【正文】 es on threats to human health or safety. A second variation is to focus on harm to private property. A final way to look through the lens of harm to human beings is to measure financial costs other than damage to property itself. At first, it may not be clear that statutes such as these vindicate environmental values at all. After all, the threat or existence of environmental harm is not an element of the crime—these results are not even mentioned. And yet, these statutes are part of environmental protection schemes. Their placement within such schemes leads to the conclusion that harm to humans is used as a surrogate measure for harm to the environment: if the pollution is extreme enough to threaten human interests, the environme nt must of necessity also be threatened. There are drawbacks to this surrogate approach. One obvious problem is that environmental damage might occur far from populated areas and thus remain outside the 4 scope of statutes that define harm in human terms. However, there is another, more serious drawback. Consider, for instance, the act of draining a wetland and filling it with soil or rocks. Elimination of wetlands may endanger human health and safety in the long term, for example by changing hydrological patterns, contributing to flooding, and so forth. However, eliminating a wetland does not present the type of shortterm danger that occurs, say, in a Bhopaltype situation where toxic chemicals are emitted into the ambient air. If harm to human health, safety, and property is viewed only in the short term, the actor who fills the wetland cannot be prosecuted for a Concrete Harm or Serious Environmental Harm crime。中文 4500 字 本科畢業(yè) 論文 外文翻譯 題 目 專 業(yè) 法 學(xué) 系 別 歷史文化與法學(xué) 系 1 A Graduated Punishment Approach to Environmental Crimes Susan F. Mandiberg and Michael Faure I. INTRODUCTION Why do we have environmental crimes? What social harms are we addressing, and what interests are we vindicating through use of the criminal sanction? The answer to these questions is not found in traditional criminal law principles. This is because environmental interests and values do not enjoy an absolute protection in the law. Unlike theft or homicide, for example, which may cause personal benefits only to the criminal, most polluting activities generate substantial societal benefits as well as environmental costs. Thus, environmental law in many countries is aimed largely at an administrative control of pollution, usually through licensing and permitting systems. Environmental criminal statutes largely function to help ensure that control. The interweaving of administrative and criminal law has been pronounced from the beginning of modern environmental crimes in the midtwentieth century. Then, as now, environmental criminal law focused on punishing the lack of a permit or the violation of permit or other regulatory requirements and conditions. However, although this administrative dependence of environmental criminal law may have been the general starting point, European mentators have increasingly pointed to serious weaknesses in this approach. For one thing, if the role of the criminal law is restricted to punishing administrative disobedience, other types of pollution may go unpunished, thus limiting the ability of the criminal law to protect ecological values. In addition, unlike the situation with traditional crimes, administrators (not legislators) decide what is and is not criminal. This critique of the absolute administrative dependence of environmental criminal law has had its effects on European legislation and on international As a result, one can now increasingly notice the use of other models of environmental crimes, models that are less dependent on administrative law. The goal of this paper is to examine and advocate for approaches to environmental crimes in addition to the punishment of disobedience to administrative rules and decisions. We acknowledge that an effective environmental criminal scheme must include administrativedisobedience crimes. For one thing, disobedience to at least some administrative decisions is a serious matter. For another, such offenses are easiest to prove6 and thus provide a mechanism for punishing some environmental malfeasance that cannot be otherwise Nevertheless, actual harm to the environment—and the threat of such harm—is more serious than mere administrative disobedience. When the government can prove that someone has both acted unlawfully and has caused or threatened such harm, an effective system should have crimes in place to address the situation. In addition, in circumstances of extreme environmental harm, it is important to include a crime that does not require the government to prove any disobedience to administrative rules and decisions. Finally, the authorized punishments for offenses on this continuum of environmental criminal statutes should be graduated according to the seriousness of the social harms at issue. II. FOUR MODELS OF CRIMINALIZATION O