【正文】 、圖表要求：1）文字通順，語言流暢，書寫字跡工整，打印字體及大小符合要求，無錯別字，不準(zhǔn)請他人代寫2）工程設(shè)計類題目的圖紙，要求部分用尺規(guī)繪制，部分用計算機繪制，所有圖紙應(yīng)符合國家技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)規(guī)范。本人授權(quán)　　 　 　大學(xué)可以將本學(xué)位論文的全部或部分內(nèi)容編入有關(guān)數(shù)據(jù)庫進(jìn)行檢索，可以采用影印、縮印或掃描等復(fù)制手段保存和匯編本學(xué)位論文。除了文中特別加以標(biāo)注引用的內(nèi)容外，本論文不包含任何其他個人或集體已經(jīng)發(fā)表或撰寫的成果作品。盡我所知，除文中特別加以標(biāo)注和致謝的地方外，不包含其他人或組織已經(jīng)發(fā)表或公布過的研究成果，也不包含我為獲得 及其它教育機構(gòu)的學(xué)位或?qū)W歷而使用過的材料。Gulati和Singh（1998）認(rèn)為，激勵機制，規(guī)范操作程序，解決爭議的，非市場定價系統(tǒng)，和其他適當(dāng)?shù)拇胧┛梢钥刂茩C制來管理價值鏈中的企業(yè)之間的關(guān)系。在利益最大化，企業(yè)試圖解決利益沖突和同質(zhì)企業(yè)的博弈行為，達(dá)到雙贏的效果，從而減少在合作的管理成本和交易成本。一般情況下，企業(yè)會考慮在同質(zhì)企業(yè)一定的價值相合作，根據(jù)相關(guān)和價值鏈理論共享思想。店主的零售價格將直接影響核心企業(yè)的利潤水平。在美國，流行的方式是CPFR（協(xié)同規(guī)劃，預(yù)測和補貨），即處理制造合作計劃，預(yù)測和補充策略，或利用博弈行為，減少彼此的合作的交易成本聯(lián)合促銷策略是一種聯(lián)盟戰(zhàn)略和核心企業(yè)之間的交易，即在經(jīng)銷商的最終銷售階段，經(jīng)銷商和制造商參與銷售按各自的優(yōu)勢，提高消費者的滿意度和擴大各自的銷售利潤。長期以來，他們的方法分別在循環(huán)運行各階段的庫存管理。在新的模式下，核心企業(yè)將從價格成本，并建立一個雙贏的局面。目標(biāo)成本法的基本原理是確定企業(yè)的價格在消費市場和最終消費者支付的價格帶來的利潤的目的，和計算成本的逆向操作分解，確定各部件的供應(yīng)成本或生產(chǎn)成本目標(biāo)成本。、確認(rèn)供應(yīng)商提前通過預(yù)先確定的供應(yīng)商選擇方法確認(rèn)在設(shè)計階段的供應(yīng)商，這些供應(yīng)商負(fù)責(zé)產(chǎn)品組件的設(shè)計或工程系統(tǒng)設(shè)計，過程中應(yīng)明確權(quán)利和責(zé)任。只有雙方充分合作，才能實現(xiàn)利益最大化和達(dá)到雙贏的結(jié)果。 基于合作價值鏈的成本管理當(dāng)價值鏈管理的范圍，價值體系已不僅僅是局限于企業(yè)內(nèi)部價值階段，應(yīng)圍繞核心企業(yè)，向上下游企業(yè)的合作，控制信息，材料和資金，從原材料采購開始，中間產(chǎn)品和成品的制作產(chǎn)品，并通過銷售網(wǎng)絡(luò)向消費者發(fā)送產(chǎn)品。所以企業(yè)的優(yōu)勢可以在價值活動所涉及的市場范圍的調(diào)整不僅根，而根在企業(yè)或優(yōu)化效益，運用價值鏈在一起帶之間的和諧。企業(yè)是一個開放系統(tǒng)，和管理會計應(yīng)多注意研究的外部環(huán)境，了解企業(yè)的競爭力的成本結(jié)構(gòu)，并注意到企業(yè)的成本相對競爭地位的競爭對手。因此，在這樣的思想的指導(dǎo)下，企業(yè)之間的競爭已不僅僅是局限于企業(yè)內(nèi)部。在激烈的市場競爭中，企業(yè)發(fā)現(xiàn)，只是內(nèi)部成本控制已不能滿足消費者對產(chǎn)品成本的要求，于是他們開始尋求如何降低營運成本，獲得了成本優(yōu)勢的方法。根據(jù)波特的價值鏈理論，“價值鏈”的價值活動存在相應(yīng)的價值鏈。價值鏈。D of certain technology and sharing the sales channel with homogenous enterprises. The cooperation among homogenous enterprises root in different core petitions of different enterprises, and the cooperative enterprises respectively possess strong strength in certain aspect, so they have different value increase points. For the maximization of respective benefits, these enterprises will consider many factors such as operation association and operation importance to contract noncore works to other enterprises, . the homogenous cooperation in the value system should seek the benefit crossing in the interest conflict to realize winwin cooperation, maximize bother benefits in the value system and effectively control the cost. In the benefit maximization, the enterprises try to solve the interest conflict and achieve the winwin effect by the game behavior with homogenous enterprises, and accordingly reduce the management cost and the transaction cost in the cooperation.4. Cooperative harmony and risk cost The plete value chain of the pany is a series of binations of all correlative activities of different enterprises including customers and suppliers in the supply chain extending across organizational boundaries. The relationship governance among panies in the value chain is mainly to harmonize, manage and control the mutually dependent activities (including the activities harmonizing