【正文】 ut the nature and content of these voluntary reports, and we pare and contrast them with the 404 reports. Our analysis includes 397 annual reports ?led by ?rms with total assets between $250 million and $5 billion. We ?nd that 36 percent of midsized panies include an MRIC in their 1998 annual report, and that the likelihood of an MRIC 1 increases with ?rm size, audit mittee meeting frequency, institutional ownership, and ine growth, and 2 decreases with sales growth. None of the reports mention any reportable conditions or material weaknesses。less than half 41 percent of the reports include a statement that controls were effective。中文 4225 字 外 文 翻 譯 外文出處 Auditing: A Journal of Practice amp。and only three of these reports include the criteria used to assess control effectiveness. Keywords:management reports on internal control。 no reports include an auditor attestation。 Palmrose and Scholz 2020 . Since the potential litigationrelated exposure from issuing a misleading MRIC is greater for larger firms, the issuance of an MRIC for larger firms is a more credible signal. We therefore expect a positive relation between firm size and an MRIC. Prior research finds that fraudulent financial reporting is more likely when controls are weak Beasley 1996。 Nicolaisen 2020 , better governed firms are likely to have better internal controls and these firms may seek to signal this fact to the capital markets by voluntarily issuing an MRIC. We measure audit mittee independence,financial expertise, and diligence, and we expect independent audit mittees, audit mittees with higher proportions of financial experts, and audit mittees that meet more frequently to be more concerned about the quality of the firm?s internal control a result, we expect a positive relation between these three governance factors and the inclusion of an MRIC. SAMPLE Our sample is from the period preceding both SOX and the Report of the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees BRC 1999 . The BRC Report spurred a heightened interest in corporate governance and might have precipitated panies to include an MRIC in their annual reports due to external pressures. The reaction of registrants to SEC and other quasiregulatory initiatives is interesting but differs from the focus of this paper. We are interested in the relation between firm characteristics and voluntary disclosure that existed before the issuance of the BRC Report. We select our sample from the population of firms with 1998 fiscal yearend data included on the July 1999 Compact D/SEC disc. There are approximately 11,900 panies included on this disc that have a 1998 yearend. We exclude panies with over $5 billion in total assets because prior research indicates that a substantial majority of very large panies include an MRIC in their annual report Raghunandan and Rama 1994 . We also exclude panies with less than $250 million in assets as prior research indicates that very small panies rarely include an MRIC McMullen et al. 1996 . We are seeking a sample with reasonable variation in whether or not an MRIC is included in the annual report。K. Raghunandan. Firm Characteristics and Voluntary Management Reports on Internal Control [J]. Auditing, 2020, :2539. 譯文： 公司特征與自愿性內(nèi)部控制管理報告 摘要：這項研究關(guān)于公司提供內(nèi)部控制管理報告 MRIC 的自愿性，在內(nèi)部控制報告被強制實行薩班斯法案 404 條款之前，就發(fā)行了有關(guān)公司特征的報告聲明。略多于三分之一的樣本有內(nèi)部控制管理報告方面的問題。許多美國證券交易委員會和一些商業(yè)協(xié)會都在抱怨與內(nèi)部控制管理報告相關(guān)的成本費用，并呼吁修改（如果不廢除） 404 條款中的一些內(nèi)容。在本文中 ,我們探討了公司特征和在 1998 年年度報告中主動披露內(nèi)部控制管理報告的自愿性之間的關(guān)系。 我們的分析包括了 397 份年度報告，這些年度報告是由總資產(chǎn)在 500 億美元和 億美元之間的企業(yè)所提供的。我們的研究結(jié)果表明，內(nèi)部控制報告是在一個自愿報告系統(tǒng)下生成，而且會跟隨企業(yè)性質(zhì)與報告的密切程度來提供的。 制度背景和假說 薩班斯法案的第 404條款要求所有上市公司在財務(wù)報告中必須披露管理者對建立和維護適當?shù)膬?nèi)部控制結(jié)構(gòu)的責任，以及對本單位內(nèi)部控制有效的管理評估。此前的研究表明，自愿披露內(nèi)部控制管理報告的財務(wù)報表使用者，可改善內(nèi)部控制，加強監(jiān)督控制，并增加決策信息。根據(jù)規(guī)則 14a9，作出此聲明是非法的如“任何申明?是虛