【正文】 8 Chapter 1 Bargaining Strategy ? Alternative outes are possible if firms or individuals can make promises that can be enforced. 109 Chapter 1 Bargaining Strategy ? Consider: ? Two firms introducing one of two plementary goods. 110 Chapter 1 Bargaining Strategy Firm 1 Produce A Produce B Produce A Produce B Firm 2 40, 5 50, 50 5, 45 60, 40 111 Chapter 1 Bargaining Strategy Firm 1 Produce A Produce B Produce A Produce B Firm 2 40, 5 50, 50 5, 45 60, 40 ? With collusion: ? Produce A1B2 ? Without collusion: ? Produce A1B2 ? Nash equilibrium 112 Chapter 1 Bargaining Strategy ? Suppose ? Each firm is also bargaining on the decision to join in a research consortium with a third firm. 113 Chapter 1 Bargaining Strategy Firm 1 Work alone Enter consortium Work alone Enter consortium Firm 2 10, 10 10, 20 40, 40 20, 10 114 Chapter 1 Bargaining Strategy Firm 1 Work alone Enter consortium Work alone Enter consortium Firm 2 10, 10 10, 20 40, 40 20, 10 ? Dominant strategy ? Both enter 115 Chapter 1 Bargaining Strategy ? Linking the Bargain Problem ? Firm 1 announces it will join the consortium only if Firm 2 agrees to produce A and Firm 1 will produce B. ?Firm 1’s profit increases from 50 to 60 116 Chapter 1 Bargaining Strategy ? Strengthening Bargaining Power ? Credibility ? Reducing flexibility 117 Chapter 1 Negotiating Game: An Example You play the following bargaining game. Player A moves first, and makes Player B an offer for the division of RMB100 with offer in units of RMB1. (For example, Player A could suggest that she takes RMB60 and Player B takes RMB40). Player B can accept or reject the offer. If he rejects, the amount of money available drops to RMB90, and he then makes an offer for the division of this amount. If Player A rejects this offer, the amount of money drops to RMB80, and Player A makes an offer for its division. Both player are rational, fully informed, and want to maximize their payoffs. Questions: (1) If you are Player A, and want the negotiation 2 rounds end, what is your offer in the first round? (2) How about 3 rounds end? (3) How about 10 rounds end? 118 Chapter 1 Answer ? The best way is to jump to the last round and find the optimal strategy, than back to the beginning A B R12345678910119 Game theory and petitive(continued) Auctions ? Auction Formats ? Traditional English (oral) ? Dutch auction ? Sealedbid ?First price ?Second price 120 Chapter 1 Auctions ? How to choose an auction format ? Privatevalue auction: bidders uncertain about the other bidders reservation price ? Commonvalue auction: bidders uncertain what the value is Valuation and Information 121 Chapter 1 Auctions ? Secondprice sealed auction: bid your reservation price ? English auction: Bid in small increments until you reach your reservation price Private Value Auction 122 Chapter 1 Auctions ? The winning bids in both auctions is the reservation price of the second highest bidder Private Value Auction 123 Chapter 1 Auctions ? Sealedbid auction ? Firstprice auction: lowers the bid ? Secondprice auction: bid just above the second highest reservation price ? Both yield the same revenue Private Value Auction 124 Chapter 1 Auctions ? Winner’s Curse ? The winner is worse off than those who did not win Common Value Auction 125 Chapter 1 Auctions ? Examples ? Bidding on a construction job ? Bidding on offshore oil reserves Common Value Auction 126 Chapter 1 Auctions ? Question ?How can you avoid the winner’s curse? Common Value Auction 127 Chapter 1 Auctions ? Privatevalue Auction ? Have as many bidders as possible ? Commonvalue Auction ? Use openbid format ? Release information about value Maximizing Auction Revenue 128 Chapter 1 Inter Auctions ? A Few Caveats ? Now quality control function ? Poor seller feedback ? Bid manipulation may occur 129 Chapter 1 Summary ? A game is cooperative if the players can municate and arrange binding contracts。 警衛(wèi)的得益 與小偷偷不偷的概率有關(guān) 51 Chapter 1 博弈模型與競爭策略 ? 若小偷來偷的概率為 偷 警衛(wèi)的得益為： R ( 1 偷 ) + (D) 偷 小偷認為警衛(wèi)不會愿意得益為負，最多為零。 警衛(wèi)睡覺，小偷不偷，小偷不失不得，警衛(wèi)得到休閑 R. 警衛(wèi)不睡，小偷不偷，都不得不失。 depends on B’s actions ? B: Advertise ? Question ? What should A do? (Hint: consider B’s decision 25 Chapter 1 The Nash Equilibrium ? Nash Equilibrium ?“I’m doing the best I can given what you are doing” ?“You’re doing the best you can given what I am doing.” 26 Chapter 1 ? Examples With A Nash Equilibrium ? Two cereal panies ? Market for one producer of crispy cereal ? Market for one producer of sweet cereal ? Each firm only has the resources to introduce one cereal ? Noncooperative The Nash Equilibrium Revisited Product Choice Problem 27 Chapter 1 Product Choice Problem Firm 1 Crispy Sweet Crispy Sweet Firm 2 5, 5 10, 10 5, 5 10, 10 28 Chapter 1 Product Choice Problem Firm 1 Crispy Sweet Crispy Sweet Firm 2 5, 5 10, 10 5, 5 10, 10 ? Question ? Is there a Nash equilibrium? ? If not, why? ? If so, how can it be reached 29 Chapter 1 Beach Location Game ? Scenario ? Two petitors, Y and C, selling soft drinks ? Beach 200 yards long ? Sunbathers are spread evenly along the beach ? Price Y = Price C ? Customer will buy from the closest vendor 30 Chapter 1 Beach Location Game Where will the petitors locate (. where is the Nash equilibrium)? Ocean 0 B Beach A 200 yards C 31 Chapter 1 Beach Location Game 2) Examples of this decision problem include: ? Locating a gas station ? Presidential elections Ocean 0 B Beach A 200 yards C 32 Chapter 1 T