諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)經(jīng)典理論—納什均衡的ppt詳解(ppt31)-經(jīng)濟(jì)理論-在線瀏覽
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【正文】 , firm 1’s problem so, . 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1*1a r g m a x ( , ( ) ) [ ( ) ]2q q R q q a q R q cacq?? ? ? ? ????*2 4acq ??Cont’d Compare with the Cournot model. Having more information may be a bad thing Exercise: Extend the analysis to firm case. n Two stage games of plete but imperfect information Theory: SubGame Perfection ? Here the information set is not a singleton. ? Consider following games (1)Players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose actions and from feasible sets and , respectively. (2) Players 3 and 4 observe the oute of the first stage ( , ) and then simultaneously choose actions and from feasible sets and , respectively. (3) Payoffs are , 2a1a1A 2A1a 2a3A 4A1 2 3 4 ( , , , )iu a a a a 1, 2, 3, 4i ?An approach similar to Backward Induction 1 and 2 anticipate the second behavior of 3 and 4 will be given by then the first stage interaction between 1 and 2 amounts to the following simultaneousmove game: (1)Players 1 and 2 simultaneously choose actions and from feasible sets and respectively. (2) Payoffs are Subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is 1a**3 1 2 4 1 2( ( , ) , ( , ) )a a a a a a2a**1 2 3 1 2 4 1 2( , , ( , ) , ( , ) )iu a a a a a a a a* * * *1 2 3 4( , , , )a a a a1A 2A An Example: Banks Runs ? Two depositors: each deposits D in a bank, which invest these deposits in a longterm project. ? Early liquidation before the project matures, 2r can be recovered, where DrD/2. If the bank allows the investment to reach maturity, the project will pay out a total of 2R, where RD. ? Assume there is no discounting. ? Insert Matrixes ? Interpretation of The model, good versus bad equilibrium. Cont’d ? Date 1 ? Date 2 r, r D,2rD 2rD, D Next stage R, R 2RD,
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