【正文】 ciety, Mill thought that ‘the ideal type of a perfect government must be a representative democracy’ (Mill 1991a [1861]: 256).Varieties of liberaldemocratic theoryWith the exception of one of these provisions, almost no theorist prepared to accept the liberaldemocratic label would wish to make substantive changes in Mill’s characterization of democracy and liberalism, though there is obviously room for many differences over how best to preserve civil liberties or structure representative democracy. For instance, regarding representation some theorists favour parliamentary and others presidential systems of government, some (including Mill) proportional representation, others first past the post representation, some a free hand for elected officials, others provision for interelection accountability such as recall. These and other such differences are clearly very important at the level of ongoing liberal democratic practice, but their connection to general theory is no more than indirect. Similarly, debates over how to interpret civil liberties – for instance, whether or not advertizing is a form of expression to be protected as freedom of speech or whether restrictions on campaign financing are a violation of civil rights——reflect differences over the application of liberaldemocratic principles rather than differences over the principles themselves.ParticipationIn most controversies of political theory the line between principled differences and variations in application, interpretation, or emphasis is blurred. One exception is in Mill’s enthusiasm for participation. This is the element of his characterization of liberal democracy in the list above that is not shared by all liberaldemocratic theorists (for instance Giovanni Sartori or William Riker). In fact, some critics of liberal democracy from the direction of participatory democracy see in Mill’s participationism a (for them weled) deviation from liberaldemocratic theory (Pateman 1970: 28–34). If Mill held that democracy should only be by direct participation or that representative democracy is not only necessary, but a necessary evil, these critics would be right. However, Mill thought that representative democracy had some positive features of its own (such as making it easier to ensure that government decisions would be made by educated people) and that, when feasible, it should be bined with direct participation. Because a measure of participatory democracy, albeit limited, is allowed to be possible and desirable by theorists even more closely identified with liberal democracy than Schumpeter, such as Robert Dahl (1970a: 102–3, 1989: 338–9), a case can be made to consider this an area of disagreement within liberaldemocratic theory, rather than as a dividing line between it and alternatives.EqualityOther differences concern equality. Mill is often and in important respects ustly classified an egalitarian. He was among the few males of his time forcefully to advocate extension of the franchise to women (Mill 1971 [1869]), and his views on the distribution of wealth put him toward the socialistic end of a spectrum of stances on the question of how far liberal democrats should insist on politics favouring social and economic equality. Ronald Dworkin (1983) may also be located somewhere in the egalitarian ‘camp,’ as, according to most interpreters, may John Rawls, and Dahl has moved in this direction over the course of his career (contrast Dahl, 1956 and 1985). Robert Nozick (who does not classify himself a liberal democrat) insists that liberal principles dictate antiegalitarianism (1974). The late Isaiah Berlin, while not explicitly antiegalitarian, was sceptical about sanctioning more than formal, political equality in the name of liberal democracy (1969 [1958]).For Mill ‘the pure idea of democracy’ is ‘government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented,’ which requires proportional representation so a minority is not denied government representatives (1991a [1861]: 302–3). However, this egalitarianism does not carry over to the vote, where Mill’s view differs with most other liberaldemocratic theorists. On the mainstream view, political equality is a central value and is interpreted as equality in the polling booth. Mill did not agree: ‘I do not look upon equal voting as among the things that are good in themselves,’ he announced, and he went on to explain that by granting the educated and the uneducated equal votes, a democracy harmfully declared ‘ignorance to be entitled to as much political power as knowledge’ (ibid.: 340)翻譯：第3章 自由民主Francis Fukuyama提出了一個(gè)曾引起備受關(guān)注和爭議的觀點(diǎn)：歷史已經(jīng)在共產(chǎn)主義在歐洲實(shí)行失敗的同時(shí)以慢慢地意識(shí)形態(tài)爭論的停止而終結(jié)。然而，現(xiàn)如今那些十年前曾經(jīng)被認(rèn)為是反對(duì)自由民主的立場(chǎng)的觀點(diǎn)，卻被認(rèn)為是對(duì)自由民主作出的不同的闡述，用來深化或?qū)崿F(xiàn)民主。密爾作為民主的倡導(dǎo)者，積極提倡在平等方面有更大的進(jìn)展，同時(shí)，平等方面的大步向前也讓托克維爾感到擔(dān)憂。簡而言之，我們可以這樣解讀密爾主要的努力方向：通過將民主與自由結(jié)合起來，以期解決多數(shù)暴政的問題?！墩撟杂伞肪褪窃谟陉U明若干的原則以規(guī)定人民對(duì)其擁有的權(quán)利加以限制。密爾在給出理論中規(guī)則的具體內(nèi)容的同時(shí)也列舉出應(yīng)當(dāng)保護(hù)的幾種最重要的自由，即良心自由、思想和情感的自由，表達(dá)自我的自由，籌劃個(gè)人未來的自由，以及基于無惡意的方式或目的與他人聯(lián)合起來的自由。也就是說，他贊同在私人領(lǐng)域與公共領(lǐng)域之間劃出一道界線，并且支持法治。例如，就代議制而言，一些理論家支持議會(huì)制，而另一些人則支持總統(tǒng)制政體；一些理論家（包括密爾）支持比例代表制，而另一些人則留戀從前的委任代表制；一些人主張讓選舉產(chǎn)生的官員放開手腳，而另一些理論家則主張應(yīng)采用罷免之類的條款來強(qiáng)化在職官員的責(zé)任。例如，廣告是否應(yīng)作為表達(dá)自由的一種形式而加以保護(hù)，或者限制競選資金是否是對(duì)公民權(quán)利的侵害等，它們反映出的是對(duì)自由——民主原則的具體應(yīng)用所持的不同觀點(diǎn)，而不是針對(duì)原則本身的分歧。事實(shí)上，一些自由民主的批評(píng)者從參與民主的角度出發(fā)，把密爾對(duì)參與的過度強(qiáng)調(diào)，雖然在一定程度上他們支持這種參與，看成是對(duì)自由—民主理論的違反。同時(shí)，密爾的理論還強(qiáng)調(diào)要代議制民主與直接的參與相結(jié)合，這樣的理論即使是像羅伯特?達(dá)爾這樣的理論家（他比熊彼特更接近于自由民主）都在一定程度上贊同這種想法，他認(rèn)為參與民主是可能的也是可取的，盡管它有基于自身特點(diǎn)的局限性。按照通行的觀點(diǎn)，Ronald Dworkin和John Rawls都可以被看成是平等主義理論里的有力的支持者，而達(dá)爾在他的在整個(gè)學(xué)術(shù)生涯中都在圍繞著平等的話題不斷推向前進(jìn)（我們可以對(duì)比達(dá)爾前后期的兩本著作）；Robert Nozick（他是反對(duì)平等主義的學(xué)者）堅(jiān)持認(rèn)為自由原則是反對(duì)平等主義的；Isaiah Berlin雖然在他們晚年時(shí)光里沒有明顯地反對(duì)平等的理論，但從他對(duì)其著作的描寫看得出他對(duì)平等理論還是持有懷疑態(tài)度的。普遍的觀點(diǎn)認(rèn)為投票過程因?yàn)槭钦纹降鹊捏w現(xiàn)所以政治平等要體現(xiàn)在投票上。