【正文】 ntions, A would be liable as an acplice for B39。s motor vehicle code), now assume Y not only recklessly bees involved in a fatal vehicle crash but also that Y collides with a gasoline truck, which explodes and causes a nearby building to catch fire. If we agree that when X gives the intoxicated Y the keys to her car she should be held accountable for all natural and probable consequences, it is arguable that X is liable not only for reckless homicide if Y is involved in a fatal collision while driving X39。 decision deals with two important questions relating to the mental element required for conviction as an acplice to murder. First, is it enough that the defendant is reckless as to the principal mitting murder, or must he intend that the principal do so? Secondly, if the acplice contemplates that the principal will cause death or serious bodily with one weapon, but the principal does so using a different weapon, which the acplice did not realise that the principal had, is the acplice still guilty? The House of Lords answered the first question by holding that the acplice only needed to contemplate the murder as a possible incident of the joint venture. It was not necessary that he should intend that it occur. This confirmed the existing general law as laid down in. Counsel for the appellants had 蘇州大學(xué)本科生畢業(yè)設(shè)計(jì)（論文） 5 argued that the rule for murder should be different to that of the general law: recklessness was insufficient to make a principal guilty of murder, so it ought not to be enough for a secondary party. It is submitted that their Lordships correctly rejected this argument. One can be guilty as an acplice either by intending that the principal mit the main offence or by being reckless as to its mission. There is no reason in principle why this should not apply to murder in the same way that it does to all other offences (see the mentary on Powell in the Court of Appeal [19961 Criminal Law Review, 201 at ). Counsel for the appellants39。s liability depend on that of the principal: unless the principal is guilty of murder the question of the acplice39。derivative principle39。s own state of mind. For example, if the acplice tells the principal that a person asleep on the floor covered by a blanket is a bolster and encourages the principal to shoot at it, the principal is not guilty of murder if the victim is killed by the shot (there is no mens rea). But the acplice is guilty of murder: he had the guilty mind and achieved theactus reus by using an agent. It is important to emphasise that the Lords39。s appeal should be allowed since he had not contemplated the fatal act. Lord Hutton added that if the primary party used a different weapon to the one contemplated by the secondary party, but it was 39。 (at ), then the secondary party would still be liable. Restrictions of space prevent a full analysis of their Lordships39。 reasoning would acquit the acplice in this situation because the principal availed himself of a means more dangerous than those contemplated by the acplice. Should the degree of danger offered by the weapon really be the crucial factor, so that an acplice contemplating a death by strangling when the principal shoots instead is innocent, but the acplice who contemplates a stabbing when the principal shoots instead is guilty? Is it sensible to draw such fine distinctions between the relative danger of the means used and the means contemplated when both are sufficiently dangerous to kill the victim and death is what the acplice expected? The speeches contain important dicta. Lord Steyn offered observations on the mental element in murder, although the appeals did not raise any question concerning it. His Lordship thought that it was particularly inappropriate that an intention to cause only serious bodily harm was sufficient, since it meant that 39。 ( at ). In his view this was a question of definition which could be swiftly reformed by limiting the mens rea of murder to an intention to kill. There was, however, a similar and more relevant question of definition in the background of the case before their Lordships. The Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 provided that anyone aiding, abetting, counseling or procuring an offence shall be 39。. To convict an acplice to murder of murder means that 39。. The same is true, mutates mutandis, of all other crimes. Is this merely a matter of terminology? Not all acplices are less