【正文】 能的發(fā)揮，是以真實(shí)與公認(rèn)的信息為前提的。這也是我們國(guó)家的一大金融隱患。在我國(guó)證券市場(chǎng)的發(fā)展過(guò)程中，在企業(yè)改革的深入和利益分配機(jī)制的轉(zhuǎn)換中，上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息披露存在的問(wèn)題已經(jīng)引起廣大投資者、債權(quán)人和政府主管部門以及會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則制定機(jī)構(gòu)等的極大關(guān)注。關(guān)鍵詞：上市公司 博弈論 企業(yè)家市場(chǎng)29 / 38ABSTRACTWith the development of economy, more and more problems occur in the listed panies released information, such as the incorrectness, insufficiency, and unpunctuality of information, etc., all these questions will lead to serious results, in general, these results include 1. The control power of government is slackened.The macrocontrol can not be pursued without economic information, and most of the information is accounting information, and the accounting table is the media of accounting information. Once the released information bees questionable, all these information will influence the statistic data of GDP and national ine that will influence the national economy in turn, and will mislead the shortterm and longterm plan as well as currency policy, financial policy and industrial policy etc.2. Reducing the distribution function of resourceThe performance of market resource distribution is based on the true and public information. But the accounting statement with a mask will mislead the market, and the result will make the panies running of resource loose resource and resource e into where it should not flow in.3. Creditor will make the wrong decisions and the national capital will dismissBecause of the problems in the listed panies released information and the problems had not been discovered, several years ago, the bank gave the loan to some panies with bad finance status, which made the debt stayed high. This is also a hidden disease of our country’s finance.It is difficult for the deciders to find and control the running off of stateowned capital by the made up accounting statement, and the end is to find the problem bee more and more serious. The investigation of finance and tax by the financial department is only face to the middle and big panies, and it is mainly based on investigating by own and checking is only taken as a supplementary measure, every year the run off stateowned capital is more than 10 billion yuan.During the procedure of our stock market, in the exploration of pany revolution and profit distribution system, the problem of listed panies’ information publishing had attracted a great attention of mass investors, creditors, government and the institution of accounting rule formulating. Since the plexity and variability of listed panies’ information publishing, there is an existing problem about how to judge if there is something wrong with the process, and in what kind of circumstance these problems are easy to occur. The control department and accounting policy formulating institution should take what kind of measures to deal with these problems.According to the problems exist in the publishing of accounting information, this article use the method of game theory to present the reasons of its occurrence, motive and the result of the equilibrium and to illustrate the choice and relative influence of individual under certain system arrangement, by the conclusion of game analysis does some research of strategies.This article can be classified into three parts. The first one