【正文】
or pledge personal collateral against external debt provided by financial institutions. The intermediaries in private markets also evaluate the personal finances of the inside owners including assets that are not invested in the firm so these personal assets also have a bearing on the capital structure of the firm. Finally, the vast majority of small businesses are ownermanaged, which alleviates agency conflicts between owners and managers that affect capital structure choices in large corporations. However, owner management may introduce other factors into capital structure decisions of small firms, such as the owner/manager’s level of risk aversion, or his/her incentive to issue external debt rather than external equity in order to keep ownership and control of the firm. While much research has begun on the topic of small business finance, even more remains to be done. Our analysis of the financial growth cycle and the interconnectedness of small firm finance suggests that some of the most exciting areas for future research may involve investigating how sources of small firm finance may change over the business cycle, in reaction to changes in government policy, during times of distress in private or public markets, and as information processing technology continues to improve. Moreover, it is important to determine the effects of the availability and cost of small business finance on the formation of new firms, their ability to engage in risky or opaque activities, and their effects on employment, real output, and economic growth. The availability of new data resources described and employed here should prove very useful in pursuing these and other research agendas on small business finance. 引自: Berger A N, Udell G F. The Economics of Small Business Finance: the Role of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 1998, 22: 613— 673. 。 引自: .小企業(yè)金融經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué):私人股票和債券市場(chǎng)在財(cái)政增長周期中的作用 [J]。此外,重要的是要確定的可用性和形成新的企業(yè)的小企業(yè)融資成本的影響,他們有能力從事高風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 或不透明的活動(dòng),并在就業(yè),實(shí)際產(chǎn)出和經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的影響。 雖然大量的研究已經(jīng)開始對(duì)小企業(yè)融資的話題,更有待完成。最后,絕大多數(shù)是小企業(yè)所有者管理,減輕影響的大型企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)選擇的所有者和管理者之間的代理沖突。即使在小企業(yè)之間的內(nèi)部融資和外部融資的區(qū)別并不總是徹底清除,因?yàn)闃I(yè)內(nèi)人士往往對(duì)金融機(jī)構(gòu)提供的外債提供個(gè)人擔(dān)?;虺兄Z個(gè)人抵押品。此外,小企業(yè)普遍接受私人“股權(quán)和債務(wù)市 場(chǎng)的外部資金,而不是公眾街市。 周圍的小企業(yè)的資本結(jié)構(gòu)的問題,一般都是比那些大型企業(yè)最重要的不同,往往涉及與該公司的財(cái)政狀況的企業(yè)家和其他知情人的個(gè)人財(cái)務(wù)的相互交織。本文探討了一些小企業(yè)融資方面,投資者和中介機(jī)構(gòu)提供的,和私人股票和債券市場(chǎng)中,它們的功能。 公眾的焦點(diǎn)對(duì)小企業(yè)的金融衍生無