【正文】 這個(gè)比喻或許揭示了華爾街業(yè)界嚴(yán)重的被迫害妄想情結(jié)，以及對(duì)于直面自己在危機(jī)中扮演的角色的無(wú)能無(wú)力，也同樣揭示了那些主張制裁華爾街的人士的上述情況。的確，公開(kāi)發(fā)表反對(duì)意見(jiàn)可能不合時(shí)宜。現(xiàn)在不是銀行家們?cè)诠_(kāi)場(chǎng)合吹毛求疵的時(shí)候。金融家們也會(huì)對(duì)預(yù)想不到的后果焦躁不安。銀行家們愈發(fā)擔(dān)心，機(jī)構(gòu)持股者出于對(duì)監(jiān)管規(guī)則不確定性的恐懼，而開(kāi)始喪失信心 。如果公眾的憤怒持續(xù)升溫，那么格拉斯斯蒂格爾法案的重新引入將是很有可能的。銀行作出了一些表示以平息民眾對(duì)巨額獎(jiǎng)金的憤慨，例如高盛將其倫敦合伙人的總報(bào)酬限制在100萬(wàn)英鎊（160萬(wàn)美元）以內(nèi)。他指出，當(dāng)奧巴馬披露沃爾克法案時(shí)，把更多的言語(yǔ)用在攻擊諸銀行上，而不是描述該計(jì)劃的大體輪廓。美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)在1月27日投票表決了對(duì)這類基金施加新的披露與流動(dòng)性規(guī)則。必須指出的是，重登舞臺(tái)的沃爾克先生支持對(duì)貨幣市場(chǎng)基金采取類似于銀行的監(jiān)管措施。如果美國(guó)的銀行相對(duì)于其國(guó)外的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手處于一個(gè)真實(shí)的劣勢(shì)地位，那么他們將會(huì)嘗試在監(jiān)管規(guī)則中尋找漏洞。其危害之一便是，各自為政將會(huì)導(dǎo)致“不計(jì)后果的慎重”（）：一個(gè)笨重的、由一些互相不一致的、互相重疊的監(jiān)管規(guī)則所組成的大雜燴。如果歐洲不愿在這件事上緊跟美國(guó)，那么這將對(duì)聯(lián)合創(chuàng)建全球化監(jiān)管的努力造成嚴(yán)重打擊。許多歐洲人傾向于對(duì)所有的交易行為規(guī)定更高的資本要求。”布魯塞爾的智囊機(jī)構(gòu)Brueghel的Nicolas V233。兩國(guó)對(duì)一個(gè)可能胎死腹中的新舉措持謹(jǐn)慎態(tài)度。金融穩(wěn)定委員會(huì)，一個(gè)基于巴塞爾協(xié)議框架并且正在協(xié)調(diào)全球的金融改革運(yùn)動(dòng)的機(jī)構(gòu)，表達(dá)了有保留的贊同，并且強(qiáng)調(diào)指出為了馴服那些金融業(yè)怪獸，一個(gè)更廣泛的一攬子改革措施或許是必要的。英國(guó)目前在野的保守黨對(duì)此作出了積極的表態(tài)。如果白宮的新舉措使他的任務(wù)難上加難，那這將被證明是一次“精彩的”自擺烏龍。一些資深民主黨員，如參議院銀行委員會(huì)主席Chris Dodd，對(duì)這個(gè)計(jì)劃的反應(yīng)不溫不火。沃爾克法案可能會(huì)在立法過(guò)程中被輕易地顛覆。這看起來(lái)不太可能。官員們當(dāng)然不會(huì)讓它如此輕易地蒙混過(guò)關(guān)，聲稱高盛將不再能夠獲得央行融資支持，并且仍是進(jìn)一步強(qiáng)化資本要求與監(jiān)管的目標(biāo)。對(duì)高盛來(lái)說(shuō)，它幸運(yùn)地?fù)碛幸粋€(gè)逃生出口。該公司的業(yè)務(wù)是咨詢、交易以及與客戶合伙投資的混合體。高盛聲稱其收入的10%來(lái)自自營(yíng)交易，這一比例遠(yuǎn)高于其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手。獨(dú)立分析師Meredith Whitney認(rèn)為，銀行業(yè)的股東回報(bào)(ROE)將受到來(lái)自“好幾個(gè)方面的損失”。即使沃爾克法案帶給金融業(yè)的沖擊是溫和的，高盛的董事總經(jīng)理Richard Ramsden[該職位相當(dāng)于CEO譯注]認(rèn)為，當(dāng)所有的監(jiān)管新措施全部到位時(shí)，銀行業(yè)的利潤(rùn)會(huì)“千瘡百孔”。另一方面，私募股權(quán)的問(wèn)題較為嚴(yán)重。比如說(shuō)，摩根大通將不會(huì)被迫分割其所珍視的“高橋資產(chǎn)管理”子公司。在自營(yíng)與客戶業(yè)務(wù)這兩者之間劃分界限是非常困難的，但這是監(jiān)管者們的問(wèn)題，而不是銀行的。由于金融危機(jī)，銀行業(yè)已經(jīng)大幅減少了自營(yíng)交易的規(guī)模：某幾家銀行聲稱，過(guò)去的三年中，自營(yíng)業(yè)務(wù)對(duì)總收入的貢獻(xiàn)已下降了超過(guò)一半。雖然還缺少細(xì)節(jié)，但對(duì)大多數(shù)銀行來(lái)說(shuō)，（新法案的）沖擊看來(lái)是可控的。事實(shí)上，上述新方案也是以此人命名的。但最近的幾個(gè)月。當(dāng)然，這個(gè)提案也不是突發(fā)奇想。官員們指出，該計(jì)劃的目標(biāo)很專一：阻止華爾街利用被國(guó)家補(bǔ)貼的存款在資本市場(chǎng)豪賭。后者要求商業(yè)銀行與投資銀行分營(yíng)，在1999年被廢止。而新的議案要求監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)必須那么做。奧巴馬希望把這些措施納入一個(gè)內(nèi)容更寬泛的一攬子改革計(jì)劃，后者正在國(guó)會(huì)中艱難地討價(jià)還價(jià)中。但1月21日推出的一項(xiàng)計(jì)劃使其達(dá)到了高潮。他承認(rèn)對(duì)銀行的注資拯救“猶如牙根管手術(shù)一樣普遍”，并且發(fā)誓要應(yīng)對(duì)那些“已經(jīng)蠢蠢欲動(dòng)試圖破壞”金融改革的游說(shuō)者。當(dāng)時(shí)，官員們每周都出臺(tái)新計(jì)劃以拯救銀行。吊在演播室天花板上的假人被撕裂時(shí)如雨點(diǎn)般落下的仿制金幣，象征了銀行家們不僅僅是高盛老板所受到的打壓在很大程度上是政客們所策劃的。pound。 Woods, a broking firm. Then, officials wheeled out weekly plans to save banks. Now they are rushing out measure after measure to punish the survivors, acpanied by increasingly fiery rhetoric. Barack Obama kept up the assault in his State of the Union address this week. Admitting that the bank bailout was “as popular as a root canal”, he vowed to take on lobbyists who were “already trying to kill” financial reform.The bombardment began on January 14th, with a new tenyear tax on big banks’ liabilities. But it intensified greatly on January 21st with a plan to cap their size, ban their “proprietary” trading (bets made for their own account) and limit their involvement in hedge funds and private equity. Mr Obama wants these