哈佛博弈論課件section-文庫吧
2024-10-04 13:34 本頁面
【正文】 information set and the corresponding type of other player – In perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a belief is a probability distribution over the nodes in one‘s own information set. Nash Equilibrium ? A strategy profile S is a Nash equilibrium if and only if each player is a playing a best response to the strategies of the other players ? A strategy profile S is a strict Nash equilibrium if and only if each player‘s strategy is the single bestresponse to the strategies of the other players ? Note that there is no strategic uncertainty – Each player‘s belief about another‘s strategy is concentrated on actual strategy the other player uses MixedStrategy Nash Equilibrium ? A mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium is a mixedstrategy profile whereby each player is playing a best response to the others‘ strategies – Consists of a probability distribution over the set of strategies, for each player ? Of course, probability density may be 0 for some strategies – To solve, look for a mixed strategy for one player that makes the other players indifferent between a subset of their pure strategies ? If a player mixes over a set of strategies, it must be the case that each of those strategies yields the same expected payoff ? Thus the player is indifferent about whi
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