【正文】 3)林特勒模型對新興市場公司的效果并不十分明顯，具有變 R 方格林特勒回歸模型大大低于我們期待的像美國公司一樣。有趣的是 ,馬來西亞是最接近又美國平均股息率 ,而韓國和中值 股息收益率有 2%差異，主要是時間的作用：在前期垂死掙扎的韓國市場導致高股息收益率 , 直到當時才消除。由于這個原因 , 隨著標準差，中值和平均都會被記錄下來。在這種情況下 ,雖然盡管與銀行有密切聯(lián)系和緊緊地握性質(zhì)的公司 ,但支付股息以吸引資本是必要的 , 替代的假設 ,我們希望能更可能的在交易資本市場上預測股利為外部投資者提供保證 ,傳達公司的經(jīng)營是正確的。 我們假設把這種股利發(fā)放角色叫做替補 ,在這種意義上的分紅代替與外部投資者直接通信 ,包括債務和股權。在本質(zhì)上，這個行為與股息支付有相同的約束作用。 這兩個觀點的暗示著，股利發(fā)放更高的地方就有分散 外部投資者 ,只要公司連續(xù)需要股權資本 ,從而迫使對資本市場產(chǎn)生作用。在之后的情形里 ,紅利削減表明 ,相應的收益永久下降 ,而不是暫時的和周期性的。我們將認為這些組織的金融體系的差別顯著影響公司金融股利政策 ,特別是將股利作為一個信號傳遞和約束。在這種情形下 ,保證高股利政策下減弱管理投機機會和加強資本市場的相互影響。然而 ,在布倫南模型中股利越高稅務越高。M assumptions. Brennan (1970), for example,relaxed the equal tax assumption. However, in Brennan’s model the higher thedividend the higher the tax penalty. Consequently, a tax wedge drives up the pretax investor required rate of return for high payout firms. Despite extensive empirical investigation this hypothesis does not seem to be borne out by the ,Poterba (1987) has documented the remarkable stability of dividend payouts throughout periods of extensive tax changes in the USA. While the impact of taxes remains inconclusive, increasing attention has been given to the problem of information asymmetries. Miller and Modigliani explicitly suggested that dividend changes could have an informational research by Watts (1973) and others have documented that initiating a dividend increases the share price and cutting a dividend generally leads to a price decline. Information asymmetries have also given rise to agency cost explanations for paying dividends. With the increased separation of ownership from control, managers frequently face very little supervision. In this context, a mitment to a high dividend policy attenuates managerial opportunism and forces the firm to frequently interact with the capital market. A central message of asymmetric information models is that dividend payments are important both as a premitment device to reduce agency costs and as a signal of management’s expectations of future earnings. Both models have been used to justify Lintner’s observation (1956) that actual dividend policies tend to follow a slowly adaptive process. However, the viability of both of these mechanisms depends on other aspects of the institutional and contracting environment. For example, if the firm is closely held there might be easier and less costly ways of municating information than by paying a dividend. Similarly, managerial control issues may be less severe in a bank centric market characterized by constant monitoring of corporate activities by lending officers. There are a variety of ways of characterizing institutional differences, but Mayer(1990) hit on one key difference: the ‘‘AngloSaxon’’ capital markets model pared to the ‘‘ContinentalGermanJapanese’’ banking model. The critical difference as Rajan (1992) pointed out is that the capital markets perspective relies on arms length contracting by ‘‘uninformed’’ investors, whereas bank debt is a contract between an informed investor frequently privy to confidential information not available in the capital market. We would expect these marked differences in the organization of the financial system to impact corporate financial policy, particularly the use of dividends as both a signaling and premitment device. In this paper, we take advantage of the recent development of an international database by the World Bank that allows for crosscountry parisons of dividend policy. Financial data is available for the largest firms from eight emerging market countries: Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1990. We analyze the dividend policies of firms from these countries, as well as the key institutional features of each country, and pare them with a control sample of US firms. Dividend signaling models offer valuable insights about the role of d