【正文】 rgument for aftertax performance measures: Were pretax ine to govern incentives, then employees with bonuses on their minds would pay far less attention to favorable tax implications....But because incentive pensation reflects aftertax earnings...managers are rewarded when taxes are lowered. The above arguments are consistent with evidence that midlevel managers respond to explicit bonusbased incentives (., Kahn and Sherer 1990。s SBU managers on an aftertax basis is thus expected to promote efforts that lead to a lower ETR. The second hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as follows: H2: Using aftertax SBUmanager accountingbased performance measures leads to lower ETR. III. EMPIRICAL MODELS To test the hypotheses stated in the previous section, the following equations are estimated cross sectionally: Variable Definitions Endogenous Variables The effective tax rate (ETR) is defined as the ratio of total tax expense (TTE) to pre tax ine. An average annual ETR for the threeyear period 19951997 is used to control for unexplained yeartoyear fluctuations in the annual ETR. TTE is used in the numerator because only efforts that lower TTE decrease the ETR and increase aftertax earnings. Accordingly, the ETR as currently measured represents the appropriate theoretical construct for evaluating the 10 effectiveness of using aftertax accountingbased bonus plans. There are at least two potential issues, however, regarding measurement of the ETR using TTE in the numerator. First, TTE excludes the effects of temporary booktax differences, so taxplanning actions that result in a tax deferral are not reflected in the ETR. For example, a more favorable purchase price allocation in an asset acquisition, which leads to greater booktax depreciation differences, is not reflected in the ETR. Similarly, investments in special purpose entities could lead to temporary differences that are not reflected in the ETR (., Hanlon 2020). Locating a foreign subsidiary in a lowtax country and postponing the repatriation of the foreign earnings is another way to defer taxes and does not impact the ETR unless the firm takes the financial reporting position that the foreign earnings are permanently or indefinitely reinvested (Krull 2020). To the extent that a firm39。 taxplanning efforts. The second measurement issue regarding the ETR is that TTE excludes the tax benefit of deductions resulting from the exercise of nonqualified employee stock options (ESO). Firms that have little or no tax liability because of their ESO deductions could have high ETR, which can be problematic in studies that attempt to use the ETR to measure a firm39。s incentive to engage in taxplanning actions (., Hanlon and Shevlin 2020). Arguably, these firms have little incentive to engage in costly tax planning actions and are unlikely to use aftertax performance measures. Adjusting the ETR to reflect the tax benefit of the ESO deductions would result in lower ETR for these firms, despite the appropriate use of pretax pensation, and would bias toward failing to reject the null hypotheses of no association between aftertax performance measures and ETR. CEO TAX is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CEO