is about the problems exist in listed panies’ information publishing. The second part thoroughly discusses the analysis of accounting information, and it is from three major aspects, such as the supplier and user of accounting statement, the panies and panies, the supervisory deputy and panies. The third part focuses on the research of strategies, it mainly starts from the second part analysis by game theory, extending the discussion from the aspects of perfecting pany management structure, setting up relative incentive and restrained system, and enhancing the supervision of media.Key Words: Listed Company, Game Theory, Enterpriser Market目 錄第一部分 上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息披露存在的問(wèn)題 1一、會(huì)計(jì)信息披露的質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn) 1二、上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息披露存在的問(wèn)題 21．會(huì)計(jì)信息披露過(guò)量 22．會(huì)計(jì)信息披露不足 33．會(huì)計(jì)信息披露不完整或完全未披露 34．會(huì)計(jì)信息披露失真 4第二部分 上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息披露中的博弈分析 5一、博弈理論與會(huì)計(jì)信息披露問(wèn)題研究 51．博弈理論簡(jiǎn)介 52．用博弈理論來(lái)分析會(huì)計(jì)信息披露問(wèn)題的優(yōu)勢(shì) 7二、博弈模型分析 71．信息的提供者與使用者之間的博弈 83．監(jiān)管部門與企業(yè)之間的博弈 13第三部分 對(duì)策研究 17一、造就真實(shí)會(huì)計(jì)報(bào)表的需求主體，提高會(huì)計(jì)信息透明度 17二、上市公司應(yīng)建立相應(yīng)的激勵(lì)約束機(jī)制 201．我國(guó)上市公司激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制的現(xiàn)狀 202．解決激勵(lì)與約束機(jī)制不健全的對(duì)策 213．成功案例分析 23三、加強(qiáng)媒體對(duì)證券市場(chǎng)的監(jiān)督 241．媒體監(jiān)督的優(yōu)越性 242．媒體監(jiān)督的具體措施及其不足 25參考文獻(xiàn) 27后 記 29第一部分 上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息披露存在的問(wèn)題一、會(huì)計(jì)信息披露的質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)會(huì)計(jì)信息披露是指按照會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則編制而成的會(huì)計(jì)信息，再按照會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則披露的要求，提供給外部使用者的過(guò)程。所以，會(huì)計(jì)信息披露的質(zhì)量在很大程度上取決于對(duì)會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則和會(huì)計(jì)信息披露準(zhǔn)則執(zhí)行的程度。這里沒(méi)有用真實(shí)性作為會(huì)計(jì)信息披露的質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，是因?yàn)榻⒃跁?huì)計(jì)分期、貨幣計(jì)量、權(quán)責(zé)發(fā)生制基礎(chǔ)之上的現(xiàn)行財(cái)務(wù)會(huì)計(jì)模式，是不可能達(dá)到絕對(duì)真實(shí)性的，而相對(duì)的反映真實(shí)性是在制定會(huì)計(jì)準(zhǔn)則時(shí)準(zhǔn)則制定者所追求的重要質(zhì)量標(biāo)準(zhǔn)之一。4．及時(shí)性對(duì)信息使用者決策有用的信息必須是及時(shí)的，即會(huì)計(jì)信息只有在使用者行動(dòng)決策做出之前提供才有意義。二、上市公司會(huì)計(jì)信息披露存在的問(wèn)題1．會(huì)計(jì)信息披露過(guò)量當(dāng)會(huì)計(jì)信息供給大于會(huì)計(jì)信息需求時(shí)，會(huì)計(jì)信息披露就處于過(guò)量狀態(tài)。吳聯(lián)生（2000）的研究也表明，我國(guó)上市公司報(bào)告規(guī)范對(duì)公司股票和股東信息的披露過(guò)量，包括股票發(fā)行、上市、交易各種情況與股東結(jié)構(gòu)、數(shù)量以及他們的持股情況。據(jù)安永國(guó)際會(huì)計(jì)公司前主席葛羅夫斯調(diào)查，%的速度增長(zhǎng)，%。對(duì)于會(huì)計(jì)信息披露過(guò)量的原因，本文認(rèn)為有兩點(diǎn)：一是會(huì)計(jì)信息供給者在成本效益許可下的過(guò)度自愿披露，而這些信息一般是無(wú)關(guān)公司痛癢的一般信息；二是過(guò)度強(qiáng)制性披露的結(jié)果?？傮w而言，會(huì)計(jì)信息是供給不足的。3．會(huì)計(jì)信息披露不完整或完全未披露對(duì)于投資者特別關(guān)心的經(jīng)營(yíng)業(yè)績(jī)的回顧和分析，凈利潤(rùn)的組成和變化的原因，以及明年公司的預(yù)算，大多數(shù)公司都忽略或草草敷衍幾句。而對(duì)公司自身原因，特別是企業(yè)的管理、營(yíng)銷等問(wèn)題輕描淡寫。調(diào)查表明，%，%。從紅光實(shí)業(yè)到黎明股份，以及銀廣夏的會(huì)計(jì)舞弊案件，其造假金額都相當(dāng)巨大。合作博弈與非合作博弈之間的區(qū)別主要在于人們的行為相互作用時(shí)，當(dāng)事人能否達(dá)成一個(gè)具有約束力的協(xié)議，就是說(shuō)，有沒(méi)有一種binding agreement。博弈論的基本概念包括：參與人、行動(dòng)、信息、戰(zhàn)略、支付函數(shù)、結(jié)果、均衡。第一個(gè)角度是參與人行動(dòng)的先后順序。從這個(gè)角度，博弈可以劃分為完全信息博弈和不完全信息博弈。囚徒困境講的是兩個(gè)嫌疑犯作案后被警察抓住，分別被關(guān)在不同的屋里審訊。表中每一格的兩個(gè)數(shù)字代