房地產(chǎn)相關(guān)外文翻譯--通過房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀人決定買房子-外文文獻(存儲版)
【正文】 f search, making it more likely that a buyer will find a satisfactory match earlier in the search process. Buying through a broker also increases the supply of houses available to buyers, and provides buyers with information on the quality of different houses and the neighborhoods in which they are located. Brokers frequently help buyers identify sources of mortgage financing and property insurance, as well as assist buyers in recording the title. All of these services suggest that brokers provide value added to buyers (in addition to providing a service to sellers), something that these buyers would be willing to pay , this bundle of services and the house that is purchased would, intuitively, be priced higher than homes purchased without the assistance of a broker. Several studies (Janssen and Jobson, 1980。最近的研究認為（ 巴雷拉和祖帕諾 , 1995），通過房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀人買房子，大大提高了購房者購房的效益，因為這樣這些購房者在尋找房子的過程中更有可能找到稱心如意的房子。另外， 來自自有產(chǎn)權(quán)出售的競爭可能會阻止賣家以高價的形式將委托成本傳遞給買家。在這里房屋的銷售價格是根據(jù)房屋的特色，購買者的喜好，以及是否需要提供經(jīng)紀協(xié)助而確定的。導致他們花更多錢的因素是：可能這些購買者的收入很高，可能他們來自其他地方，也可能是受別人的雇傭而這么做，更有可能的是他們通過經(jīng)紀人來購買自己的房子從而使自己的房子升值。分析了來自加拿大的房屋市場數(shù)據(jù)后，詹森和喬布森表明，在一定規(guī)模的房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)，對于同類物業(yè)經(jīng)紀人會比競爭者列出更高的價9 格從而實現(xiàn)銷售價格的顯著提高。根據(jù)以上的結(jié)果他們得出了這樣的結(jié)論，他們認為在完全沒有信息的市場中經(jīng)紀人起到了類似廣告的作用。 數(shù)據(jù)和方法 本 文 使用來自由美國房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀人協(xié)會在 1987 年 對 全國的購房者進行的調(diào)查數(shù)據(jù)。如果沒有選擇 性偏見 存在，價格較高的價值可能是由 通過 經(jīng)紀人 買房 的購買者 來 補充。 祖帕諾， 哈羅德 W買方收入作為搜索的機會成本。香格里拉表顯示購房者之間的信息和搜尋成本的差異。恩布爾和 錫爾曼斯 的結(jié)論針對的是現(xiàn)有的經(jīng)紀機構(gòu)，如大聯(lián)盟，成功地消除了信息不對稱 的影響，從而提高了住房市場的效益。 喬德（ 1983）憑借其在住宅市場的研究，他估計了房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀服務的作用。當然也有一部分文獻研究了房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀人的作用，經(jīng)紀人對購房者買房的深遠影響，以及利益和道德對經(jīng)紀中介的影響。該數(shù)據(jù)包括了房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀人對經(jīng)紀輔助銷售和業(yè) 主銷售的兩種模式在影響銷售價格方面的評估，并揭示了經(jīng)紀人為賣方所提供的營銷服務的價值。 具體來說，本文探討 的是在以 兩階段進程 的假設(shè)條件下對 一個房地產(chǎn)經(jīng)紀人的影響。因此，包含這些服務的房屋的銷售價格會高于無經(jīng)紀人協(xié)助置業(yè)的房屋的價格。s results indicate that with real estate firms of parable size, brokers who list parable properties for higher prices than peting brokers tend to realize significantly higher selling prices. The higher selling prices tend to be associated with transactions involving executive transfers and brokerarranged secondary financing. These results may, in turn, indicate that brokers obtain higher prices when dealing with buyers who are both less knowledgeable about local market conditions and less sensitive to price. Yavas and Colwell (1994) suggest that selling price may also be, at least to some degree, a function of the type of broker listing arrangement used by the seller. In a study of the residential market, Jud (1983) estimates the demand for real estate brokerage services. Using housing transactions data from three urban areas in North Carolina, Jud finds that brokers do not affect the prices of the houses which they sell, although they do appear to influence the level of housing consumed by buyers. In a subsequent study, Jud and Frew (1986), using different data, find that brokers do obtain higher prices for the homes they sell. Evidence is also presented 4 that brokerassisted buyers have a greater demand for houses than their nonbrokerassisted counterparts. Their results lead them to conclude that broker intermediation has an effect analogous to that of advertising in markets with imperfect information. More recent research by Turnbull and Sirmans (1993) examines the extent to which differences in information and search costs are related in housing prices. Using data from the Baton Rouge market area, Turnbull and Sirmans pare the prices paid by firsttim
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