【正文】 ing standards can be blamed for causing contagion effects. But it is possible that, in practice or in crises, the standards do not work as intended. Ultimately, this is an empirical question and answering it is beyond the scope of this article. But we can at least raise and discuss two important implementation issues. Many have argued that both the emphasis of FAS 157 on observable inputs (., Level 1 and Level 2) and extant SEC guidance make it very difficult for firms to deviate from market prices, even if these prices are below fundamentals or give rise to contagion effects (., Wallison, 2020a, Bigman and Desmond, 2020). Consistent with these claims, the relevant standards in . GAAP and IFRSas well as guidance for these standards are quite restrictive as to when it is appropriate for managers to deviate from observable market , such restrictions should not be surprising. By allowing deviations from market price in some instances, standard setters face the problem of distinguishing between a situation in which a market price is indeed misleading and a situation in which a manager merely claims that this is so in order to avoid a writedown. Without restrictive guidance, the standards could be easily gamed. There is evidence that managers can be reluctant to take writedowns even when assets are substantially with this concern, current estimates of banks’ loan losses far exceed the writedowns that banks have taken so far and they also exceed the difference between the loans’ carrying values and banks’ fair value disclosures for these loans according to FAS 107 (., Citigroup, 2020。 Magliolo, J. (1995). Managing financial reports of mercial banks: The influence of taxes, regulatory capital and earnings. Journal of Accounting Research33, 231261. Beaver, . (1981). Financial reporting: An accounting revolution. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Benston, G. J. (2020). The shortings of fairvalue accounting described in SFAS 157. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 27, 101114. Berger, ., Herring, ., amp。 Thaler, R. (1985). Does the stock market overreact? The Journal of Finance40, 793805. Disclosure Insight (2020). Comment letter on proposed staff position under FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements, March 25, 2020. ECB (2020). Fair value accounting and financial stability. By ECB staff team led by A. Enria. Occasional Paper Series, No. 13, April 2020. 公允價值會計的危機 :正確理解最近的辯論 作者： Christian Laux and Christian Leuz 出處： Forthing in Accounting, Organizations and Society 摘 要 最近的金融危機已經(jīng)導致了一個關(guān)于公允價值會計的優(yōu)缺點 (FVA)的激烈爭論。最后 ,我們確定幾個未來研究的方向。我們來看下面的四個結(jié)論。此外 ,對其螺旋下降的擔憂是最明顯的 FVA 自身形態(tài)。同時 ,重要的是要認識到 , 在應(yīng)對FVA 潛在的問題 (例如經(jīng)濟危機時期 )時給予管理更大的靈活性可以使操作更方便。 我們從文章中總結(jié)了幾個建議給未來的研究。 FAS 157把公允價值定義為“在測量日期，市場參與者會把價格當做資產(chǎn)出售價格或以有序交易為基礎(chǔ)進行負債轉(zhuǎn)移支付。如果沒有這樣的價格 ,一個實體應(yīng)該使用評估技術(shù)和所有相關(guān)的市場信息，這樣的估值技術(shù)可以最大限度地使用可觀察到的輸入 (IAS 39)。例如 ,它可能會把會計數(shù)字目的調(diào)整為確定監(jiān)管資本。然而 ,他們并沒有說 HCA 更為可取。我們至少可以討論兩個現(xiàn)實的問題。到目前為止，據(jù) FAS 107(例如花旗集團、高盛 2020。最后 , 在這個問題上我們還需要投入更多的研究。然而 ,隨著訴訟成為一種重要的執(zhí)行機制 ,就必須對 SEC 執(zhí)行作權(quán)衡（前面強調(diào)過）。在我們看來 ,設(shè)計一 套接受FVA 審慎監(jiān)管的系統(tǒng)作為起點會更好。 最后 ,重要的是要認識到 ,會計規(guī)則及其變化都受到了政治進程的影響 (就像任何其他規(guī)定 )。 Thaler, R. (2020). A survey of behavioral finance. In . Constantinides, M. Harris, amp。 Palepu, . (1995). Marktomarket accounting for banks and thrifts: Lessons from the Danish experience. Journal of Accounting Research 33, 132. Bigman, D., amp。 Shin, . (2020). Liquidity and leverage. Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports, No. 328. Allen, F., amp。一份由畢馬威 (2020)發(fā)布的歐洲銀行年度報告分析表明 ,在 2020 年 ,銀行增加了金融工具的相關(guān)披露 ,部分實在經(jīng)濟危機初期。首先 ,FVA 在“正常時期” (當不需要立即采取行動 )介紹財務(wù)報表的波動。 從訴訟風險的角度來看 ,在價格偏差合理時期，指導可能扮演重要的角色 ,尤其是在執(zhí)法力度強大的訴訟環(huán)境。 區(qū)別隨著金融危機出現(xiàn) ,顯然這是不可能與模型對應(yīng)的 (參見國際貨幣基金組織 ,2020 年 )。有證據(jù)表明 ,管理者即使大幅受損也不愿意減記資產(chǎn)。但在實踐中存在標準不能按預期工作的可能性。也許這些問題最好留給審慎監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的當事人，做出他們認為合適的相應(yīng)調(diào)整。美國公認會計原則以及最近的 IFRS允許把公允價值資產(chǎn)重新分類到一個 HCA減少損傷測試的應(yīng)用。 公允價值定義，在國際財務(wù)報告準則中資產(chǎn)金額同樣可以交換 ,或解決負債問題。最后在第四節(jié)給出了進一步研究的建議。例如， HCA 會激勵參與所謂的“收益交易”或證券化和出售資產(chǎn)。例如 ,我們指出經(jīng)理人擔心訴訟可能使一個市場價格產(chǎn)生偏差，這一 點不太可能發(fā)生。然而 ,這些問題說成是會計系統(tǒng)的變化并不明顯。 FVA 既無需為經(jīng)濟危機負責，也不僅僅是一個沒有自身經(jīng)濟影響的資產(chǎn)價值報告評估系統(tǒng)。關(guān)于 HCA 也有許多問題 ,這些問題甚至有可能比 FVA更大。 Shin, H. (2020). The fundamental principles of financial regulation. Geneva Reports on the World Economy 11. International Center for Moary and Banking Studies. Geneva, Switzerland. Citigroup (2020). Industry focus: . Banks, Research report by Citigroup Global Markets, March 2, 2020. Credit Suisse (2020). Letter to the SEC, File Number 4573, November 13, 2020. Coval, ., Jurek, ., amp。 R. M. Stulz, Handbook of the Economics of Finance, vol. 1, chapter 18, pages 10531128. North Holland, Amsterdam: Elsevier. Barth, M. (2020). Fair Values and Financial Statement Volatility. In: The Market Discipline Across Countries and Industries, Claudio Borio, William Curt Hunter, George G Kaufman, and Kostas Tsatsaronis (eds). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. Barth, ., Beaver, ., amp。L) crisis, this concern should not be underestimated. Thus, standard setters and enforcement agencies face a delicate tradeoff (., between contagion effects and timely impairment). Fourth, we emphasize that a return to historical cost accounting (HCA) is unlikely to be a remedy to the problems with FVA. HCA has a set of problems as well and it is possible that for 3certain assets they are as severe, or even worse than the problems with FVA. For instance, HCA likely provides incentives engage in so called “gains trading” or to securitize and sell assets. Moreover, lack of transparency under HCA could make matters worse during crises. We conclude our article with several suggestions for future research. Based on extant empirical evidence, it is difficult to evaluate the role of FVA in the current crisis. In particular, we need more work on the question of whether market prices significantly deviated from fundamental values during this crisis and more evidence that FVA did have an eff