【正文】 本文通過分析中小企業(yè)融資規(guī)律和融資特點(diǎn),以及中小企業(yè)融資的國際經(jīng)驗(yàn),針對我國中小企業(yè)亟待解決的問題提出對策,以此推動(dòng)我國中小企業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。9【篇名】中小企業(yè)融資與信用體系的建設(shè)【作者】貝洪俊 鄭長娟【刊名】生產(chǎn)力研究，2003，（06）：2425.【摘要】中小企業(yè)融資是一種信用關(guān)系和信用行為 ,其融資能力有賴于信用制度的建立和完善。8【篇名】發(fā)達(dá)國家支持中小企業(yè)融資的比較及借鑒【作者】蘇志鑫【刊名】現(xiàn)代商業(yè),2006,（01）：34.【摘要】中小企業(yè)是社會經(jīng)濟(jì)發(fā)展的一支重要力量。金融支持體系不健全是導(dǎo)致中小企業(yè)融資難的根本原因 。支持中小企業(yè)發(fā)展,是金融業(yè)義不容辭的義務(wù)。然而,目前我國由于籌資渠道單一、銀行體系不合理及中小企業(yè)自身的問題,籌資難,仍然是制約中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的一大瓶頸。因此 ,應(yīng)從宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境和企業(yè)內(nèi)部管理兩個(gè)方面提出一些具有針對性的措施和對策。據(jù)經(jīng)合組織最近的一份報(bào)告，民營企業(yè)在獲得風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本的機(jī)會相當(dāng)難得。盡管如此，不足50名雇員（或年?duì)I業(yè)額低于200萬歐元）的限制似乎仍然妨礙它們的發(fā)展，特別是對企業(yè)。這個(gè)鏡像是一個(gè)貸款相對下降，以大公司，這失去了其最初的65%的市場份額，而在1993年是8%。兼并和收購浪潮從而似乎刺激了信貸機(jī)構(gòu)之間的競爭。迪特希解釋說，雖然它是由較小的公司通過維護(hù)費(fèi)用昂貴，挑起多重關(guān)系的貸款競爭行為，打破小企業(yè)仍可能通過切換時(shí)間的流逝時(shí)，銀行的壟斷。首先是數(shù)量的關(guān)系，是民營企業(yè)必須散布在一個(gè)較小的貸款額，貸款固定費(fèi)用迪奇指出，一個(gè)明顯的原因。此外，較小的公司，較大的影響。迪奇在法國發(fā)現(xiàn)類似情況，除了極少數(shù)的法國公司，只從一個(gè)單一的機(jī)構(gòu)借貸。這三個(gè)國家在這里證實(shí)這一審查的結(jié)果，這些都顯示出公司作出相當(dāng)多的銀行使用研究。最近的一項(xiàng)研究（哈佩利和帕加諾2002）顯示，在貸款銀行的貸款信息交流的增加，減少信貸風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 Wagenvoort簡要回顧了對公共貸款方案和保障計(jì)劃的有效性文獻(xiàn)。首先，金融限制往往阻礙少于50名員工的小型和極小型企業(yè)（即公司的增長），對平均而言，這些公司的增長是一對一的有關(guān)保留溢利。在財(cái)政困難的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)測試這里歸結(jié)為金融變數(shù)是否可用，如內(nèi)部資金量，已經(jīng)對公司的投資產(chǎn)生重大影響，因此，它的增長。這可能是因?yàn)殄e(cuò)誤的理由民營企業(yè)支付高利率。這可能是不足為奇的，因?yàn)樾」就ǔ１却蠊旧俣嘣?。迪奇認(rèn)為，違約相關(guān)性的內(nèi)比在大型企業(yè)集團(tuán)民營企業(yè)組。在這方面，從投資組合信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的觀點(diǎn)未必是合理的。然而，鑒于德國公司，股本權(quán)益缺乏大的差距是主要的財(cái)務(wù)約束和額外的債務(wù)似乎并沒有成為在德國提出最佳方式。在與小型和中型公司的對比，具有堅(jiān)實(shí)的信譽(yù)非常小公司做比同等規(guī)模提高他們的同齡人更多的貸款，但較低的信譽(yù)。金融債務(wù)對許多意大利公司的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的情況下是這樣，主要是因?yàn)樗麄儾幌虢桢X，不是因?yàn)橘J款人不想貸款的情況。這是配給的財(cái)務(wù)約束缺乏彈性這三個(gè)國家的案例研究得出一個(gè)明確結(jié)論：民營企業(yè)信貸配給是不是在意大利，法國和德國普遍現(xiàn)象。他認(rèn)為，金融債務(wù)比率是非常不同的動(dòng)力相比。與此相比，歐洲約為三分之一的平均資產(chǎn)比率（見Wagenvoort）。他仔細(xì)解釋說，這種差異是因?yàn)樵S多小公司沒有在金融機(jī)構(gòu)的貸款未償還。金融債務(wù)比率，以總負(fù)債，其中主要包括民營企業(yè)的銀行貸款案中，也是全國規(guī)模大致相同的類別。我們在歐洲的民營企業(yè)評估是否受到信貸限制，以及是否金融市場不完善阻礙公司成長。由于民營企業(yè)貸款通常被認(rèn)為是正確或錯(cuò)誤，因?yàn)樘貏e危險(xiǎn)，許多觀察家，尤其是民營企業(yè)本身，已針對融資進(jìn)一步惡化發(fā)出警告聲。這可能不利于民營企業(yè)的貸款，因?yàn)橛凶C據(jù)表明，與大銀行相比，小區(qū)域銀行投資小。第三，股權(quán)資本提供給民營型企業(yè)越來越通過二級資本市場和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)資本融資的發(fā)展。首先，新的信息和通信技術(shù)作出貢獻(xiàn)，以較低的成本，減少貸款人與借款人之間的信息不對稱問題，從而使民營企業(yè)貸款更具吸引力。 