【正文】 言下之意是，中立，不干涉允許更強(qiáng)大的一方利用他或她的優(yōu)勢(shì)，并有可能成為調(diào)解員的工作“公平的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)環(huán)境，這將是適當(dāng)?shù)膱?chǎng)合。如果我們堅(jiān)持自由選擇，然后我們重視自主 或自由。在 20 世紀(jì) 70 年代以來(lái)，學(xué)校擔(dān)心，他們不應(yīng)該教給學(xué)生特定的值。鑒于這些事實(shí)，可能會(huì)認(rèn)為任何形式的教育調(diào)解中的客戶端是無(wú)異于隱倡導(dǎo)。在克勞迪婭?米爾斯的話， 勸說(shuō)，理解其理想的形式，是影響，呼吁只有最好的理由，大致的理解，形成信念和欲望，并因此導(dǎo)致一個(gè)人有針對(duì)性的結(jié)論。調(diào)解員的工作，因此，其中的一部分可能會(huì)確保任何決定是可以實(shí)現(xiàn)的。 然而，有一種張力：如果一方往往占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位，例如，如果調(diào)停顯然給予同等的“空中時(shí)間”給兩者，然后調(diào)解員若似乎代表一方并制約另一方。醫(yī)療干預(yù)不會(huì)被認(rèn)為是有效的病人會(huì)得到了更好的證據(jù)，除非有控制無(wú)關(guān)因素的研究。 倫納德?馬庫(kù)斯罷工通常的立場(chǎng)。締約方可能有非常不同的權(quán)利基礎(chǔ)，以及病人和家屬可能因害怕管理者而不能維護(hù)自己的權(quán)利，甚至當(dāng)他們意識(shí)到他們。但是，這些需求進(jìn)行修改，在醫(yī)療方面，因?yàn)椴∪说臋?quán)利和法律的先例壓倒一切的擔(dān)憂。如果他們成為鎖定為超過(guò)工資的位置 ，他們可能放棄了廣泛的可以使雙方滿意的解決方案，可能是他們選擇停車場(chǎng)，公共斑塊，或遞延花紅。但當(dāng)正式的調(diào)解會(huì)議和技術(shù)可以在保健領(lǐng)域發(fā)揮巨大的作用，關(guān)鍵的是存在不同的醫(yī)療環(huán)境將導(dǎo)致傳統(tǒng)調(diào)解理論背道而馳。一般來(lái)說(shuō)， ADR 和調(diào)解特別是一直提倡健康安全法作為未來(lái)美國(guó)醫(yī)療保健體系中的一個(gè)組成部分。s advocate here.” Although it cannot be denied that the mediator has values, the key is that those values not be imposed on the client. It might be charged that there is a paradox in attempting to clarify a client39。 people bring their own biases and history into any dispute. Mediators petently distinguish what they think from what they say and do. The proof is in the oute. There are two problems here: First, the claim that quality of oute correlates with the neutrality of the mediator is neither necessarily true nor selfcertifying, at least without much more discussion. A medical intervention would not be thought effective on the evidence that the patient got better unless there had been studies that controlled for unrelated factors, and similarly we cannot automatically accept that a dispute was effectively mediated based on the oute alone. A mediator could maintain professional distance and even handedness and yet the clients nevertheless reach suboptimal outes, and a strong interventionist and partisan mediator could strongly encourage (or “muscle”) an excellent oute. Thus the quality of mediator neutrality cannot be retrospectively diagnosed by simply examining the oute. Second, mediator neutrality seen from this perspective relies on the personal qualities of the mediator. Extensive evidence from social psychology suggests that mediators are rarely immune to biases, while at the same time they routinely overestimate their ability to avoid Distinguishing personal from professional opinion about what ments to stress or avoid in mediation is much harder than Marcus suggests, even for experienced mediators. Extensive evidence from social psychology suggests that mediators are rarely immune to biases, while at the same time they routinely overestimate their ability to avoid them. Yet there is a tension here: if one side tends to dominate, for example, and if the mediator apparently works to give equal “air time” to both, then the mediator seems to be acting on behalf of one side and constraining the other. I believe this is appropriate, but in such a case, the espousal of neutrality appears misleading. If a mediator is to do anything in shaping the process, then this will inevitably involve favoring some ments, choosing which elements to draw out or suppress, and asking questions that will steer the discussion in a particular direction。t consent to that operation”) into interests (“So you are worried about the potential side effects?”), and then generating options that are satisfactory to both parties. It is oriented to the future and to settlement. Mediation theory has generally claimed that at least three linked elements are important to the process: mediator neutrality in the sense of nonpartisanship in the process, neutrality in the sense of mediator indifference to oute, and confidentiality. But each of these needs to be modified in the medical context because of overriding concerns about patients’ rights and legal precedent. The Baseline of Acceptability In general, mediation accepts that individuals can craft their own settlements, even if they are unusual or less than ideal. Jay Folberg, a leading theorist, defines mediation as the process by which the participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider alternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will acmodate their needs. Yet plainly, as one critic has charged, “The bright new ideas of client selfdetermination and autonomy are consistent with letting one party freely choose to be the victim of exploitation.”5 Although this problem has been vigorously debated in the literature, it has not been a mortal blow to the process, and the merits of letting individuals craft outes for themselves have been seen as outweighing the risks of unjust settlements. In his book The Mediation Process, Chris Moore offers a limited list of appropriate reasons for intervening, including settlements that are vastly inequitable, unlikely to hold over time, likely to result in a renewed conflict later, or