宣布更高的宣告股利比管理層 提供 更高的生產(chǎn)率 更好 。 以實證研究來檢驗理論的有效性，適當(dāng)開展研究活動，將實證方面的理論和試驗同時進行，這是完成任務(wù)的有效途徑。 米勒和巖石研究模型 ,不包括管理的效率 。在信號模型 中 , 隱藏 信息來源 造成