創(chuàng)業(yè)融資外文翻譯-企業(yè)融資-在線瀏覽
2025-03-24 07:45本頁(yè)面
【正文】 nterpretation, it will be shown that this investor takes debt in equilibrium. Briefly, the intuition is that when one is uninformed, one solves the adverse selection problem in the traditional way. As mentioned in the introduction, this solution is debt. An alternative source of capital is an investor endowed with technology that can evaluate project quality. This investor is referred to as a VC. Consistent with this identification, it will be shown that the VC takes highpowered contracts in equilibrium. Likewise, it needs to be shown that the VC actually employs the screening technology. A priori, this usage is not obvious. In particular, if the financial contract is very generous (if it leaves the VC with a large stake), then it may be profitable to forego the costly evaluation in favor of funding all projects. Such an oute would benefit bad entrepreneurs, because they too would like to attract funding provided they can pool with good firms and thereby obtain mispriced financing. By limiting this pooling, costly due diligence effects a transfer from bad entrepreneurs to good entrepreneurs, and in the process, directs real investment toward better projects. Entrepreneurs seeking venture capital finance form a (randomly ordered) queue, and the VC sequentially evaluates them. For each entrepreneur, upon paying a cost C the VC receives a signal s ∈ {G, B} with Pr{s = G | entrepreneur is bad} = Pr{s = B | entrepreneur is good} =ε (3) The unconditional probability of a good signal is θ (1 ? ε) + (1 ? θ )ε, so VCs expect to evaluate 1/(θ (1 ? ε) + (1 ? θ )ε) entrepreneurs before a good one is found. The financial contract must be sufficiently generous (ex ante) as to pensate the VC for both capital contribution K and expected evaluation costs C = C/(θ (1 ? ε) + (1 ? θ )ε) incurred in the process of obtaining each good signal. This game admits three types of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In separating equilibrium, good entrepreneurs offer a security which bad entrepreneurs find too unpleasant to mimic (choosing instead to receive reservation utility V). Adverse selection in the queue bees degenerate since only good firms are active. VC equilibrium serve as a second solution. In this scenario, the entrepreneurs’ contracts induce the investor to evaluate all firms in the queue. Finally, pooling can be thought of as the case in which good entrepreneurs find both of the aforementioned solutions to adverse selection too expensive. In this paper, I limit attention to debt and equity. Earlier drafts considered arbitrary securities, with similar resulting intuition: highpowered securities promote due diligence, whereas lowpowered securities are more effective signaling devices. The restriction to standard securities simplifies the presentation, retains the crucial intuition, and facilitates parison of my results with those of the existing literature. This paper argues that in entrepreneurial finance markets, direct revelation of project quality (via the due diligence of VCs) is more costeffective than signaling quality. This theme ties into an empirical literature showing that the due diligence process in those markets is quite extensive. Indeed, due diligence is a defining feature of the VC market. Several features of the model are quite strong and give the appearance that the mechanisms considered for resolving adverse selection are perfect substitutes. In a richer model, the two mechanisms could work as partial plements as well. Generally, a role exists for both entrepreneurial signaling and VC due diligence. Earlier drafts of the paper show plement may be motivated in multiple ways. For examp
高考資料相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號(hào)-1