外文翻譯--治理機制與企業(yè)價值：股權(quán)集中度和紅利的影響-展示頁
2025-05-27 06:28本頁面
【正文】 igate the agency problem by providing unbiased accounting information, thus reducing the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Principle 4 of the 2020 ASX Best Practices Remendations includes a remendation that all members of the audit mittee should be nonexecutive directors and that the mittee should prise a majority of independent directors as well as is chaired by an independent director who is not chairperson of the board. Companies within the Samp。 Klein, 1998。 Gunasekarage, 2020) find that audit mittee independence has insignificant impact on firm value. In contrast, DeFond, Hann, and Hu(2020) find significant positive abnormal returns around the appointment of “accounting” financial expertindependent directors to the audit mittee. More recently, Hsu(2020) and Chan and Li(2020) report that firm performance is positively associated with audit mittee financial expertise. Several studies have also provided evidence on the governance role of an audit mittee in Australia. For example, Koh, Laphante, and Tong(2020) examine the twin roles of accountability and value enhancement of corporate governance in the context of financial reporting. The authors find that independent active audit mittees and independent boards are important governance mechanisms and value enhancing. Cotter and Silvester(2020), however, find no support for a positive relationship between audit mittee independence and firm value. Meanwhile, Psaros and Seamer(2020) report that the audit mittee independence of Australia’s largest 250 panies appears to have deteriorated between 1998 and 2020. The positive impact of an audit mittee on firm value may e from the role of the audit mittee in constraining earnings management. A number of studies provide support for this notion. For example, Davidson, Goodwin Stewart, and Kent(2020) show that a majority of nonexecutive directors on the audit mittee is associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management. Hsu and Koh(2020) find that a longterm oriented institution can act as a corporate governance mechanism to mitigate aggressive earnings management, while Chan, Faff, Mather, and Ramsay(2020) documented a positive relationship between the likelihood and frequency of firms issuing management earnings forecasts and audit mittee independence. Stewart and Munro(2020) show that the existence of an audit mittee is associated with a reduction in perceived audit risk. Finally, Krishnamoorthy, Wright, and Cohen(2020) and Chen, Carson, and Simt(2020) suggest that audit mittee plays an important role in enhancing financial reporting quality. Independent Directors, Audit Committee and Ownership Concentration The relation between ownership concentration and boards of directors can be explained by agency theory. Jensen and Meckling(1976) suggest that agency problems will be lower when the interests of agents(., managers) and principals(., shareholders) are more aligned through higher managerial share ownership. Agency problems between owners and managers relate to managerial consumption of perquisites, shirking, misallocation of pany funds, and entrenchment(Shleifer amp。 Vishny, 1986) as well as have enough voting power to force management to act in the interest of shareholders(La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, the classic ownermanager conflict described by Berle and Means(1932) should be lower in closelyheld firms than in widelyheld firms. The literature, however, suggests that bining ownership and control allows concentrated shareholders to exchange profits for private rents (., Bebchuk, 1999。 Kahan, 1990:1090。 Young, 2020。 Jensen, 1983。 Vishny, 1997) define private benefits as “any value ca
畢業(yè)設(shè)計相關(guān)推薦
鄂ICP備17016276號-1