【正文】 0 and 1988.　　NEC has emerged as the world leader in semiconductors and as a first tier player in telemunications products and puters. It has consolidated its position in mainframe puters. It has moved beyond public switching and transmission to include such lifestyle products as mobile telephones, facsimile machines, and laptop puters bridging the gap between telemunications and office automation. NEC is the only pany in the world to be in the top five in revenue in telemunications, semiconductors, and mainframes. Why did these two panies, starting with parable business portfolios, perform so differently? Largely because NEC conceived of itself in terms of core petencies, and GTE did not.　　　　Rethinking the Corporation　　　　Once, the diversified corporation could simply point its business units at particular end product markets and admonish them to bee world leaders. But with market boundaries changing ever more quickly, targets are elusive and capture is at best temporary. A few panies have proven themselves adept at inventing new markets, quickly entering emerging markets, and dramatically shifting patterns of customer choice in established markets. These are the ones to emulate. The critical task for management is to create an organization capable of infusing products with irresistible functionality or, better yet, creating products that customers need but have not yet even imagined)　　This is a deceptively difficult task. Ultimately, it requires radical change in the management of major panies. It means, first of all, that top managements of Western panies must assume responsibility for petitive decline. Everyone knows about high interest rates, Japanese protectionism, outdated antitrust laws, obstreperous unions, and impatient investors. What is harder to see, or harder to acknowledge, is how little added momentum panies actually get from political or macroeconomic relief. Both the theory and practice of Western management have created a drag on our forward motion. It is the principles of management that are in need of reform.　　NEC versus GTE, again, is instructive and only one of many such parative cases we analyzed to understand the changing basis for global leadership. Early in the 1970s, NEC articulated a strategic intent to exploit the convergence of puting and munications, what it called Camp。s sales were $ billion, and net cash flow was $ billion. NEC, in contrast, was much smaller, at $ billion in sales. It had a parable technological base and puter businesses, but it had no experience as an operating telemunications pany.　　Yet look at the positions of GTE and NEC in 1988. GTE39。ll have to rethink the concept of the corporation itself.　　Consider the last ten years of GTE and NEC. In the early 1980s, GTE was well positioned to bee a major player in the evolving information technology industry. It was active in telemunications. Its operations spanned a variety of businesses including telephones, switching and transmission systems, digital PABX, semiconductors, packet switching, satellites, defense systems, and lighting products. And GTE39?！　he Core Competence Of the Corporation　　　　by . Prahalad and Gary Hamel　　　　C. K. Prahalad is professor of corporate strategy and international business at the University of Michigan. Gary Hamel is lecturer in business policy and management at the London Business School. Their most recent HBR article, Strategic Intent (May June 1989), won the 1989 McKinsey Award for excellence. This article is based on research funded by the Gatsby Charitable Foundation.　　　　The most powerful way to prevail in global petition is still invisible to many panies. During the 1980s, top executives were judged on their ability to restructure, declutter, and delayer their corporations. In the 1990s, they39。