論冷戰(zhàn)后美國(guó)的強(qiáng)制外交(參考版)
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【正文】 。 [36]“中俄聯(lián)合聲明”，新華社2004年10月14日北京電。此外，在阿特把8個(gè)大的強(qiáng)制外交案例進(jìn)一步細(xì)分為16次具體的強(qiáng)制外交行動(dòng)后，有5次行動(dòng)是成功的，成功率為31％。 [35]羅伯特筆者也是采用這種做法，判定本文中兩個(gè)強(qiáng)制外交案例的成敗。 [28]The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, pp. 142, 145. [29]Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. , The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 9192. [30]判斷強(qiáng)制外交的成敗，并非易事。 Sarah Bermeo, Clinton and Coercive Diplomacy: A Study of Haiti, WWS Case Study 2/01, January 18, 2001, . wws. princeton. edu/～cases/papers/coercivedipl. html [20]The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 3, 131150. [21]Heike Krieger, ed. , The Kosovo Conflict and International Law: An Analytical Documentation, 197499, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 255256. [22]The Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report, pp. 8183, 131158. [23]Heike Krieger, ed. , The Kosovo Conflict and International Law, p. 303. [24]Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Remarks at the U. S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D. C. , February 4, 1999, released by the Office of the Spokesman, U. S. Department of State. [25]石鳳軍、柴永忠：《新世紀(jì)的陰云：科索沃危機(jī)透視》，北京：世界知識(shí)出版社，1999年版，第16頁(yè)。 Remarks by the President in Television Address to the Nation , The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 15 July 1994. [16]James Harding, FT Guide to the Haiti Crisis , Financial Times, September 5, 1994, p. 11. [17]Roland I. Perusse, Haitian Democracy Restored, pp. 93, 101. [18]Marcos Mendiburu amp?？死锼雇懈ブ?，蘇廣輝等譯：《美國(guó)新外交：經(jīng)濟(jì)、防務(wù)、民主》，北京：新華出版社，1999年版，第6163頁(yè)。參見(jiàn)Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. , The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, p. 18。 try and see39。 gradual turning of the screw39。根據(jù)威脅的緊迫程度由強(qiáng)到弱的順序，亞大山大 [10]Roland I. Perusse, Haitian Democracy Restored, 19911995, Maryland: University Press of America, 1995, pp. 196。參見(jiàn)Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, New York: Columbia University Press, 1974, p. 105。 [9]作者將借鑒西方國(guó)際政治研究常用的一種方法，即“結(jié)構(gòu)性重點(diǎn)比較法”(a structured, focused parison)：在所選取的每個(gè)案例中都要回答同樣一組問(wèn)題或者驗(yàn)證同樣一組理論假設(shè)，然后再集中進(jìn)行比較、分析，得出一些結(jié)論。 Stephen J. Cimbala, Military Persuasion: Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War, University Park, Penn. : the Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994, pp. 234236。 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy After the Cold War, pp. 3335。 [6]Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 40。 Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. , The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, p. 10. [5]雖然威脅和懲罰的實(shí)際目的是一致的，但兩者存在差別。 [2]Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy after the Cold War, pp. 23. [3]Alexander L. George and William E. Simons, eds. , The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, pp. 710. 關(guān)于西方學(xué)者對(duì)于強(qiáng)制外交概念的界定，以及強(qiáng)制外交與威懾之間的區(qū)別，可參見(jiàn)拙文“美國(guó)與強(qiáng)制外交理論”，載《美國(guó)研究》2006年第3期；“國(guó)際政治中武力的潛在運(yùn)用：威逼與威懾”，載《歐洲研究》2005年第4期。 Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. , The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003。 Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001。 Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Western Use of Coercive Diplomacy a
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