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薪酬管理外文翻譯--薪酬為效益而支付?政府章程和薪酬之間的關(guān)系-文庫吧資料

2025-05-21 18:15本頁面
  

【正文】 a majority vote, and (iii) before any payment of such remuneration, the pensation mittee certifies that the performance goals and other material terms were satisfied. 3. Data collection We retrieve pensation data from Standard and Poor39。 (3) provide estimates of the present value of managerial stock options granted。s new Compensation Disclosure Rules and . Section 162(m) As a result of public perception regarding excessive executive pay in the early 1990s, executive pensation became a hot political issue. As a result, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted new rules regarding disclosure of executive pensation in These rules required that corporations enhance the disclosure of executive pensation in proxy statements beginning with the 1993 proxy season. Under the new rules, firms are required to: (1) pare their financial performance to an industry benchmark with a table and performance graphs。 (2) shareholder activists, the press, regulators, and many previous academic studies have focused on the annual pay of CEOs and not on changes in the value of CEO equity holdings。s salary is less than one million dollars. Hall and Liebman (2020) use a similar definition to identify firms likely to be affected by 162(m). The second variable is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm39。s salary is more than one million dollars in the prior year, and is equal to the prior year39。s 1992 proxy reform initiative was a response to the public outcry on executive pensation and a proposed Senate bill on shareholder rights and CEO pensation. In addition, Congress never intended for Section 162(m) to be a revenueraising provision, but instead Congress hoped to change corporate When adopting 162(m), the House Ways and Means Committee stated the congressional intent in the following way: Recently, the amount of pensation received by corporate executives has been the subject of scrutiny and criticism. The mittee believes that excessive pensation will be reduced if the deduction for pensation (other than performancebased pensation) paid to the top executives of publicly held corporations is limited to $1 million per Changing behavior could mean that the changes have led to real economic effects or that the pensation contracts are cosmetically different but that the economic effects are unchanged. Miller and Scholes (1982) examine the influence of personal taxes on pensation contracts and argue that some pensation plans are taxadvantageous schemes because they defer payments for employees in tax brackets that are higher than the corporation39。s concern is not new. Jensen and Murphy (1990), for example, analyze and discuss the low pay for performance sensitivity in the 1970s and 1980s. Recent evidence, suggests, however, that the pay for performance sensitivity may have increased since Jensen and Murphy studied the issue. Hall and Liebman (1998) document that the pay for performance sensitivity has increased since the early 1980s, with a striking acceleration in the last three years of their sample (1992–1994). They conclude