【正文】 場”。 raid on it was the establishment firm of Dillon, Read—and its former chairman, Nicholas F. Brady, was now Secretary of the Treasury. Brady had never fiven Drexel for its role in the Unocal deal, and would not ? even consider signing off on a bailout. Accordingly, he, the SEC, the NYSE and the Fed strongly advised Joseph to file for bankruptcy. Later the next day, Drexel officially filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. [6] DBL Trading, a subsidiary, was involved in the temporary gold loan default with the Central Bank of Portugal at that time. Even before the firm39。s last resort was a bailout by the government. Unfortunately for Drexel, one of first hostile deals came back to haunt it at this point. Unocal39。s lines of credit at any time. Unfortunately, Drexel had no corporate parent that could pump in cash, unlike most American financial institutions. Groupe Bruxelles Lambert refused to even consider making an equity investment until Joseph improved the bottom line. The firm posted a $40 million loss for 1989—the first operating loss in its 54year history.[5] ? Drexel managed to survive into 1990 by transferring some of the excess capital from its regulated broker/dealer subsidiary into the Drexel holding pany—only to be ordered to stop by the SEC in February out of concerns about the broker39。t work out, as well as an unexpected crash of the junk bond market, 1989 was a difficult year for Drexel even after it settled the criminal and SEC cases. Reports of an $86 million loss going into the fourth quarter resulted in the firm39。s credibility with many at Drexel who believed in Milken39。s children, and more ominously, managers of money funds. This partnership raised the specter of selfdealing, and at worst, bribes to the money managers. At the very least, this was a serious breach of Drexel39。t known about. This partnership had been involved in the issuing of bonds for Storer Broadcasting. Several equity warrants were sold to one client who sold them back to Milken39。d been told that if Drexel were indicted under RICO, it would only survive a month at most.[6] Noheless, negotiations for a possible plea agreement collapsed on December 19 when Giuliani demanded that Drexel waive its attorneyclient privilege. He also demanded that Milken leave the firm if the government ever indicted him. These terms were far too much even for those who had advocated a settlement from the beginning, and Drexel39。s case, 96 percent—by far the most of any firm). This debt would have to take second place to this performance bond. Additionally, if the bond ever had to be paid, Drexel39。s crimes.[5] The threat of a RICO indictment unnerved many at Drexel. A RICO indictment would have required the firm to put up a performance bond of as much as $1 billion in lieu of having its assets frozen. This provision was put in the law because anized crime had a habit of absconding with the funds of indicted panies, and the writers of RICO wanted to make sure there was something to seize or forfeit in the event of a guilty verdict. Unfortunately, most of Drexel39。s own internal investigation, only speaking through his attorneys. [5] For two years, Drexel steadfastly denied any wrongdoing, claiming that the criminal and SEC cases were based almost entirely on the statements of an admitted felon looking to reduce his sentence. However, it was not enough to keep the SEC from suing Drexel in September 1988 for insider trading, stock manipulation, defrauding its clients and stock parking (buying stocks for the benefit of another). All of the transactions involved Milken and his department. The most intriguing charge was that Boesky paid Drexel $ million in 1986 for Milken39。s aggressive culture led many Drexel employees to stray into uhical, and sometimes illegal, conduct. Milken himself viewed the securities laws, rules and regulations with some degree of contempt, and often condoned uhical and illegal behavior by his colleagues at Drexel39。在 2023~2023年的金融動蕩中，政府拯救了許多大型金融機構使其免于破產，其原因是政府對系統(tǒng)風險的顧慮。這是因為在銀行之間存在大量的場外交易，當銀行 A破產時，銀行 B因為與銀行 A之間的交易而蒙受巨大損失，從而可能會造成銀行 B破產，銀行 C可能同銀行 A及銀行 B之間都有交易，因此銀行 C也可能遭遇巨大損失，從而也會給 C的運作帶來巨大的困難，依次類推。假如財務并不處于高杠桿狀態(tài) ， LTCM也許能夠承受“擇優(yōu)而棲”現象帶來的壓力，這樣公司就有機會等到流動性強的產品價格和流動性差的產品價格趨向一致的時候。這時，無論對長頭寸還是短頭寸交易都必須注入抵押品，公司的財務又處于高杠桿狀態(tài)（高負債比率）。 ? 當利率增長時， LTCM預計債券價格下降的數量基本相同，因此對于 X債券付出的抵押品與 Y債券收入的抵押品基本相同；類似地，當利率下降時， LTCM預計債券價格上漲的數量也會基本相同，因此因抵押條約造成的資金外流不會很大。 32 保證金的運作 Margins ? A margin is cash or marketable securities deposited by an investor with his or her broker ? The balance in the margin account is adjusted to reflect daily settlement ? Margins minimize the possibility of a loss through a default on a contract 33 Example of a Futures Trade (page 2729) ? An investor takes a long position in 2 December gold futures contracts on June 5 ? contract size is 100 oz. ? futures price is US$1250 ? initial margin requirem