【正文】 ts, such as trade policy, petition policy, tax policy, corporate governance standards, policies for promoting responsible business conduct, human resource development and labor market policy, infrastructure development, and financial and public sector governance. The particular policy mix appropriate for a specific country will depend on its individual circumstances. Attempts to transfer regulatory structures from other countries, especially developed countries, with little or no adaptation to local conditions have not proved to be successful. As well, creating the right investment environment is not a onetime policy shift but rather a plex, multifaceted and longterm process (see box). Recent research shows that investment promotion programmers can have a positive effect on the attractiveness of a particular jurisdiction. On the other hand, trying to ‘pick winners’ has not been successful and the World Bank, among others, advocates moving away from specific incentives to domestic policy measures that improve the general climate for investment in host countries (World Development Report 2020). An important benefit of such an approach is that reforming the domestic policy environment will promote investment and growth generally, not just FDI. Improved transparency, for example, is likely to be disproportionately advantageous to small and medium local firms with few resources to devote to pliance with government requirements. Transparency, improved efficiency in government administration and more secure property rights may also contribute to moving small businesses from the informal economy to the formal, with positive effects on tax revenues. Developing countries seeking the right domestic policy mix must confront a tension between attracting investment and achieving development objectives. States must balance social needs and investor preferences. For example, regulators must develop and enforce standards, including those related to health and safety, labor, the environment and human rights, even if doing so will impose costs on investors. Disincentives to invest, however, can be minimized to the extent that such regulation is transparent, efficient, predictable and free of corruption. Similarly, an effective tax system will be needed to capture value create through FDI, but if the tax system is fairly administered investment disincentives associated with the tax burden will be reduced. Domestic reforms can be plemented with IIA In many cases, a domestic reform strategy is unlikely to be sufficient to attract stable long term investment flows. Some states simply lack capacity to achieve domestic reforms, or suffer from rentseeking behavior on the part of government officials and others who benefit from the existing regime. Also, some states that have reformed their domestic regimes have experienced little increase in FDI inflows. This may reflect foreign investors’ concerns regarding the credibility of host state mitments to maintain proinvestment reforms. International investment agreements (IIA) provide credible mitments, though, as discussed in the next section, existing forms of agreement are not well adapted to encouraging investment flows that contribute to development. Existing IIA protect investors but do not promote development effectively The Monterrey Consensus calls for a ‘new partnership’ between developed and developing countries in relation to development finance, including increased FDI. In any case, increased investment itself is no guarantee of positive development outes. With few exceptions, existing IIA are not designed to achieve development outes. It is possible, however, to imagine new forms of IIA that do a better job of attracting i