measures to be wrapped into a broader set of reforms that is grinding its way through Congress. A bill passed by the House of Representatives, but not yet taken up by the Senate, already allows regulators to limit the scope and scale of firms that pose a threat to financial stability. The new proposals require them to do so.Though widely characterised as a return to the GlassSteagall act, the plan falls far short of the Depressionera law that separated mercial banking and investment banking (and was repealed in 1999). Banks can continue to offer investmentbanking services to clients, such as underwriting securities and making markets. The plan’s aim, say officials, is narrow: to stop Wall Street from gambling in capital markets with subsidised deposits.The timing of the proposal—two days after Mr Obama’s party suffered a thumping Senateelection loss in Massachusetts—looks nakedly political. But it was not dreamed up overnight. Last year the president’s economic lieutenants had seemed content to shackle the banks with tougher regulation and higher capital ratios, rather than limiting their activities. In recent months, though, they warmed to the ideas of Paul Volcker, a former chairman of the Federal Reserve, who was advocating more drastic action—and after whom the new rule is named (see article).Banks have been scrambling to estimate the potential damage. Despite the lack of detail, for most the impact looks manageable. Officials admit that new limits on nondeposit funding are designed to prevent further growth rather than to force firms to shrink. Banks were already scaling back their proprietarytrading activity sharply as a result of the crisis: some say its contribution to revenue has fallen by more than half in the past three years. Prop trading now typically accounts for a mere percentage point or two of firms’ revenues (see table)—if it is defined narrowly to exclude risktaking related to client business. Drawing a line between the two will be horribly difficult, but that will be the regulators’ problem.Moreover, banks will be allowed to keep hedge funds that hold clients’ money. JPMorgan Chase will not have to offload its prized Highbridge subsidiary, for instance. American banks have only $10 billion of their own capital invested in hedge funds, according to Preqin, a research firm. Private equity is more problematic. Several firms have large dollops of their own capital in buyout funds, which also generate fees for their advisory and lending arms.Even if the Volcker rule’s financial impact is modest, banks could face “a thousand cuts” to profits when the full range of regulatory initiatives is totted up, says Richard Ramsden of Goldman Sachs. The latest proposals, on top of recent creditcard and overdraft restrictions, could together cost JPMorgan Chase $ billion in aftertax profit, he says. Meredith Whitney, an independent analyst, sees banks losing “several points” of return on equity.Much attention is focused on the new rule’s impact on Mr Ramsden’s own firm. Goldman says that 10% of its revenues e from proprietary trading, well above rivals’ shares. Some analysts put the figure much higher. With its blend of advisory work, trading and coinvesting with clients, the firm’s “entire culture is, in a sense, proprietary,” says Ms Whitney.Fortunately for Goldman, it has an escape hatch. If it gives up its small deposittaking arm, it can go back to being a brokercumhedge fund, free to trade as it likes. Officials defend this getout, saying Goldman would have no access to centralbank funding and would still be subject t