that in recent years CEOs have not been paid like bureaucrats. One plausible explanation for this change is that the increasing pressure from outside investors on boards of directors has led to increased sensitivity of executive pay to firm performance. Johnson and Shackell (1997), Smith (1996), Strickland et al. (1996), and Wahal (1996), amongst others, document the rise in shareholder activism in the early 1990s. The increased public attention on the pay for performance relation resulted in regulatory intervention by the SEC in 1993 requiring enhanced disclosure on executive pensation and the enactment of tax legislation limiting the deductibility of nonperformance related pensation over one million dollars [Section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, henceforth Section 162(m) or 162(m)]. The purpose of the new SEC disclosure requirements, as stated in the SEC39。 Contracts。s wealth to changes in shareholder wealth has increased from 1993 to 1996 for firms with CEOs near or above the million dollar pensation level. Overall, our results suggest that some firms have reduced salaries in response to 162(m). More importantly, the pay for performance sensitivity, measured using total annual pensation and firmrelated CEO wealth, has increased for firms likely to be affected by 162(m). Author Key words: CEO pensation 。總之 , 我們的研究結(jié)果是,薪酬委員會應(yīng)該先考慮企業(yè)的管理環(huán)境,并且防止新的章程的出臺對員工的薪酬和企業(yè)的效益產(chǎn)生經(jīng)濟(jì)沖擊。 通過進(jìn)一步的研究發(fā)現(xiàn): 162(m)章程對我們的大企業(yè)也是有影響的 , 我們還通過三個方面來研究大企業(yè) CEO 的薪酬敏感性和企業(yè)效益之間的關(guān)系 。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)尤其是百萬美元企業(yè)受到 法律的 影響更大。 25 個企業(yè)當(dāng)中的 23 個受到了162(m)章程的影響 , 然而 , 這些企業(yè) 員工的總薪酬還是有所增加。我們發(fā)現(xiàn):即使章程未能限制 CEO 薪酬的增長 ,可是該章程還是會對企業(yè)員工的薪酬結(jié)構(gòu)產(chǎn)生重大的沖擊。 7 結(jié)論 新的 SEC報(bào)酬規(guī)則和 162(m)章程出臺的目的是減少 CEO過高的薪酬水平和加強(qiáng)薪酬與效益之間聯(lián)系??傊?, 這些結(jié)果都表明 , 當(dāng) 1993 年新規(guī)則出臺 以后,無論是百萬美元企業(yè)還是其他企業(yè),員工薪酬對公司效益的敏感性都增加了。 接下來,我們對表 6進(jìn)行分析: (i)企業(yè)的 CEO對企業(yè)的控制力有所降低了 (假設(shè)在 1993 年所有的參照企業(yè)的薪酬都處于同一水平 ); (ii)股票分析家通過Strickland 獲得關(guān)于企業(yè)的數(shù)據(jù),并將關(guān)注的重點(diǎn)放在那些目標(biāo)企業(yè)當(dāng)中 ,這是Wahal (1996)研究出來的結(jié)果 。同時我們也探索了百萬美元企業(yè)的薪酬發(fā)放特征,得出的結(jié)論是:那些百萬美元企業(yè)傾向于以降低 CEO 對企業(yè)的控制力這個方式來發(fā)展成為更大規(guī)模的企業(yè)。我們現(xiàn)在研 究那些百萬美元企業(yè)之所以受到章程的影響的原因,是否因?yàn)樗麄兒驼块T的關(guān)系緊密。 6 持有人和股東的目標(biāo) 我們隨后進(jìn)行各種各樣的測試,目的是檢驗(yàn)我們的研究結(jié)果是否是真實(shí)可靠。 Jensen、墨菲 (1990), 霍爾、 Liebman (1998)以及墨菲 (1999), 研究發(fā)現(xiàn): CEO 的薪酬、對股票的所有權(quán)是以公司的效益為基礎(chǔ)來發(fā)放的。 5 CEO 的薪酬對股東所產(chǎn)生的影響 現(xiàn)在 ,我們集中關(guān)注每年薪酬的發(fā)放方式 (即 , 薪金、獎金、有限的股票、高級職員優(yōu)先認(rèn)股權(quán)、長期刺激性計(jì)劃支出 ,以及其它形式的報(bào)酬 )。在 162(m)的準(zhǔn)備前期 , 我們假設(shè)變量幫助我們進(jìn)行測試 , 我們只有1991 年 , 1992 年 , 和 1993 年與崗位 162(m) 數(shù)據(jù)是真實(shí)的、可比較的薪酬數(shù)據(jù)。我們還收集了薪酬委員會對 CEO 的薪酬的評估的信息。為了獲得期票 , 企業(yè)必須透露高級主管在報(bào)償表中的報(bào)酬。由七個部分組成的總薪酬都被列入到報(bào)告中。P 500, Midcap 以及 Smallcap 的企業(yè)索引。s ExecuComp 數(shù)據(jù)庫中檢索到想要的數(shù)據(jù)。為達(dá)到這個目的 ,薪酬要以效益為基礎(chǔ)來進(jìn)行分類,要求: (i)企業(yè)效益的目標(biāo)應(yīng)該由薪酬委員會來確定 , (ii)效益的目標(biāo)要股東投票來決定 , (iii)在執(zhí)行新的薪酬制度前,薪酬委員要確定這個效益目標(biāo)是否能夠使大部分人滿意。 在 1993
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