【正文】
。May 20, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 2 1 Static (or SimultaneousMove) Games of Complete Information Dominated Strategies Nash Equilibrium May 20, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 2 2 Outline of Static Games of Complete Information ? Introduction to games ? Normalform (or strategicform) representation ? Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies ? Nash equilibrium ? Review of concave functions, optimization ? Applications of Nash equilibrium ? Mixed strategy equilibrium May 20, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 2 3 Today’s Agenda ? Review of previous class ? Dominated strategies ? Iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies ? Nash equilibrium May 20, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 2 4 Review ? The normalform (or strategicform) representation of a game G specifies: ? A finite set of players {1, 2, ..., n}, ? players’ strategy spaces S1 S2 ... Sn and ? their payoff functions u1 u2 ... un where ui : S1 S2 ... Sn→R . Prisoner 2 Mum Confess Prisoner 1 Mum 1 , 1 9 , 0 Confess 0 , 9 6 , 6 All binations of the strategies. A bination of the strategies is a set of strategies, one for each player May 20, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 2 5 Review ? Static (or simultaneousmove) game of plete information ? Each player’s strategies and payoff function are mon knowledge among all the players. ? Each player i chooses his/her strategy si without knowledge of others’ choices. ? Then each player i receives his/her payoff ui(s1, s2, ..., sn). ? The game ends. May 20, 2021 73347 Game TheoryLecture 2 6 Solving Prisoners’ Dilemma ? Confess always does better whatever the other player chooses ? Dominated strategy ? There exists another strategy which always does better regardless of other players’ choices Prisoner 2 Mum Confess Prisoner 1 Mum 1 , 1 9 ,