農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的再思考外文翻譯-其他專業(yè)-展示頁(yè)
2025-01-31 07:39本頁(yè)面
【正文】 r agricultural producers, replacing a standing disaster assistance program with subsidized crop insurance. To encourage sales, private panies were enlisted to deliver the product and significantly share in the underwriting risks. Almost overnight, the crop insurance program was converted from a pilot program offering limited coverage to a limited number of crops nationwide, to a nationwide program covering most major field crops in most major growing regions. The perceived failures of crop insurance were many. At the time of passage of the 1980 Act, Congress envisioned a participation rate approaching 50% of eligible acres by the end of the decade. Despite premium subsidies and expanded coverage, crop insurance participation grew very slowly. When a major drought struck the Midwest in 1988, only 25% of eligible acreage was enrolled in the program nationwide and participation was even less in states such as Illinois and Indiana (Chite).Widespread crop losses and poor participation in the insurance program prompted Congress to pass supplemental disaster legislation throughout the decade including almost $5 billion in disaster assistance to cover crop losses in 1988 and 1989 alone (Glauber and Collins). In addition to its failure to replace disaster assistance, the actuarial performance of the crop insurance program was dismal throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. The aggregate loss ratio, that is, total indemnities divided by total premiums (including premium subsidies), exceeded 150% over 1981–93. Poor actuarial performance was blamed on expansion of coverage into new areas without having adequate data to rate risks which contributed to adverse selection problems and the difficulty in monitoring producer behavior which contributed to moral hazard issues (. General Accounting Office 1993). Finally, despite large actuarial losses, panies shared little of the underwriting risks. Over 1981–90, total indemnities exceeded total premiums (including premium subsidies) by $ billion. Over the same period, panies recorded underwritings ―gains‖ of $102 million (Glauber and Collins). This prompted repeated criticism from the . General Accounting Office (1981, 1987, 1992) that panies were not adequately sharing in risks. Within ten years of the 1980 Act, poor performance of the crop insurance program prompted the Bush Administration to propose eliminating the crop insurance program and replacing it with a standing disaster program (Gardner 1994). The proposal received little interest in Congress, but the criticism of the crop insurance program remained unabated. Widespread crop losses due to the 1993 floods in the Midwest prompted yet another disaster bill. This time, however, Congress and the Clinton Administration agreed on the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, which authorized additional premium subsidies to increase participation. Yet, despite increases in participation, Congress passed ad hoc disaster legislation covering losses in 1998, 1999, and 2021. In 2021, Congress passed the Agricultural Risk Protection Act, which provided further subsidies to encourage crop insurance purchases. Now, fifteen years and two reform bills later, the crop insurance program boasts an 80% par
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