我們相信，熱衷于核心競爭力的建設(shè)，將是20世紀(jì)90年代全球競爭勝利者的一個重要特點(diǎn)，重新思考公司的概念刻不容緩。　　就最高管理層而言，他們不能只滿足于成為最高級別的財務(wù)核算與匯總中心——盡管在權(quán)力高度分散的組織中這種情況經(jīng)常會出現(xiàn)。經(jīng)理們必須在核心產(chǎn)品的制造方面贏得領(lǐng)先地位，同時通過旨在利用范圍經(jīng)濟(jì)的晶牌建設(shè)計劃獲取全球份額?！　『诵母偁幜κ切聵I(yè)務(wù)開發(fā)的源泉。應(yīng)該讓他們忠誠于他們所代表的整個公司的核心競爭力，而不是某個特別的業(yè)務(wù)部?！　∷芯邆浜诵母偁幜Φ膯T工都應(yīng)當(dāng)定期聚集在一起，分享彼此的心得和體會。這些擁有核心競爭力的員工應(yīng)當(dāng)知道，他們的職業(yè)發(fā)展是由公司總部的人力資源專家來跟蹤和指導(dǎo)的。在佳能，關(guān)鍵人才會定期在照相機(jī)部和復(fù)印機(jī)部之間，以及復(fù)印機(jī)部和專業(yè)光學(xué)產(chǎn)品部之間流動?！　∽詈?，公司可以采取一些措施消除骨干員工腦海中“我永遠(yuǎn)屬于某個業(yè)務(wù)部”的認(rèn)識。在部門的核心人才被調(diào)去開發(fā)其他領(lǐng)域的商機(jī)之后，有些業(yè)務(wù)部門的競爭力可能會暫時下降。只要優(yōu)先順序是明晰的，人才的調(diào)動就不會被人們視為只是出于個人喜好或者政治考慮。要知道，一個事業(yè)部經(jīng)理不可能為了讓其化事業(yè)的獲得好處（或者讓作為晉升對手的其他事業(yè)部總經(jīng)理受益)就同意把關(guān)鍵人才調(diào)出。也許會有某個分部比別的分部付出的更多或者得到的更少，但這種不公平只是暫時的，長期內(nèi)終究會達(dá)成一種平衡。他們共同決定開發(fā)未來的每項核心競爭力需要多少投資，以及每個部門需要貢獻(xiàn)多少資金和提供多少人力支持。　　然而，如果公司的獎酬體系僅僅以產(chǎn)品線的業(yè)績?yōu)橐罁?jù)，或者職業(yè)發(fā)展的道路僅僅局限在事業(yè)部內(nèi)部，那么各事業(yè)部經(jīng)理的行為模式就會朝著破壞性競爭的方向發(fā)展。當(dāng)佳能發(fā)現(xiàn)數(shù)字激光打印機(jī)市場大有可為時，它授權(quán)該事業(yè)部的經(jīng)理到其他事業(yè)部搜羅人才，以便建立業(yè)務(wù)所需的人才庫。如果在每年的戰(zhàn)略規(guī)劃或預(yù)算編制過程中，事業(yè)部經(jīng)理必須給出合理的理由才能把這些擁有核心競爭力的人才保留在本部門中，那么公司實際上是在進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化這個信號。任何員工都不為某一個業(yè)務(wù)部門所獨(dú)自占有?？偛康墓芾碚哌€應(yīng)當(dāng)指導(dǎo)相關(guān)部門對這些代表核心競爭力的人員做一次審核，確定他們的所在地、數(shù)量以及素質(zhì)。我們曾經(jīng)略微地談過這個問題，鑒于這個問題非常重要，我們要談得更加深入一些。它在揭示大方向的同時，指明了具體的行動步驟。這也就是為什么特定的戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)不可能輕易被競爭對手模仿的原因。創(chuàng)建一個戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)可迫使組織確定和發(fā)展跨事業(yè)部的技術(shù)聯(lián)系和生產(chǎn)聯(lián)系，而這些聯(lián)系將為組織提供一種獨(dú)特的競爭優(yōu)勢。在這一點(diǎn)上，3M、威格士、NEC、佳能和本田都做得相當(dāng)成功。們的決策保持一致。威格士公司不僅要制定戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)圖，還要向所有的員工、客戶和投資者廣泛宣傳這一架構(gòu)，同時建立與這個架構(gòu)相應(yīng)的管理系統(tǒng)。該架構(gòu)也是公司內(nèi)部開發(fā)新核心競爭力的基礎(chǔ)。威格士公司所制定的戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)不僅從核心競爭力角度對未來進(jìn)行了描述，而且也為當(dāng)下的各種決策(重點(diǎn)產(chǎn)品、收購、聯(lián)盟和招聘)奠定了基礎(chǔ)?！　?zhàn)略架構(gòu)并不只是對某種具體產(chǎn)品或者具體技術(shù)的預(yù)測，而是一種更宏觀的規(guī)劃，它揭示了客戶對功能的要求、潛在技術(shù)與核心競爭力這三者之間不斷發(fā)展的關(guān)系。而戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)圖又確認(rèn)了另外兩種核心競爭力：電力元件和電子控制。它的口號是“邁向21世紀(jì)”。威格士公司的經(jīng)理們試著把思考的重點(diǎn)放在以下三個方面的演化上：　　(1)與動力和運(yùn)動控制業(yè)務(wù)相關(guān)的技術(shù)，(2)能夠滿足客戶新需求的功能，(3)創(chuàng)造性地管理“技術(shù)+客戶需求”所需的核心競爭力?？梢姡@一舉動的初衷是自我防御?！　⊥袷抗疽庾R到．如果把電子學(xué)科領(lǐng)域的應(yīng)用與自己的傳統(tǒng)技術(shù)相結(jié)合，那么自己的傳統(tǒng)業(yè)務(wù)很可能會發(fā)生巨大的轉(zhuǎn)變。威格士公司是其最主要的業(yè)務(wù)單元之一，它是生產(chǎn)液壓元件的一流廠家，其產(chǎn)品包括閥門、泵、作動器以及過濾器等器具，分別應(yīng)用于航空、航海、國防、汽車。但也有例外。它為最高管理層提供了一個資源分配決策的模板。戰(zhàn)略事業(yè)部經(jīng)理必須面對這樣的問題：新的市場機(jī)會是否會有助于實現(xiàn)公司的總體目標(biāo)——成為世界一流企業(yè)?它是否利用或者增強(qiáng)了公司的核心競爭力?比如在威格士(Vickers)公司，在判斷有關(guān)多元化的選擇決定時，要考慮這個決定是否有助于使該公司成為世界上最好的動力和運(yùn)動控制公司。答案因公司而異。NEC的計算機(jī)與通信戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)就是一例。戰(zhàn)略架構(gòu)是未來的路線圖，它指明需要培養(yǎng)哪些核心競爭力以及這些核心競爭力是由哪些相關(guān)技術(shù)組成的?！　?zhàn)略架構(gòu)的制定　　在一家多元化公司中，如果信息系統(tǒng)、溝通模式、職業(yè)發(fā)展道路、管理層報酬以及戰(zhàn)略制定流程都受制于戰(zhàn)略事業(yè)部的組織界限，那么其核心競爭力就必然是支離破碎的。記住，當(dāng)佳能準(zhǔn)備進(jìn)軍復(fù)印機(jī)市場大展身手時，它給外界的印象是經(jīng)營照相機(jī)業(yè)務(wù)的公司。在沒有找出核心競爭力的情況下，各戰(zhàn)略事業(yè)部只會追求手邊的創(chuàng)新機(jī)會，比如，沒有多少新意的產(chǎn)品線延伸或者地理上的擴(kuò)張。企業(yè)高管中幾乎沒有人能夠走下四五個職級，去發(fā)現(xiàn)具有關(guān)鍵能力的人才，并跨越組織界限調(diào)配他們。令人奇怪的是，在制訂公司預(yù)算時全力爭奪資金的戰(zhàn)略事業(yè)部經(jīng)理，卻不情愿爭奪人才這種公司最寶貴的資產(chǎn)。　　一旦能力被禁錮，掌握著關(guān)鍵能力的員工就無法參加充滿機(jī)遇的項目，而他們的技能也就逐漸退化和萎縮。公司總部的研發(fā)支出不能完全反映佳能的核心競爭力