【正文】 her things, such an appreciation can help both proponents and critics of subjective measures to develop clearer and more effective arguments. Proponents of subjective measures– like those who argue for the development of NWBAs – will want to identify the most plausible interpretation of these measures, so as to permit the development of as strong a case as possible in their favor. Critics – like those who argue for the superiority of traditional economic or capabilitybased measures – will want to zero in on the most plausible interpretation of subjective measures so as to avoid the charge that they are attacking a straw man. My hope is that in the end, a clearer appreciation for the foundations of subjective measures can help remove obstacles to scientific munication, collaboration, and progress.2. Subjective wellbeing and wellbeing simpliciterIn this section, I explore the relationship between subjective wellbeing and wellbeing simpliciter in the writings on subjective measures. I will argue that proponents of subjective measures of wellbeing disagree about the relationship between subjective wellbeing and wellbeing simpliciter: about whether subjective wellbeing constitutes wellbeing simpliciter or merely is a ponent of it.As my starting point, I take the concept of wellbeing, that is, what I have so far called wellbeing simpliciter: “what we have when our lives are going well for us, when we are living lives that are not necessarily morally good, but good for us” (Tiberius, 2006, p. 493,italics in original). Let us call this the “core” concept of wellbeing. There are many other terms that are used in the same sense, including “a person’s good, benefit, advantage, interest, prudential value, welfare, happiness, flourishing, eudaimonia, and utility” (Moore amp。 this would make little sense if, in fact, subjective measures were not intended to represent that which the other measures were designed to represent viz. welfare or wellbeing. Second, the proponents’ concept of wellbeing plays the very same role as that played by the core concept: those who defend the use of subjective measures of wellbeing often emphasize that they think of wellbeing as that which is ultimately good for the individual, as that which is worth promoting in the life of others, and as a central (sometimes the only) ultimate goal for public policy (cf. Diener amp。Sarin, 1997。 Watson, 1930).Over the years, philosophers have tried to shed light on the concept of wellbeing by developing and defending various accounts, or conceptions of wellbeing. Here, I follow Parfit (1984, –502) in dividing such accounts into three main classes: mental state accounts, preferencesatisfaction or desirefulfillment accounts, and objectivelist According to mentalstate accounts, wellbeing is a “mental state” or a “state of mind.” Because these accounts all see welfare “as having to enter our experience,” they are said to satisfy the experience requirement (Griffin, 1986, p. 13). Scanlon writes: “Experiential theories hold that the quality of life ‘for the person who lives it’ is pletely determined by its experiential quality,” where “experiential quality” refers to “what it would be like to live it” (Scanlon, 1998, pp. 97, 99). On this view, then, subjectively felt experience is both necessary and sufficient for a person’s wellbeing. According to desirefulfillment or preferencesatisfaction accounts, by contrast, a person is well off to the extent that her desires are fulfilled and/or her preferences are satisfied. Scanlon puts it this way:Desire theories reject the experience requirement and allow that a person’s life can be made better and worse not only by changes in that person’s states of consciousness but also by changes elsewhere in the world which fulfill that person’s preferences (Scanlon, 1993, p. 186).Such accounts do not require that a person who is well off experience any feelings of happiness or satisfaction. What they do require is that her desires are fulfilled (or that her preferences are satisfied), which does not e down to the same thing. The two kinds of account described so far are frequently referred to as subjective accounts, because they describe a person’s wellbeing as (at least partly) a function of his or her feelings, experiences, desires, and so on. According to socalled objective accounts, by contrast, a person’s wellbeing does not depend on such subjective factors. On such accounts, “certain things are good or bad for beings, independently in at least some cases of whether they are desired or whether they give rise to pleasurable experiences” (Chappell amp。 Harsanyi, 1982。 McPherson, 2006). This is evident, among other things, from the fact that welfare economists traditionally have defended their measures by showing that they are utility functions, that is, that they are indices of preference satisfaction. It has also been noted that measures inspired by the capability approach are based on objectivelist accounts of wellbeing (Nussbaum, 2008。 note, in particular, the use of the term “subjective wellbeing” as synonymous with “wellbeing.” The explicit reference to states of mind strongly suggests that what he has in mind is some type of mentalstate account.Similarly, Ed Diener writes: “The area of subjective wellbeing is subjective. [It] resides within the experience of the individual” (Diener, 1984, p. 543). Diener and Eunkook Suh reinforce the point: Subjective wellbeing research is concerned with individuals’ subjective experiences of their lives. The underlying assumption is that wellbeing can be defined by people’s conscious experiences—in terms of hedonic feelings or cognitive satisfactions. The field is built on the presumption that to understand the individuals’ experiential quality of wellbeing, it is appropriate to directly examine how a person feels about life in the context of his or her own standards (Diener amp。 Suh, 1998, p. 33。Diener, 2008, p. 69).