【正文】 rall, the authors conclude that Mittelstand firms seem to be more flexible than monly assumed. Companies approaching several banks obtain an average of approximately three loan offers. What is more, a substantial amount of offers originates from banks that had no prior relationship with the firm and/or from banks situated outside the immediate geographical vicinity of the firm seeking finance. This is quite surprising because it is often argued that a local bank is best informed about firms in its region, essentially tying small firms to local banks. Having established that both relationship banking and multiple banking enhance credit availability for SMEs, Dietsch continues his analysis by investigating whether bank consolidation in France has altered those two important features of European banking. He emphasises that bank consolidation in France went hand in hand with a lower concentration level in the business loan market. The wave of mergers and acquisitions thus seems to have stimulated petition between credit shows that the number of bankfirm relationships significantly increased during the consolidation period. The relative change in the number of relationships is most important for small and mediumsized panies. An increase in the number of creditors tends to improve credit availability and, indeed, the share of SMEs in the French business loan market has significantly increased during the 1990s. The mirror image of this is a relative decline in lending to large firms, which lost 8 percent of their initial market share of 65 percent in 1993.5. Concluding remarks Bank consolidation and Basel II have widely raised the fear that banks may reduce their participation in the SME loan market segment. So far, these expectations cannot be borne by empirical findings. On the contrary, there are indications that recent and future developments in the European banking industry will actually foster SME lending.That said, especially for firms with less than 50 employees (or an annual turnover less than EUR 2 million) finance constraints still seem to hamper their development. It is worthwhile noting that a lack of financing does not necessarily imply a lack of debt. Indeed, credit rationing in the strict sense is rarely observed in France, Italy, and Germany. However, this does not rule out that banks overcharge SME loans and, as a consequence, that financial market imperfections have a negative impact on the growth of SMEs and thus the economy at large. Public policy in support of SMEs needs to be designed in such a way that relief is offered where finance constraints are most binding. In this respect, equity financing deserves more attention. According to a recent OECD report (OECD 2002), small businesses experience considerable difficulty in obtaining risk capital. In Europe, small firms are relatively unimportant on the equity market in parison to the United States. Therefore, the promotion of secondary capital markets and venture capital funds need to rank high on the political agenda.