金融專業(yè)外文翻譯-----資本結(jié)構(gòu)決定因素以中國企業(yè)為案例-金融財(cái)政(存儲(chǔ)版)
【正文】 ximizes the ?rm value, but the tradeo? es in various forms. . TaxShield Bene?ts and the Financial Distress Cost of Debt One of the crucial assumptions of the MM (1958) model was that there is no taxation. Later work by Modigliani and Miller (1963), and Miller (1977) add tax e?ects into the original framework. An implication of this newer work was that ?rms should ?nance their projects pletely through debt in order to maximize corporate value. Clearly this contradicts reality in that debt constitutes only a fraction of ?rms? total capital. Subsequent theoretical work seeks an optimal capital structure which results from a tradeo? between the bene?ts of tax shield of debt and the costs of ?nancial distress of debt. According to this line of theory, the bene?ts of debt arise from its tax exemption, which implies that a higher debt ratio will increase the ?rm?s value. But the bene?ts can be o?set by costs of ?nancial distress, which may destroy the value of the ?rm. Thus the optimal capital structure is determined by the tradeo? between the taxfree bene?ts of debt and the distress costs of debt see Figure 1. De Angelo and Masulis (1980), Ross (1985) and Leland (1994) have shown that, in the presence of taxation, it is advantageous for a ?rm with safe, tangible assets and plenty of taxable ine to take a high debtequity ratio to avoid high tax payments. For a ?rm with poorer performance and more intangible assets, it is better to rely on equity ?nancing. One problem with the theories based on consideration of the taxshield bene?ts is that they cannot explain why capital structures vary across ?rms that are subject to the same taxation rates. Empirical evidence from the United States (Copeland and Weston, 1992) shows that the capital structure of corporations did not change much after corporate ine tax came into existence. In Australia, where there is no dual ine taxation at all, capital structure is roughly the same as in other economies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). Booth et al. (2020) found that the tax bene?ts vary in developing countries and play no role in the determination of capital structure choice. . Agency Theory and Capital Structure Even if markets are perfect and there is no tax impact, agency theory suggests that the appropriate mix of debt and equity is still an important matter for corporate governance. In general, debt claims provide the holders with a ?xed repayment schedule but little in the way of rights to control the pany, as long as the repayment schedule (and sometimes certain other terms) is met. However, creditors can have a strong in?uence over a pany if it gets in ?nancial distress but, even if a pany is ?nancially sound, creditors can in?uence whether it can obtain additional funding for proposed new projects. For example, a bank that has loaned a pany the money for factory expansion can make it easy or hard for the pany to borrow more money for a new o?ce building. Conversely, equity claims – in particular, mon stock – give shareholders the right to vote for Boards of Directors and on other important corporate issues such as major mergers or plans that would dispose of substantial portions of the pany?s assets. Shareholders are also entitled to receive dividends or other distributions whenever the pany pays them or, if the pany is liquidated, to receive the
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