【正文】 ore independent central bank is then also associated with more rapid growth. Since industrial nations do not generally face high inflation, this vehicle to higher growth is not available to them. Empirical studies were also conducted to examine the relationship between central bank independence and fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP in the nation. The expectation was that a more independent central bank would be able to resist better government efforts to moize fiscal deficits and thus lead to lower longrun average fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP in the nation. Such a negative relationship was in fact found by Parkin (1987) and Grilli et al. (1991) for industrial countries. Thus, the overall conclusion that can be reached from empirical studies to date is that an independent central bank is associated with lower inflation rates and lower fiscal deficits as a percentage of GDP but is unrelated to growth in industrial nations. Although empirical studies have found no relationship between central bank independence and the rate of economic growth in industrial nations, there is a theoretical reason for expecting that a central bank that can set its own inflation target and operate independently of the fiscal authority of the nation can lead to a lower rate of growth in the nation. This can result when there is a conflict between the goals of the moary and the fiscal authority of the moary and fiscal policies can move at cross purposes from each other and result in suboptimal economic performance for the nation. Thus, a central bank can be too independent. For example, a central bank that is excessively inflation averse, such as the Bundesbank, may excessively restrain the growth of the nation. Better economic performance for the nation would result with the coordination of fiscal and moary policies. This can be acplished by giving the central bank instrument but not goal independence. Thus, the general tendency for economists today of endorsing the separation of power in the conduct of moary and fiscal policies may not be the best policy to maximize noninflationary growth in the nation (see Nordhaus, 1994). Better results can be obtained by the coordination of moary and fiscal policies. It is not just that in the absence of such a coordination, fiscal and moary authorities might pursue contradictory goals. Suboptimal results may arise simply because of the different time horizon for moary and fiscal policies. Moary authorities usually have a longer time horizon than fiscal authorities and often respond only slowly and cautiously to changed economic conditions. Because of this, fiscal authorities might not be willing to adopt deficitreduction policies and risk an economic slowdown (which may cost them reelection) if they cannot be sure that their contractionary fiscal policies will be offset by sufficiently strong and timely expansionary moary policies.外文翻譯 國際貨幣和金融安排：現(xiàn)狀與未來 在這一部分，我們研究在現(xiàn)行國際貨幣體系下的中央銀行的獨(dú)立性、貨幣和財(cái)政政策。一些國家的中央銀行，如瑞士和德國的中央銀行，在戰(zhàn)后時(shí)期都享有高度的獨(dú)立性。馬斯特里赫特條約禁止中央銀行市服從政府的指示，作為條件之一，為歐洲貨幣聯(lián)盟。 但何謂中央銀行的獨(dú)立性？費(fèi)舍爾（ 1995）介紹了目標(biāo)獨(dú)立性和相對獨(dú)立的區(qū)別。當(dāng)然，央行有目標(biāo)獨(dú)立性和相對獨(dú)立性，可以設(shè)定自己的貨幣目標(biāo)，是貨幣自由利用其掌握的工具以實(shí)現(xiàn)目標(biāo)。保守的銀行家認(rèn)為，央行同時(shí)具有絕對和相對的獨(dú)立性。委托代理的目標(biāo)是新西蘭最明確的例子，那里的央行行長正式同意遵守由政府制定的通 脹目標(biāo)。首先，一個國家的貨幣政策應(yīng)該反映國家的社會財(cái)富，而不是僅僅是中央銀行行長的偏好。在美國，聯(lián)邦儲備銀行或美聯(lián)儲（美國中央銀行）一般向國會負(fù)責(zé)，它必須經(jīng)美聯(lián)儲選擇的主席 批準(zhǔn)并且可以解釋其政策。中央銀行越可信，越能夠在經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩情況下不削減利率，也不引發(fā)較高的通貨膨脹預(yù)期和較高的長期利率，或提高利率以遏制通脹壓力，恐懼可能會引發(fā)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。也就是說，工業(yè)國的央行越獨(dú)立，在全國范圍內(nèi)的通脹率越低。正如在以前的研究中，作者發(fā)現(xiàn)在中央銀行的獨(dú)立程度和通貨膨脹率呈負(fù)相關(guān)。有較強(qiáng)的規(guī)避通脹的國家更可能給他們的中央銀行更多的獨(dú)立性。 對獨(dú)立性中央銀行的支持已經(jīng)在世界各地增加，所以有傾向委托中央銀行來實(shí)現(xiàn)一個給定的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)或范圍。至于為何央行應(yīng)給予具體的通貨膨脹目標(biāo)，而不是一個增長的國民生產(chǎn)總值或失業(yè)率目標(biāo)，是因?yàn)橥ㄘ浥蛎浭且环N貨幣現(xiàn)象，而國內(nèi)生產(chǎn)總值及失業(yè)率是真實(shí)的現(xiàn)象。許多發(fā)展中國家，已朝向更大的匯率靈活性改變，以便應(yīng)對外國資本流動大幅波動更好。毫無無疑墨西哥和委內(nèi)瑞拉的案例就是這樣。巴羅（ 1995）和薩雷爾西利（ 1996年）確保低于 8％的通貨膨脹率。在大多數(shù)發(fā)展中國家中，當(dāng)通貨膨脹率高時(shí)，以至于更獨(dú)立的中央銀行伴隨的通貨膨脹率越高（鼓勵增長），中央銀行的獨(dú)立性越強(qiáng)，并且增長速度更快。這種消極的關(guān)系是由帕金（ 1987年）和 Grilli（ 1991）等人在工業(yè)國家發(fā)現(xiàn)的事實(shí)。當(dāng)時(shí)的金融和財(cái)政政策可以在相互 的目的中移動，并導(dǎo)致國家的經(jīng)濟(jì)表現(xiàn)為次優(yōu)。這可以通過賦予中央銀行獨(dú)立文書，但不是獨(dú)立的最終目的。次優(yōu)的結(jié)果僅僅因?yàn)榭赡懿煌瑫r(shí)間范圍貨幣和財(cái)政政策