【正文】 續(xù)研究證明了增加股利使股價上升和削減股利通常會導致股票價格下降。因此 ,一個稅收因素的推動稅前投資者要求選擇股利回報率高的公司。布萊克 (1976)稱為股利之謎。米勒和莫迪里阿尼 (1961)(MM 理論 ),表明在一定假設(shè)條件下的現(xiàn)金股利不會影響公司的股票價格 。本科畢業(yè)論文（設(shè)計） ? 外 文 翻 譯 原文： Dividend policy and the organization of capital markets How firms determine their dividend policy has been a puzzle to financial economists for many years. Miller and Modigliani (1961) (Mamp。M assumptions. Brennan (1970), for example,relaxed the equal tax assumption. However, in Brennan’s model the higher thedividend the higher the tax penalty. Consequently, a tax wedge drives up the pretax investor required rate of return for high payout firms. Despite extensive empirical investigation this hypothesis does not seem to be borne out by the ,Poterba (1987) has documented the remarkable stability of dividend payouts throughout periods of extensive tax changes in the USA. While the impact of taxes remains inconclusive, increasing attention has been given to the problem of information asymmetries. Miller and Modigliani explicitly suggested that dividend changes could have an informational research by Watts (1973) and others have documented that initiating a dividend increases the share price and cutting a dividend generally leads to a price decline. Information asymmetries have also given rise to agency cost explanations for paying dividends. With the increased separation of ownership from control, managers frequently face very little supervision. In this context, a mitment to a high dividend policy attenuates managerial opportunism and forces the firm to frequently interact with the capital market. A central message of asymmetric information models is that dividend payments are important both as a premitment device to reduce agency costs and as a signal of management’s expectations of future earnings. Both models have been used to justify Lintner’s observation (1956) that actual dividend policies tend to follow a slowly adaptive process. However, the viability of both of these mechanisms depends on other aspects of the institutional and contracting environment. For example, if the firm is closely held there might be easier and less costly ways of municating information than by paying a dividend. Similarly, managerial control issues may be less severe in a bank centric market characterized by constant monitoring of corporate activities by lending officers. There are a variety of ways of characterizing institutional differences, but Mayer(1990) hit on one key difference: the ‘‘AngloSaxon’’ capital markets model pared to the ‘‘ContinentalGermanJapanese’’ banking model. The critical difference as Rajan (1992) pointed out is that the capital markets perspective relies on arms length contracting by ‘‘uninformed’’ investors, whereas bank debt is a contract between an informed investor frequently privy to confidential information not available in the capital market. We would expect these marked differences in the organization of the financial system to impact corporate financial policy, particularly the use of dividends as both a signaling and premitment device. In this paper, we take advantage of the recent development of an international database by the World Bank that allows for crosscountry parisons of dividend policy. Financial data is available for the largest firms from eight emerging market countries: Korea, India, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Turkey and Zimbabwe between 1980 and 1990. We analyze the dividend policies of firms from these countries, as well as the key institutional features of each country, and pare them with a control sample of US firms. Dividend signaling models offer valuable insights about the role of dividends. In particular they explain why dividends are more stable than earnings and why firms are reluctant to cut dividends. In the former case, as long as underlying permanent e