外文翻譯----瑞士社會(huì)健康保險(xiǎn)：共同支付-其他專業(yè)-在線瀏覽
2025-03-24 09:12本頁面
【正文】 ine as well as his/her premium (for details, see Werblow and Felder 2021). The estimation results confirm the hypotheses:The higher health care expenditure in the past, the higher the probability that an individual distances himself from choosing an optional (higher)deductible. Lowine individuals likewise prefer the pulsory minimal deductible. Individuals with a low ine fear the risk of high copayments more than highine persons. Individuals living in highpremium regions more likely choose a higher deductible. This has to do with the regulation of proportional rebates. For any deductible,the rebate in absolute terms, therefore, increases with the premium level. For this reason, in highpremium regions, it is more profitable to restrict insurance coverage by means of a high deductible. Does moral hazard exist in Swiss healthcare insurance? In the second step of the estimation, we dealt with the explanation of the demand for healthcare services,given the choice of contract. By taking into account the endogeneity of the choice, it is possible to out the effect of selection from the change in demand. In the second estimation, age, sex and ine, but also supplyside factors such as the density of physicians in the neighborhood of an insured serve as explanatory variables for the demand for healthcare services. The estimation results confirm to a large extent the existence of moral hazard. Despite selfselection, healthcare expenditure for highdeductible individuals is significantly lower pared to individuals with a minimal deductible. Figure 2 summarizes the results for an average male person. The first bar in each category shows the observed reduction of healthcare expenditure for the four optional deductibles pared to the level of the minimal deductible (corresponds to the bars in Fig. 1). The next two bars present the division of this change between selfselection and moral fortyyearold man who opted for a deductible of€270 on average incurs 30 percent lower health care expenditure than a man of the same age and a minimal deductible of € 160. Two thirds of this reduction are – according to our estimations – due to selfselection. The remaining one third is caused by a change in behavior. The same division between selfselection and moral hazard occurs at the deductible level of € the two highest deductibles, moral hazard is more prone. Of the observed change in health care expenditure 70 percent is due to moral a higher reduction of healthcare expenditure in total, selfselection makes up 30 percent. Deductibles in Switzerland reduce healthcare demand The Swiss social health insurance system includes differentiated optional deductible schemes. The insured appear to deal rationally with these options, . as in other insurance sectors theychoose their coverage depending on the expected damages and the premiums. Our study based on healthcare expenditure data of 60,000 individuals shows that price signals from deductibles significantly affect behavior even when taking into account the endogeneity of the contract deductibles substantially reduce healthcare expenditure. Even though part of the reduction of health care expenditure is due to the rational choice of contracts,coinsurance induces a change in demand that significantly contributes to the on the si
環(huán)評公示相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號(hào)-1