and highlights that the changes in Europe’s financial landscape including bank consolidation and Basel II promise to foster SME finance.1. Introduction Some of the changes in Europe’s financial landscape should work in favour of SME finance. Firstly, new information and munication technologies contribute, at a lower cost, to reducing information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, thereby making SME lending more attractive (see, among others, Frame et al. 2001). Secondly, partly due to progress in information technology, new banking methods are being developed and implemented. For instance, banks adopt new portfolio credit risk models that allow them to allocate and price their resources more , the use of credit risk transfer mechanisms (such as the securitarisation of SME loans) is spreading, allowing banks to focus on parativeadvantage activities, notably credit risk assessment, loan origination, and credit risk monitoring all activities crucial for the provision of finance to SMEs. Thirdly, equity capital is being increasingly available to SMEs through the development of (secondary) capital markets and venture capital finance. Fourthly, the second banking directive of the EU aims at boosting petition between banks, thereby improving the terms and conditions of bank finance, including those supplied to SMEs. Other features of Europe’s financial landscape have raised concerns about a possible deterioration of conditions for SME finance. Firstly, consolidation in national banking markets has reduced the number of banks and has in many EU countries, especially in the smaller ones, increased the market share of the topfive largest institutions . This may be detrimental to SME lending since there is evidence that large banks devote a lesser proportion of their assets to small business loans in parison to small, often regional Secondly, there is evidence (Davis, this volume) that capital markets and institutional investors are gaining ground over banks. Institutional investors are in petition with banks when collecting savings in the economy, but they tend to lend less to SMEs than banks do. Thirdly, a new capital adequacy framework for banks (Basel II) is in the making. The thrust of Basel II is to better align capital charges and, by extension, interest rates on loans with underlying credit risks. As SME lending is often perceived, rightly or wrongly, as particularly risky, many observers in particular SMEs themselves have been vocal in warning against a (further) deterioration of SME finance. why financing of SMEs tends to be more challenging than financing of large firms. Reflecting these challenges, small businesses often have no other choice than to rely on bank relationships for their external financing while large firms may turn to banks as well as capital markets.We will also elaborate on the benefits and costs of relationship banking and briefly consider the impact of bank petition on relationship banking. In Section 3, we discuss the capital structure of the average European firm across different size classes and review similar results for Italy, Germany, and France. In Section 4, we evaluate whether SMEs in Europe suffer from credit constraints and whether financial market imperfections hamper the growth of panies. Section 5 begins with a brief empirical description of relationship banking in the three countries covered here and continues with an evaluation of the impact of bank consolidation on relationship banking in France. 2. Capital structure of the average firm across size classesIn analysing the capital structure of f