中小企業(yè)融資在歐洲：介紹和概述本文介紹了中小企業(yè)融資問題以及總結(jié)歐洲投資銀行的貢獻(xiàn)，本概述強(qiáng)調(diào)民營企業(yè)的信貸供給關(guān)系的重要性；指出了在整個歐洲的分歧和企業(yè)結(jié)構(gòu)的異同；注意到，盡管有廣泛的民營企業(yè)信貸配給的現(xiàn)象，金融市場的不完善仍在抑制民營企業(yè)的成長和亮點(diǎn)。第三，股權(quán)資本提供給民營型企業(yè)越來越通過二級資本市場和風(fēng)險資本融資的發(fā)展。金融債務(wù)比率，以總負(fù)債，其中主要包括民營企業(yè)的銀行貸款案中，也是全國規(guī)模大致相同的類別。這是配給的財務(wù)約束缺乏彈性這三個國家的案例研究得出一個明確結(jié)論：民營企業(yè)信貸配給是不是在意大利，法國和德國普遍現(xiàn)象。在這方面，從投資組合信用風(fēng)險的觀點(diǎn)未必是合理的。在財政困難的實(shí)證檢驗(yàn)測試這里歸結(jié)為金融變數(shù)是否可用，如內(nèi)部資金量，已經(jīng)對公司的投資產(chǎn)生重大影響，因此，它的增長。這三個國家在這里證實(shí)這一審查的結(jié)果，這些都顯示出公司作出相當(dāng)多的銀行使用研究。迪特希解釋說，雖然它是由較小的公司通過維護(hù)費(fèi)用昂貴，挑起多重關(guān)系的貸款競爭行為，打破小企業(yè)仍可能通過切換時間的流逝時，銀行的壟斷。據(jù)經(jīng)合組織最近的一份報告，民營企業(yè)在獲得風(fēng)險資本的機(jī)會相當(dāng)難得。金融支持體系不健全是導(dǎo)致中小企業(yè)融資難的根本原因 。本文通過分析中小企業(yè)融資規(guī)律和融資特點(diǎn),以及中小企業(yè)融資的國際經(jīng)驗(yàn),針對我國中小企業(yè)亟待解決的問題提出對策,以此推動我國中小企業(yè)的可持續(xù)發(fā)展。支持中小企業(yè)發(fā)展,是金融業(yè)義不容辭的義務(wù)。盡管如此，不足50名雇員（或年?duì)I業(yè)額低于200萬歐元）的限制似乎仍然妨礙它們的發(fā)展，特別是對企業(yè)。首先是數(shù)量的關(guān)系，是民營企業(yè)必須散布在一個較小的貸款額，貸款固定費(fèi)用迪奇指出，一個明顯的原因。最近的一項(xiàng)研究（哈佩利和帕加諾2002）顯示，在貸款銀行的貸款信息交流的增加，減少信貸風(fēng)險。這可能是因?yàn)殄e誤的理由民營企業(yè)支付高利率。然而，鑒于德國公司，股本權(quán)益缺乏大的差距是主要的財務(wù)約束和額外的債務(wù)似乎并沒有成為在德國提出最佳方式。他認(rèn)為，金融債務(wù)比率是非常不同的動力相比。我們在歐洲的民營企業(yè)評估是否受到信貸限制，以及是否金融市場不完善阻礙公司成長。首先，新的信息和通信技術(shù)作出貢獻(xiàn)，以較低的成本，減少貸款人與借款人之間的信息不對稱問題，從而使民營企業(yè)貸款更具吸引力。其次，部分原因是由于信息技術(shù)的進(jìn)步，新的銀行管理辦法正在制定和實(shí)施。 Wagenvoort區(qū)分五個不同的大小級：非常小，小，中型，大型和超大型企業(yè)。更具體而言，民營企業(yè)則似乎不那么靈活調(diào)整其資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表的結(jié)構(gòu)比大企業(yè)不斷變化的發(fā)展機(jī)會。有幾個合格的話，是很值得。銀行可能會成功過度充電民營企業(yè)由于（本地）銀行市場的競爭和有限鎖定在上述效果。借款人和貸款人本身也有助于減少信息不對稱解決民營企業(yè)直接融資問題。添加更多的債權(quán)人對公司的金融中介機(jī)構(gòu)名單將觸發(fā)額外的費(fèi)用。這是值得指出的是，缺乏資金，并不一定意味著對債務(wù)缺乏。6【篇名】借鑒國外經(jīng)驗(yàn)構(gòu)筑我國中小企業(yè)支持系統(tǒng)【作者】郭朝先【刊名】經(jīng)濟(jì)問題，1999，(3)：67.【摘要】制定法律法規(guī)對中小企業(yè)予以支持，設(shè)立專門扶持中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的金融機(jī)構(gòu)，成立中小企業(yè)基金，對中小企業(yè)實(shí)行特殊的金融政策，以及建立中小企業(yè)金融支持社會輔助體系，是國外在金融方面支持中小企業(yè)發(fā)展的基本做法。7【篇名】中小企業(yè)融資問題及對策【作者】賀云龍【刊名】經(jīng)濟(jì)師，2003,（02）：1617.【摘要】文章論述了融資法律環(huán)境不健全是導(dǎo)致中小企業(yè)融資渠道不暢和融資方式單一的主要原因 。但是，這并不排除民營企業(yè)貸款，銀行濫收費(fèi)用，并造成后果的，這種金融市場的不完善有一個對民營企業(yè)成長的負(fù)面影響，在經(jīng)濟(jì)大國，股權(quán)融資這方面，值得更多的關(guān)注。但是，只依靠一家銀行的缺點(diǎn)是，這家銀行可能變成一個長期的壟斷。銀行和銀行合并的關(guān)系是否有經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)支持這樣的觀點(diǎn)的關(guān)系可以緩解銀行資金的限制？ Ongena和史密斯（2000）報告說，在整個歐洲國家的銀行企業(yè)關(guān)系的平均人數(shù)大幅變化。 超出信貸配給和金融市場不完善，可能導(dǎo)致資金的限制，其中包括信貸配給，但也限制過度貸款定價和提高股票以外的困難造成測試Wagenvoort舉措。換言之，根據(jù)這一堅(jiān)定不被視為信貸配給的定義，如果它不希望在要求借款利率的條件，即使該銀行施加過于苛刻相對于借款人的真實(shí)信用。我們對這個結(jié)果的解釋是，小企業(yè)在應(yīng)對不斷變化調(diào)整生長條件的金融債務(wù)較少的靈活性?；仡欉^去一段長時間作為一個整體的歐洲，總負(fù)債權(quán)益比率是全國規(guī)模大致相同的類，因此，杠桿是或多或少的一個典型的民營企業(yè)與大企業(yè)相同的一個典型。此外，信貸風(fēng)險轉(zhuǎn)移機(jī)制正在蔓延，使銀行能夠?qū)Ｗ⒂诒容^優(yōu)勢的活動，特別是信貸風(fēng)險評估，貸款發(fā)放，信貸風(fēng)險監(jiān)控，所有活動的提供都是為民營企業(yè)融資。在歐洲金融環(huán)境變化的大背景下，包括銀行合并和新巴塞爾協(xié)議簽署的承諾，將會促進(jìn)民營企業(yè)發(fā)展。反映這些挑戰(zhàn)，民營小企業(yè)往往比較依賴外部資金來源，沒有其他選擇，而大型企業(yè)可能轉(zhuǎn)向銀行以及資本市場。總的來說，平均歐洲，法國和意大利的民營企業(yè)似乎并非是資本不足，德國民營企業(yè)。 Hommel和施奈德認(rèn)為，信貸增長在2002年在德國幾乎癱瘓主要可以歸因于德國目前的經(jīng)濟(jì)周期性衰退。大公司往往會被鎖定在現(xiàn)有的組織結(jié)構(gòu)和技術(shù)。 不過積極的公共干預(yù)的凈回報