哈佛博弈論課件section-wenkub
2022-11-03 13:34:33 本頁面
【正文】 *P( ) / P(at info set) 。) / (189。, 189。 189。 off the path, NE may include incredible strategies ? In subgame perfect NE, best replies are judged in every subgame ? In perfect Bayesian equilibrium, best replies judged at each information set ? Beliefs: a probability distribution for a particular information set – In mixedstrategy NE, a belief is a probability distribution over the nodes in the other player‘s information set – In Bayes Nash equilibrium, a belief is a probability distribution over the nodes in nature‘s information set and the corresponding type of other player – In perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a belief is a probability distribution over the nodes in one‘s own information set. Nash Equilibrium ? A strategy profile S is a Nash equilibrium if and only if each player is a playing a best response to the strategies of the other players ? A strategy profile S is a strict Nash equilibrium if and only if each player‘s strategy is the single bestresponse to the strategies of the other players ? Note that there is no strategic uncertainty – Each player‘s belief about another‘s strategy is concentrated on actual strategy the other player uses MixedStrategy Nash Equilibrium ? A mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium is a mixedstrategy profi
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