【正文】 ： 假說 1a。金 Kitsabunnarat Chatjuthamard 和諾夫辛格（ 2020年）發(fā)現(xiàn)，股權(quán)集中度與董事會的獨立性是負 14 個歐洲國家的關(guān)系。事實上， Westphal（ 1998）提出，由于在緊密合作，舉辦公司治理機制是有限的，少數(shù)股東可能在他們的議會及其委員會的依賴，以限制控股股東的機會主義。 因此，股權(quán)集中度可以減輕或加劇代理問題，從而可能影響的組成和內(nèi)部治理機制的有效性。 “例如，有機會進行自我交易，并采取企業(yè) 機會被視為作為控制私人利益。 Fama amp。 Bebchuk amp。此外， Shleifer 和 Vishny（ 1997）和 La Porta 等人（ 2020）認為，少數(shù)股東征用涉及到內(nèi)部使用該公司的利潤，他們的利益，而不是把他們送回其他股東。 Jensen, 1983。 Kahan, 1990:1090。 Vishny, 1986），以及有足夠的投票權(quán)的行為，迫使管理層在股東權(quán)益（ La Porta 等人， 1999）。所有者和經(jīng)營者之間的代理問題涉及到管理消耗額外補貼，推卸，公司資金分配不當，與塹壕（ Shleifer amp。 Stewart 和Munro(2020)表明，一個審計委員會的存在是在自覺與審計風險減少有關(guān)。 一個審計委員會對公司價值產(chǎn)生積極的影響可能會從盈余管理的制約審計委員會的作用。例如，Koh, Laphante, 和 Tong(2020)研究問責制和加強 公司治理的價值在財務(wù)報告方面的雙重作用。 Gunasekarage, 2020）發(fā)現(xiàn)，審計委員會的獨立性對公司價值影響不大。 關(guān)于審計委員會的組成和之間的公司價值關(guān)系的實證研究，然而，也沒有定論。審計過程中，與內(nèi)部會計控制。 為什么在董事會構(gòu)成與公司績效關(guān)系的調(diào)查結(jié)果沒有結(jié)論？一個可能的解釋是，公司治理最既是結(jié)果由以前的董事作出的決定，這本身就是一個因素可能會影響以后的董事的選擇。 有報道來自澳大利亞，矛盾證據(jù)對于董事會構(gòu)成與公司績效有直接關(guān)系。許多研究已在美國進行這一問題。 Jensen, 1983) and that independent directors can drive their power to monitor a dominant shareholder legally, contractually, or implicitly. Erickson, Park, Reising, and Shin(2020), however, examine the relation between board position and firm value in the presence of significant ownership concentration using publicly traded Canadian firms. They find that greater board independence does not have a positive influence on firm value and that poorly performing firms increase the proportion of outside directors in subsequent periods. Based on Anderson and Reeb(2020) and Dahya et al.(2020) , this study develops the following hypotheses to examine whether closelyheld firms with a less independent board or audit mittee underperform closely held firms with more independent board or audit mittee (Research Question2): Hypothesis 2a. Among Australian closelyheld firms, board independence is positively related to firm performance. Hypothesis 2b. Among Australian closelyheld firms, audit mittee independence is positively related to firm performance. In addition, to test whether the impact of board or audit mittee independence on firm performance differs between closelyheld and widelyheld firms (Research Question 3), this study develops thefollowing hypotheses: Hypothesis 3a. The impact of board independence on firm performance is stronger in closelyheld than widelyheld firms. Hypothesis 3b. The impact of audit mittee independence on firm performance is stronger in closelyheld than widelyheld firms. Source: Lukas Y. Setia Atmaja. 2020, “Governance Mechanisms and Firm Value: The Impact of Ownership Concentration and Dividends”. Corporate Governance: An International Review, ,. 譯文： 治理機制與企業(yè)價值：股權(quán)集中度和紅利的影響 在過去的三十年中，獨立董事的概念已成為重要的，特別是與股市監(jiān)管機構(gòu)和許多公司治理倡導者（ Farrar， 2020）。 Fama amp。 Bebchuk amp。 Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour, amp。Weisbach, 1988). The most widely discussed question regarding board position is therefore whether having more independent directors on the board enhances firm performance. A number of studies have been conducted in the US on this issue. For example, a study by Baysinger and Butler(1985) found that the proportion of independent directors was positively correlated with accounting measures of performance. In contrast, Bhagat and Black(2020), Hermalin and Weisbach(1991), and Klein(1998) have found that a higher percentage of independent directors on the board does not have a significant impact on accounting measures of firm performance. A study by Agrawal and Knoeber(1996) show that the proportion of independent directors has a negative relationship to market measures of performance. Conflicting evidence on a direct relationship between board position and fir