農(nóng)業(yè)保險(xiǎn)的再思考外文翻譯-其他專(zhuān)業(yè)(編輯修改稿)
2025-02-24 07:39 本頁(yè)面
【文章內(nèi)容簡(jiǎn)介】 mines the problems of rating agricultural production risks and how subsidies mask actuarial performance. The unintended effects of subsidized crop insurance on production are considered in section ―Effects of Crop Insurance on Production.‖ The section ―Alternative Crop Insurance Plans‖ examines alternatives means to manage production risks, including area yield options and weather derivatives. Summary and conclusions are offered in the final section. The Demand for Crop Insurance Table 1 shows the growth of the crop insurance program since 1981. Participation in the program grew slowly in the 1980s, reaching only million acres in 1988, about 25% of eligible acreage. Participation reached 40% in 1989 and 1990, largely because of disaster legislation that required recipients of disaster payment in 1988 and 1989 to buy crop insurance in the subsequent crop year. By 1993, participation had fallen to 32% of eligible area (Glauber and Collins). Over the period 1981–93, participating producers received, on average, about $2 in indemnity payments for every $1 of premium paid. Why then did participation rates in the program remain so low throughout the 1980s and early 1990s? The most often cited reason is adverse selection (see, ., Miranda). Adverse selection problems arise when risks vary across insurance buyers and buyers know more about the risks they face than does the insurer who sets the rates (Hirshleifer and Riley). Thus, producers whose expected indemnities exceed the premiums costs are more likely to purchase insurance。 those whose costs exceed their expected indemnities are less likely to purchase. Second, studies show that farmers and ranchers use a variety of riskmanagement strategies to mitigate the risks that they face (Harwood et al., . GAO 1999). Empirical studies of crop insurance participation during this period confirmed that many of these practices had negative effects on participation (see Knight and Coble 1997). By the end of the 1980s, it was clear to policy makers that the subsidy levels provided under the 1980 Act were not sufficient to achieve50% participation without either making insurance purchases pulsory or increasing the level of the subsidy. In their analysis of . crop insurance program, Gardner and Kramer concluded that premiums would have to be subsidized as much as 50% to achieve 50% participation. Similar conclusions were reached by Wright and Hewitt and Goodwin and Smith (1995). Congress responded by both making insurance pulsory and increasing remium subsidies. Under the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994, producers of insurable crops were eligible to receive a basic level of coverage, catastrophic risk protection (CAT), which initially covered 50% of a producer’s approved yield at 60% of the expected market CAT coverage was required for producers who participated in the modity price support and production adjustment programs, farm credit, or other farm the premium cost of CAT coverage was fully subsidized by the government, producers were required to pay a signup fee equal to $50 per crop per county. In addition, the 1994 Act provided additional subsidies for coverage levels greater than 50% (buyup levels). Over 220 million acre
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