【正文】 ication). ?The question at hand is how best to achieve domestically the carbon emission targets. CO2 is the major current contributor to climate change. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?Instead of auctioning, the government could give the permits away to specific groups. This alternative is known as ―grandfathering.‖ 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?An auction is preferred to grandfathering (giving panies permits based on historical output or emissions), because it allows reduced tax distortions, provides more flexibility in distribution of costs, provides greater incentives for innovation, and reduces the need for politically contentious arguments over the allocation of rents. ?The political desire to grandfather may also lead to an administratively cumbersome downstream system with exemptions for some sectors and inefficient mand and control type regulation for others. ?The potential cost of this inefficient system is tremendous. If auctioned permits were accepted, much of the rationale for choosing these inefficient options would disappear. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?CO2 is a uniformly mixed, accumulative pollutant. Neither the source of emissions nor their timing is important from an environmental standpoint. Thus, permits are ideally defined in a homogeneous way over space and time. Ideally permits would be fully tradeable internationally. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?To minimize administrative costs, permits would be required at the level of oil refineries, natural gas pipe lines, liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?To maximize liquidity in secondary markets, permits would be fully tradable and bankable. ?The government would conduct quarterly auctions. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——背景 ?who, on efficiency grounds, should get the permits and at what prices? The best answer to these questions depends on the government’s goals. ? A secondary goal is revenue maximization. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——目標(biāo) 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——目標(biāo) ?To minimize regulatory transaction costs, permits are required by oil refineries, natural gas pipelines, naturalgas liquid sellers, and coal processing plants. Such an ―upstream‖ system is prehensive and minimizes the number of parties that need permits. ?In addition, permits can and should be auctioned not only for the current years but also for future issue years. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——目標(biāo) ?Market power should not be a concern in an auction for carbon permits. Even in an upstream program, there would still be more than 1,700 permit buyers. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——方式 ?Ways to auction many identical items ?A standard ascendingclock auction in which price is gradually raised until there is no excess demand would provide reliable price discovery. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——方式 ?The ascendingclock auction offers a simpler approach. The clock indicates the current price. In each round, the bidders submit the quantity they are willing to buy at that price. If the total quantity bid exceeds the quantity available the clock is increased. The bidding continues until the quantity bid is less than the quantity available. The permits are then allocated at the prior price, and are rationed for those that reduced their quantity in the last round. ?It is easier to implement for both seller and buyers, since a buyer only bids a single quantity in each round, rather than a schedule. ?There is no possibility of undesirable bid signaling, since only the total quantity bid is reported. ?Rapid convergence is guaranteed, since the price increases by one bid increment with each round of bidding. 拍賣實(shí)踐 3：二氧化碳許可證拍賣 ——優(yōu)點(diǎn) ?近來網(wǎng)絡(luò)技術(shù)的飛速發(fā)展，出現(xiàn)了越來越多的網(wǎng)上拍賣。 拍賣實(shí)踐 4：信息時(shí)代下的拍賣 ?機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)在相當(dāng)普遍的意義下存在，且相當(dāng)有效。 ?企業(yè)適應(yīng)未來，需要博弈論。 ?激勵(lì)相容問題 ?效率性問題 ?機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)來源于拍賣理論，創(chuàng)始人是Vickrey. 機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論簡介 ?機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)實(shí)質(zhì)上是一種特殊的不完全信息博弈分析 ?當(dāng)賣者在選擇出售商品的方式時(shí)，他事實(shí)上是在選擇或設(shè)計(jì)一個(gè)博弈規(guī)則。 機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論簡介 ?委托人設(shè)計(jì)機(jī)制的目的是最大化其期望效用 機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)理論簡介 ?在實(shí)現(xiàn)效用期望最大化同時(shí)，面臨兩個(gè)約束 ?參與約束或個(gè)人理性約束：一個(gè)有理性的代理人有興趣參與這個(gè)約