【正文】 costs of directly management by owner will be increased. After that owners have to seek for efficient agents, separate management give to agents. The conflict in interests of enterprise managers and Shareholders cause the agency problems, and the methods which can solve the conflict like supervision, restraint, encouragement and punishment are all have costs, namely agency cost. In strictly, the principalagent theory are one of the intersect research results by Finance and banking, economics and financial affairs. Just because the principalagent theory appears let the internal structure of enterprise39。 本文將以代理成本難題、代理成本的性質(zhì)、其他類型的代理成本和代理成本的控制方法這四個方面來對代理成本進行綜述。于是所有者尋求有效的代理人 ， 分離出經(jīng)營權(quán)成為委托人的角色。 9 19571990. [19]Fischer, Edwin O., Robert Heinkel, Josef Zechner. 1989. Dynamic Capital Structure Choice: Theory and Tests .Journal of Finance. 44:1940. [20]Froot, ., Scharfstein ., Stein ., 1993. 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The Effects of Slack Resources and Environmental Threat on Product Exploration and Exploitation .Academy of Management Journal. 51:147164. [48]Wu, J. and R. Tu. 2020. CEO Stock Option Pay and Ramp。企業(yè)有應(yīng)收賬款，就有壞賬損失的可能。 財務(wù)冗余管理要求企業(yè)從長遠利益出發(fā)，適當合理的延長支付期限。采購控制程度對財務(wù)冗余的影響主要體現(xiàn)在兩個方面：一是采購的速度、效率越高，企業(yè)的物流成本就越低，現(xiàn)金流出量就越少，財務(wù)冗余就越多；而是采購 控制程度越高，企業(yè)原材料的成本就越低，產(chǎn)品成本就越低，企業(yè)利潤就越高，相應(yīng)地將會增加企業(yè)現(xiàn)金流的流入量，財務(wù)冗余就越多。市場營銷策略的選擇關(guān)系到企業(yè)產(chǎn)品的銷售，作為價值鏈的重要環(huán)節(jié)，牽動著各支流的運作 ；市場營銷策略的成功運作有助于促進現(xiàn)金的回流和銷售業(yè)績的增加，從而進一步增加財務(wù)冗余，是企業(yè)不可缺少的財務(wù)冗余管理環(huán)節(jié)。 ①企業(yè)基本活動的財務(wù)冗余 控制 首先 ， 庫存管理控制。 ④對立統(tǒng)一原則。 ②系統(tǒng)化原則。 所以，財務(wù)冗余管理的目標，是以客戶為導(dǎo)向、滿足客戶需求為出發(fā)點的同一價值鏈上企業(yè)財務(wù)冗余的均衡性、有效性。 企業(yè)的基本戰(zhàn)略是建立在企業(yè)資源與能力分析的基礎(chǔ)上 ，而 安排好企業(yè)的這些資源與能力是其獲得競爭優(yōu)勢的基礎(chǔ)， 這些優(yōu)勢進而轉(zhuǎn)化為核心競爭力，為 企業(yè)創(chuàng)造價值。) ]k p b C k p bk p bk p be k p b k p b E E k p b???? ? ????? (9) 假定 * * *( , , , ) ( , , )k p b k p b?? ? ，用 ( , , , )k p ?? 表示最優(yōu)的投資政策， *( , , , )( ( ( , , , ) ) ( , ) )( 1 ) m a x , 0k p br p g y k p b k r b bkks?? ? ???? ? ? ? ? ???? ? ? ? ???????? (10) 債務(wù)政策 *( , , , )P k p b p p? ??，現(xiàn)金 余額 保留政策 *( , , , )B k p b b b? ??。, ) [ ( 39。, 39。 5在廣義米勒平衡經(jīng)濟中， (1 ) / (1 )z derr ??? ? ?。在任何狀態(tài) ( , , , )k pb? 下債務(wù)的價值由票面價值 p 簡單給出