金融專業(yè)外文翻譯-----資本結(jié)構(gòu)決定因素以中國(guó)企業(yè)為案例-金融財(cái)政-免費(fèi)閱讀
【正文】 最佳資本結(jié)構(gòu)在平衡滋長(zhǎng)的債務(wù)償還決策和研究成本之間取得。這種不完全合同法將權(quán)益和債券視為有價(jià)證券。日益增加的債務(wù)減少了 39。況且 ， 杰森指出 （ 1986 ） ,因?yàn)閭鶛?quán)人要求還現(xiàn)金 , 它減少了管理者提供自由現(xiàn)金用于上述高消費(fèi)的追求行為。因而經(jīng)理不會(huì)對(duì)公司的資源管理投入跟多，卻將公司資源轉(zhuǎn)向個(gè)人利益，例如通過(guò)建造 39。這樣的投資導(dǎo)致債務(wù)價(jià)值的下降。 相反地 ： 股東權(quán)益 ， 特別是普通股票的權(quán)利 —— 給予普通股持股股東這樣的權(quán)利：股東大會(huì)投票表決權(quán)以及其他的公司處理權(quán)像公司合并以及部分資產(chǎn)處理等問(wèn)題。來(lái)自美國(guó)的實(shí) 徵證據(jù) (科普蘭和韋斯頓 ， 1992)表明 ， 公司所得稅形成后企業(yè)資本結(jié)構(gòu)并沒(méi)有改變多少。隨后的理論工從抵稅效應(yīng)和資本成本的平衡中尋找最優(yōu)資本結(jié)構(gòu)。然而埠斯在他們的十所公司的研究中找到了實(shí)證依據(jù)。 羅斯(1977 年 )是第一個(gè)強(qiáng)調(diào)債務(wù)功能 的 ， 總有一個(gè)信息令公司的管理及其投資者機(jī)制之間的信息不對(duì)稱。本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計(jì)） 外 文 翻 譯 原文 ： The Determinants of Capital Structure:Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies One early extension was to allow for the incidence of taxation and ?nancial distress. Since the late 1970s, there have been two new strands of research which originate more from the theory of the ?rm: the ?pecking order? theory and the ?tradeo?? theory. The pecking order theory argues that ?rms have a preference of issuing ?nancing instruments due to adverse selection problems (Myers and Majluf, 1984). The theory suggests that the ?nancial manager tends to use internal capital as the ?rst choice, then issue debt, and equity will only be considered as the last resort as issuance of equity can be perceived by the market as a signal of a poor future for the investment. In contrast, the tradeo? theory emphasizes that an optimal capital structure can be achieved by the tradeo? of the various bene?ts of debt and equity. . The pecking order theory The pecking order theory is based on the information asymmetries between the ?rm?s managers and the outside investors. Ross (1977) was the ?rst to address the function of debt as a signalling mechanism when there are information asymmetries between the ?rm?s management and its investors. He argued that management has better knowledge of the ?rm than the investors, and that management will try to avoid debt when the ?rm is performing poorly for fear that any debt default due to poor cash ?ow will result in their job loss. The information asymmetry may also explain why existing investors may not favor new equity ?nancing, as new investors may require higher returns to pensate for the risks of their investment thus diluting the returns to existing investors. Myers and Majluf (1984) later developed their socalled pecking order theory of ?nancing: . that capital structure will be driven by ?rms? desire to ?nance new investments preferably through the use of internal funds, then with lowrisk debt, and with new equity only as a last resort. In their theory, there is no optimal capital structure that maximizes the ?rm value. The ?nancial managers issue debt or equity purely according to the costs of capital. Subsequent empirical studies provide mixed evidence. Helwege and Liang (1996) found no empirical evidence for such a pecking order. Booth et al. (2020) found evidence supporting the theory in their 10country empirical study. Frank and Goyal (2020) tested the pecking order theory on a broad crosssection of publicly traded American ?rms for 1971 to 1998, and concluded that the theory was not supported by the evidence. Whilst large ?rms exhibited some aspects of pecking order behavior, the evidence was not robust to the inclusion of conventional leverage factors, nor to the analysis of evidence from the 1990s. . The tradeoff theory The tradeo? theory argues that there is an optimal capital structure that ma
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