【正文】 (其中的利息是指企業(yè)利息收入減去利息支出后的余額)。F分?jǐn)?shù)模型中的五個(gè)自變量的選擇都是基于財(cái)務(wù)理論。反之，,則企業(yè)可繼續(xù)穩(wěn)健經(jīng)營。我認(rèn)為財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)警系統(tǒng)將會(huì)在保證其原有特征和用途的基礎(chǔ)上不斷完善。橫向要針對(duì)國有企業(yè)經(jīng)營和財(cái)務(wù)管理中的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，即主要把握好投資、籌資、應(yīng)收賬款、內(nèi)部擔(dān)保抵押、關(guān)聯(lián)交易等日常經(jīng)營管理行為中可能存在的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這樣才能對(duì)企業(yè)的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)進(jìn)行全面的監(jiān)測(cè)和控制。對(duì)于投資類企業(yè)，重點(diǎn)應(yīng)關(guān)注資產(chǎn)保值增值能力和盈利能力，可主要選擇總資產(chǎn)報(bào)酬率、資本收益類、資產(chǎn)保值增率等指標(biāo)；對(duì)于貿(mào)易類企業(yè)應(yīng)重點(diǎn)關(guān)注企業(yè)的營運(yùn)能力，或選擇應(yīng)收賬款周轉(zhuǎn)率等指標(biāo)；對(duì)于生產(chǎn)類企業(yè)，重點(diǎn)應(yīng)關(guān)注。企業(yè)財(cái)務(wù)管理者必須具有高度的警惕性和較高的財(cái)務(wù)管理能力。一般而言，保護(hù)壟斷行業(yè)、缺少必要監(jiān)管的行業(yè)、新業(yè)務(wù)層出不窮的行業(yè)出現(xiàn)財(cái)務(wù)舞弊的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)較高。如果行業(yè)出現(xiàn)危機(jī)，企業(yè)也必然受累。一般而言，企業(yè)內(nèi)部管理不健全、員工精神面貌差、管理層更換頻繁等，都是企業(yè)出現(xiàn)失敗的跡象。一般而言，企業(yè)戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)如果制定得過高或過低，都會(huì)影響企業(yè)的發(fā)展。因此，企業(yè)管理者要注意觀察、總結(jié)，然后再結(jié)合量化數(shù)據(jù)進(jìn)行定性分析判斷，從而可以提高財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)警系統(tǒng)的效用，提高自己規(guī)避風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的能力。協(xié)調(diào)好公司各個(gè)軟件系統(tǒng)之間的關(guān)系。應(yīng)當(dāng)考慮公司不同軟件系統(tǒng)的數(shù)據(jù)傳遞和各個(gè)系統(tǒng)對(duì)各種數(shù)據(jù)的不同要求，實(shí)現(xiàn)公司信息共享，使各個(gè)軟件系統(tǒng)之間的關(guān)系變得更加和諧。(2)根據(jù)行業(yè)特征選擇合適的財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)，可以對(duì)財(cái)務(wù)指標(biāo)進(jìn)行創(chuàng)新性的重合，可以保證財(cái)務(wù)比率指標(biāo)更加具有科學(xué)性和實(shí)際應(yīng)用價(jià)值。財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)預(yù)警研究有著廣闊的發(fā)展前景，日益被人們所關(guān)注，但對(duì)其研究需要在長(zhǎng)期內(nèi)得到發(fā)展和完善。致謝在論文完成之際，我要特別感謝我的指導(dǎo)老師李奇志老師的熱情關(guān)懷和悉心指導(dǎo)。感謝我的室友們，從遙遠(yuǎn)的家來到這個(gè)陌生的城市里，是你們和我共同維系著彼此之間兄弟般的感情，維系著寢室那份家的融洽。四年里，我們沒有紅過臉，沒有吵過嘴，沒有發(fā)生上大學(xué)前所擔(dān)心的任何不開心的事情。在論文的寫作過程中，也得到了許多同學(xué)的寶貴建議，同時(shí)還到許多在工作過程中許多同事的支持和幫助，在此一并致以誠摯的謝意。 最后，向在百忙中抽出時(shí)間對(duì)本文進(jìn)行評(píng)審并提出寶貴意見的各位專家表示衷心地感謝。. 2002.[2]Raynor M E, flexibility in R and D[M].Review of Financial .[4][M]. 2004（2）：3480[5][J].現(xiàn)代會(huì)計(jì)，2004,1：2329.[6][J].財(cái)經(jīng)論叢,2003,1：3138.[7][M].價(jià)值工程，2005（4）.[12]鐘敏，[J] ，2005（7）.[13][J].內(nèi)蒙古財(cái)經(jīng)學(xué)院學(xué)報(bào)，2005（3）:2225.附錄In financial prewarning of qualitative research, scholars from the enterprise crisis caused by the development of internal and external factors is discussed, and the various stages of financial crisis and the detailed research, analysis of the problems in all aspects are very deep. But the conclusion can be engaged in the qualitative and quantitative model directly bined still small. If the enterprise financial difficulties of various factors, but how these factors for financial prewarning model, this paper does not see more people.Research a brief ment on:In the existing financial earlywarning index selection, based on the theory of financial monly often, risk management theory, theory and even sometimes depends on the intuitive judgment and the availability of information, many researchers also found no convincing financial risk prewarning theoretical support and established by the early warning model, thus causing the various financial prewarning model inconsistent conclusions, the warning and even conflicting and conflict. The financial risks of enterprise39。