追趕，危機(jī)和產(chǎn)業(yè)升級(jí)：韓國(guó)的電子產(chǎn)業(yè)的技術(shù)學(xué)習(xí)進(jìn)化方面外文翻譯-免費(fèi)閱讀
【正文】 總 之，由于其早期的成功，韓國(guó)的創(chuàng)新體系正面臨著新的挑戰(zhàn) 。但是這類的研發(fā)企業(yè)存在一個(gè)狹隘的焦點(diǎn)： 其中大部分是面向發(fā)展，而不是研究，特別是流程重整和產(chǎn)品定制 。大多數(shù)聯(lián)系是與國(guó)外公司或者被領(lǐng)先的 財(cái)閥 內(nèi)化 (Bloom 1992)。雖然外部技術(shù)采購(gòu)戰(zhàn)略已經(jīng)高度成熟，但是 這些企業(yè)內(nèi)部創(chuàng)新組織依然相當(dāng)無(wú)效 而且 有巨大潛力的重組和生產(chǎn)力的提高 。D 研發(fā) 費(fèi)用的金額是臺(tái)灣的兩倍，但相比較下1992 年美國(guó)授予韓國(guó)的專利數(shù)量是 538 個(gè)，臺(tái)灣卻有 1252 個(gè) (Kim Linsu 1997b, )。 到 1990年這個(gè)數(shù)字已上升到 12,865，而占了韓國(guó)產(chǎn)業(yè) 總研發(fā)人員 的 37％ 。 因此，韓國(guó)需要去建立一個(gè) 基礎(chǔ)廣泛的，多元化的知識(shí)基礎(chǔ) ， 尤其是在產(chǎn)品設(shè)計(jì)，市場(chǎng)開發(fā)，關(guān)鍵部件生產(chǎn)和高端知識(shí)密集的支援服務(wù) 。 經(jīng)過三十年的快速增長(zhǎng)，韓國(guó)正面臨一個(gè)重大的危機(jī) 。韓國(guó)成功的進(jìn)入電子產(chǎn)業(yè)并如同急行軍般發(fā)展出批量生產(chǎn)的能力，可以服務(wù)于高速增長(zhǎng)的同類產(chǎn)品出口市場(chǎng)； 很少發(fā)生升級(jí)到更高端 的、 快速增長(zhǎng)的差異化的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的細(xì)分市場(chǎng) 。D has declined to less than 20%, it is still large enough to play an important role. Yet, there is a serious lack of coordination among Ramp。Kim I. Y. and Chung 1991。D/sales ratios of . and Japanese manufacturing panies. And Korea’s pet capita Ramp。 and equally important inefficiencies of its public innovation system. An insufficient critical mass Until around the mid1980s, Korean electronics firms had little motivation co invest in Ramp。 their impact however has been magnified by important domestic factors. A failure to upgrade is one important reason for Korea’s vulnerability to the current crisis in the financial and currency markets: it has reduced the capacity of Korean firms to generate a sufficiently large amount of foreign exchange that is necessary to service their huge debt. A NARROW DOMESTIC KNOWLEDGE BASE A narrow domestic knowledge base is another indicator of Korea’s truncated industrial upgrading. Catchingup required a limited set of capabilities: a capacity to absorb and upgrade imported foreign technology and to develop operational capabilities in production, investment and minor adaptations. This is no longer sufficient today. In 1995, an OECD review of Korea’s NSI concluded: ‘The country can no longer afford simply to import technology which foreigners are in fact more and more reticent to introduce on concessional terms and will have to raise the valueadded and technological intensity of what it produces.’ (OECD 1995b, ) Today, there is an even more powerful reason for such a shift in Korea’s development paradigm: the country simply does not have the foreign exchange required to buy in foreign technology. Korea thus needs to create a broadbased and diversified knowledge base, especially with regard to product design, market development, the production of key ponents and the provision of highend knowledge intensive support services. So far however, Korea’s knowledge base is constrained by three main weaknesses: an insufficient critical mass of Ramp。D in the electronics industry, and this accounted for 32% of the researchers in the entire Korean industry. By 1990 this number had risen to 12,865 and accounted for 37% of total Ramp。D output, ., the efficiency of technology management. Patent figures indicate that Korea has a problem: while it spends more than twice the amount for Ramp。D which is typical today for Japanese, . and European firms. One important difference between Korea and Japan is that in Korea hierarchical patterns of firm organization are still much more prevalent (Janelli and Ylm Dawnhee ).T
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