receives an annual bonus based, at least in part, on an accounting measure determined on an aftertax basis, and 0 otherwise. BUATAX equals 1 if the firm uses a unitbased accounting measure in the pensation plans of a majority of its BU managers and this measure reflects the allocation of at least one unitspecific ine tax If a firm does not use a businessunitbased accounting measure, then BUATAX equals 1 if the firm uses an aftertax firmwide accounting measure to pensate its BU managers. The ETR model also includes two selectivity correction variables, A CEO and SBU, which represent the doubleselection analogs to the Heckman (1976) singleequation inverse Mills39。s taxplanning opportunities. The 11 rationale for including these variables in the ETR equation is that a firm39。 Atwood et al. 1998。 但不包括那些臨時(shí) 繳稅財(cái)產(chǎn)清單和稅率 差異造成的加速折舊 ， 因?yàn)檫@些差異并不影響一個(gè)公司的稅后會(huì)計(jì)盈余，用于測(cè)量稅后會(huì)計(jì) 績(jī)效 為基礎(chǔ)的獎(jiǎng)金計(jì)劃。 與以前的文獻(xiàn) 相 一致， Dhaliwal et al. (2020) 發(fā)現(xiàn)有更大的稅收抵免和 繳稅財(cái)產(chǎn)清單和稅率 差異絕對(duì)值 使 公司更容易 給 首席執(zhí)行官 高的稅后報(bào)酬 。 目前 研究 首席執(zhí)行官的稅后 報(bào)酬和 出口退稅 的關(guān)系。 本文還擴(kuò)展了稅前稅后報(bào)酬 的 分析，以作為激勵(lì)事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的薪酬計(jì)劃。 該公司的稅務(wù)專(zhuān)業(yè)人士不 僅要幫助該公司的事業(yè)部經(jīng)理在稅務(wù)規(guī)劃?rùn)C(jī)會(huì)的選擇， 而且在他們制定和執(zhí)行戰(zhàn)略，以利用這些機(jī)會(huì)合作。 Young 1999), 這有助于降低出口退稅 ， 通過(guò) 國(guó)家報(bào)告 反 映的 事業(yè)部經(jīng)理參與 減少（增加）收入的其他例子，有助于降低出口退稅。 上述討論表明，事業(yè)部經(jīng)理 的 參與對(duì)降低出口退稅是有幫助的。如果是這樣的話(huà)，那么明確的獎(jiǎng)勵(lì)工資就沒(méi)有必要去激勵(lì)他們付出 更多的 努力 了。 這迫使經(jīng)營(yíng)單位站在對(duì)節(jié)稅有利的立場(chǎng) 13 上 考慮問(wèn)題 。 上述論點(diǎn)的證據(jù)表明，與 中層管 理人員 額外 獎(jiǎng)金的激勵(lì)機(jī)制相一致 (., Kahn and Sherer 1990。 一個(gè)公司的事業(yè)部經(jīng)理額外報(bào)酬 基于稅后收益，預(yù)計(jì)會(huì)使管理人員更加努力， 導(dǎo)致較低的出口退稅。 為了測(cè)試在上一節(jié)所述的假設(shè)，下面的等式 通過(guò)部分 估計(jì)： 變量定義 內(nèi)生函數(shù) 實(shí)際的出口退稅率被定義為稅收總收入的費(fèi)用率關(guān)于稅前收入。因?yàn)橹挥信档统隹谕硕?，才?huì)增加稅后收益。 至少有兩個(gè)潛在的問(wèn)題， 然而，出口退稅方面的測(cè)量，在計(jì)算中的使用。例如，一個(gè)更加有利的購(gòu)買(mǎi)資產(chǎn)的收購(gòu)，從而導(dǎo)致更大的賬面折舊攤銷(xiāo)的差異，是不會(huì)體現(xiàn)在出口退稅上的。設(shè)立一個(gè)外國(guó)子公司在低稅率的國(guó)家 和推遲遣返外國(guó)收入的另一種方式是推遲納稅并不會(huì)影響出口退稅，除非該公司是以財(cái)務(wù)報(bào)告的立場(chǎng)，即外國(guó)收益永久或無(wú)限期地投資 (Krull 2020)。 第二次測(cè)量有關(guān)出口退稅問(wèn)題，計(jì)算時(shí)排除了由非限定員工股票期權(quán)產(chǎn)生的扣除稅收優(yōu)惠。 可以說(shuō)，這些企業(yè)缺乏動(dòng)力去從事代價(jià)高昂的稅務(wù)規(guī)劃行動(dòng)并不太可能使用稅后業(yè)績(jī)的措施。 如果首席執(zhí)行官收到年度獎(jiǎng)金，則 總裁稅 的指標(biāo)變量等 1，一位首席執(zhí)行官和事業(yè)部經(jīng)理 ， 它代表的赫克曼單方程逆米爾斯比雙選模擬 (1976)。 這些變量詳細(xì)描述在下面“估計(jì) ” 小節(jié)。 包括在這些變量方程的理由是，各個(gè)公司的法定的出口退稅率不同，因此有機(jī)會(huì)采取行動(dòng)，增加出口退稅，從而 減少應(yīng)稅收入或增加稅收抵免 (Mills et al. 1998)。 Atwood et al. 1998。由于所在地稅務(wù) 的 影響， 跨國(guó)經(jīng)營(yíng)的企業(yè)預(yù)計(jì)將有較大的稅務(wù)規(guī)劃?rùn)C(jī)會(huì)，更多的遣返和轉(zhuǎn)移定價(jià)決策， 為跨國(guó)經(jīng)營(yíng)的代理，作為外國(guó)資產(chǎn)的比例，截至 2020 年年底，以 CAPINT 作為財(cái)產(chǎn)的比例計(jì)算總資產(chǎn)的賬面價(jià)值，廠(chǎng)房和設(shè)備的總 資產(chǎn)，截至 2020 年年底以 1997 年（ BVA）賬面價(jià)值，并列入有關(guān)控制固定資產(chǎn)投資的機(jī)會(huì)。截至 2020 年的比例，以 1997 年年底的自然對(duì)數(shù) 作為BVA。 LEV 是從 1997 年至 2020 年底的長(zhǎng)期負(fù)債比率。 IND 是一個(gè) 采礦和建筑行業(yè)的指標(biāo)變數(shù)的向量，交通和通訊，公用事業(yè)，銷(xiāo)售，金融機(jī)構(gòu) 和保險(xiǎn)，服務(wù)業(yè)。