s action under the condition of this game action, called oneoff game. In the actual operating environment, many game is not a onetime, but repeated, such as an enterprise established low price, the petitor may adopt the same strategy, because of this strategy is the damage of their own interests, therefore, the price to follow a bottom line, if the existing strategy game is infinite repetition, player may establish a mon protocols and make the game to stop.In economics, often see in the example is dominant strategy equilibrium. Due to the game process of each game strategies, each game relevance of optimal strategies depend on all other game of strategy. But in some particular game, a game the optimal strategy may not depend on other player strategies, namely, regardless of what the other game on the game, the strategies for selection of a particular strategy is always the optimal strategies, such as pure. Assume the market with two manufacturers are always full production, if the manufacturer to expand capacity, may get more market share, but will be facing the market price pressure. Each manufacturer are able to independently, if given decision making capacity of manufacturer for no strategy to expand capacity, then, in the decision, the manufacturer b not to expand capacity b will gain economic profits 180 million Yuan, to expand capacity b will gain economic profits of 200 million Yuan, visible, in this case, the manufacturer b will choose to expand capacity this decision, Similarly, when manufacturers of strategy determine to expand capacity, not a manufacturer will expand capacity in economic profit is million Yuan, will expand capacity in economic profit, manufacturers, 160 million Yuan will choose a expand capacity. In this example we don39。但從事定性研究的結(jié)論能夠直接和定量模型結(jié)合起來的還不多。國內(nèi)外研究簡(jiǎn)評(píng): 在國內(nèi)外現(xiàn)有的財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)警研究中,指標(biāo)的選擇往往基于一般的財(cái)務(wù)理論、風(fēng)險(xiǎn)理論和管理理論，有時(shí)甚至取決于研究者的直觀判斷以及資料的可獲得性，眾多研究者還沒有找到令人信服的財(cái)務(wù)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和預(yù)警理論來支撐所建立的預(yù)警模型,由此造成了各種財(cái)務(wù)預(yù)警模型的預(yù)警結(jié)論不一致，甚至相互矛盾和沖突。博弈論又稱對(duì)策論，是一種分析戰(zhàn)略行為的方法。博弈論由約翰紐曼和奧斯卡目前博弈論已越來越多地被應(yīng)用于公司及政府決策分析，在所有決策者為理性假定下，每個(gè)決策者試圖預(yù)測(cè)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的可能行為和反應(yīng)時(shí)的最優(yōu)決策制定。各種博弈的過程是不同的，比如每個(gè)博弈者在不知道其他博弈者將如何做，以及沒有機(jī)會(huì)對(duì)對(duì)方的行動(dòng)作出反應(yīng)的情況下采取行動(dòng)，這種博弈被稱為一次性博弈。在經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)中經(jīng)常見到的例子是占優(yōu)策略均衡。但在一些特殊博弈中，一個(gè)博弈者的最優(yōu)策略可能并不依賴于其他博弈者的策略選擇，即不管其他博弈者選擇什么策略，對(duì)該博弈者而言選擇某一策略永遠(yuǎn)是最優(yōu)的，這樣的策略稱為“占優(yōu)策略”。每個(gè)廠商都能夠同時(shí)獨(dú)立地作出產(chǎn)能決策，如果給定廠商甲的戰(zhàn)略為“不擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能”，那么，在廠商乙的決策中，“不擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能”廠商乙將會(huì)獲得年經(jīng)濟(jì)利潤180萬元，“擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能”廠商乙將會(huì)獲得年經(jīng)濟(jì)利潤200萬元，可見，在這種情況下，廠商乙將選擇“擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能”這一決策；同理，當(dāng)廠商乙的戰(zhàn)略確定為“擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能”，廠商甲“不擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能”將獲得年經(jīng)濟(jì)利潤150萬元，“擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能”將獲得年經(jīng)濟(jì)利潤160萬元，可見，廠商甲將選擇“擴(kuò)大產(chǎn)能