and influencing the boundaries of the pany) between two neighboring node enterprises and the mutual capital transmission. The interior harmonizing mechanism of the pany can take the administrative order as the primary measure, but the node enterprises in the value chain are independent each other, and the authority mechanism is deficient to harmonize the relationships among them. Gulati and Singh (1998) thought that the encouragement mechanism, the standard operation program, the dispute solution, the nonmarket pricing system, and other proper measures can be the control mechanisms to manage the relationships among panies in the value chain. In addition, Thompson (1967) thought that the mutual dependence and uncertainty about the activities in the node enterprises were stronger, and they more need to harmonize and manage these relationships. Therefore, to harmonize the relationships among node enterprise in the value chain, the mutually dependent activities and the capital transformations among panies should be first harmonized and managed, and the management measures are related with the cooperative relationships (such as merger relationship, series relationship and reciprocal relationship) among node enterprises in the value chain and the uncertainty of the activities engaged by these panies. Because the enterprises in the value chain are independent each other, the cooperation is mainly to form the contract by the negotiation. The contract is the agreement achieved by people who actualize the cooperation and benefit distribution. To sign a contract must pay corresponding cost, and because of the diversity of the contract form, to achieve different contract will consume different transaction costs and induce different cooperative effects. But in the game process, there are still some decisive risk factors which will raise the cost for the enterprise. First, for both sides in the cooperation, (1) the enterprises participating in the cooperation generally possess certain strength and certain stability for the development strategy, but they can not eliminate the costs induced by the adjustment and adaptation for the cooperation when the management strategy changes largely, (2) though the cooperation emphasizes sharing information, but the cooperation members can not realize plete information sharing in the cooperation because of their respective benefits, and the cooperator can not know the other’s information sufficiently, and the phenomenon of information asymmetry will occur, and the cooperators will continually select their partners in the cooperation process, so the additive cooperation selection cost will occur, (3) in the implementation process of the cooperation, cooperators may adopt the opportunism behaviors, and the “moral risk” may occur, so the enterprise certainly adopt corresponding measures to keep away, and the cost to prevent the risk occurs, (4) in the game process of the cooperation, because both sides are inclined to keep their private information, poke others’ information and prevent information loss, the information technology and the safety risk about the information emerge as times require, so the cost of information safety will occur. Second, as viewed from the exterior ec