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【正文】 a certain date. ? The shareholder’s claim on firm value is the residual amount that remains after the debtholders are paid. ? If the value of the firm is less than the amount promised to the debtholders, the shareholders get nothing. Capital Structure :Debt and Equity 113 Corporate Finance 169。 Professor HoMou Wu Combined Payoffs to Debt and Equity $F $F Combined Payoffs to debt holders and shareholders Value of the firm (X) Debt holders are promised $F. Payoff to debt holders Payoff to shareholders If the value of the firm is less than $F, the shareholder’s claim is: Max[0,$X – $F] = $0 and the debt holder’s claim is Min[$F,$X] = $X. The sum of these is = $X If the value of the firm is more than $F, the shareholder’s claim is: Max[0,$X – $F] = $X – $F and the debt holder’s claim is: Min[$F,$X] = $F. The sum of these is = $X 115 Corporate Finance 169。 Professor HoMou Wu Asymmetric Information and Agency Costs ? There is asymmetric information between shareholders and managers. ? How to induce managers to act in the shareholders’ interests ? – The shareholders can devise contracts that align the incentives of the managers with the goals of the shareholders. – The shareholders can monitor the managers behavior. ? (Agency Cost) This contracting and monitoring is costly.
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