【正文】 因此，它是關(guān)鍵，以解決金融部門的弱點(diǎn)提前，或同意與資本賬戶自由化，這可能是中國未來的匯率改革的一個重要問題。隨著中國入世承諾開放國內(nèi)金融市場，外國投資大幅可能會成為資本流動的自由化控制制度的另一個驅(qū)動力。到目前為止，資本賬戶的措施已經(jīng)具有高度選擇性和主要集中在外來直接投資自由化。因此，正式宣布的時間表提前 3 年，中國實(shí)現(xiàn)了經(jīng)常項(xiàng)目可兌換的目標(biāo)。此外，已采取措施以減少貿(mào)易障礙，在 1996 年4 月，進(jìn)口關(guān)稅降低 4994 項(xiàng)，占中國稅目總數(shù)的 83％以上 。在 3 月，國家外匯管理局開始試驗(yàn)一個系統(tǒng)，允許外商投資企業(yè)購買和出售外匯交 易及結(jié)算所通過外匯指定銀行在江蘇 、 上海 、 深圳 、 大連，并允許外資銀行提供此類服務(wù)的外商投資企業(yè) 。在新制度下，國內(nèi)企業(yè)需要將所有外匯收入出售給外匯指定銀行。事實(shí)上，這些措施，主要是鋪平了道路，為中 國最終加入世界貿(mào)易組織于 2020 年 11 月。到 1993 年，在 1991年之前，全國各地共有 108 家外匯調(diào)劑中心調(diào)劑市場匯率，中國的外匯交易的50％左右，但 1991 年后，份額上升至 80％。因此，在 1991 年 12 月，外匯掉期市場的銷售幾乎沒有任何限制。這項(xiàng)改革的核心是取消出口補(bǔ)貼。改善的情況設(shè)置了階段為最終實(shí)現(xiàn)人民幣可兌換，當(dāng)局獲得了信心和經(jīng)驗(yàn)，在宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定。 1989 年 6 月后，當(dāng)局采取了非常強(qiáng)有力的措施，以遏制在經(jīng)濟(jì)，收緊信貸和提高利率。 很長一段時間，外匯平衡的要求，是一個最嚴(yán)重的問題，為外商投資企業(yè)（外商投資企業(yè)）經(jīng)營的鼓勵更多的資本流入，國務(wù)院允許外商投資企業(yè)實(shí)際利用外資互相交換交換 1986 年，而在經(jīng)濟(jì)特區(qū)，外商投資企業(yè)，甚至允許與國內(nèi)機(jī)構(gòu)交換。因此，外匯掉期業(yè)務(wù)來虛擬停止。雖然這個系統(tǒng)是一個非常復(fù)雜的多重匯率安排，但它確實(shí)超出中央政府提供外匯資源的控制措施。 在 1985 年 8 月至1986 年 7 月，它保持 3 年以上 。 如果擬議的改革方案全面實(shí)施后，可能已發(fā)生根本性的變化。為了鼓勵外商投資的流入，政府決定開放 4 月外商投資的主要沿海地區(qū)。例如，在 1978 年無利可圖的出口占中國出口總額 66％。一組建議，按現(xiàn)行官方匯率低估了人民幣幣值，要求重估人民幣官方匯率。保留外匯收入可以用于國家政策批準(zhǔn)的進(jìn)口貨物和服務(wù)。在同一年，當(dāng)局推出了外匯留成制度，向出口商提供激勵。在 1981 年， 10 個傳 統(tǒng)外貿(mào)企業(yè)出口占出口總額的 ％和 ％，進(jìn)口。在1979 年采取的改革措施主要集中在一些的外貿(mào)經(jīng)營權(quán)下放，并允許更多的外貿(mào)企業(yè)要建立。 2． 在 1979 年的改革和采用的 ISR 外部改革的第一輪開始于 1979 年。本文的組織如下 ：第 2 節(jié)簡要介紹了改革前的外貿(mào)和匯率制度的紙張作為一個起點(diǎn)，第 3 節(jié)討論從 1981 年到1979 年外部的改革，并通過內(nèi)部結(jié)算率。以往的改革一般集中在經(jīng)常賬戶和外來直接投資的逐步開放，旨在加強(qiáng)真正的制造業(yè)和出口的經(jīng)濟(jì)能力，而下一階段資本賬戶自由化往往是國內(nèi)金融的發(fā)展密切相關(guān)部門。在 2020 年 11 月，中國結(jié)束了加入世界貿(mào)易組織（ WTO）。由于當(dāng)局開始部署下一階段匯改，發(fā)生了亞洲金融危機(jī)。本文的結(jié)論是，中國的外匯改革的核心，自 1979 年以來一直在逐步轉(zhuǎn)變其外匯分配機(jī)制，從一個受中央計(jì)劃經(jīng)濟(jì)到市場力量發(fā)揮了顯著作用。 Chen 1989, p. 47). In essence, people who held this view were mainly concerned about the situation in the export sector and growing export with the two conflicting views, the authorities decided to choose the middle of the road by adopting a dual exchange rate system, with the official exchange rate applied to nontraderelated foreign exchange transactions and the more depreciated ISR applied to traderelated transactions. 3. Development of the foreign exchange swap market China launched the second round of external reform in 1984. To encourage inflows of foreign investment, the government decided to open up major coastal areas to foreign investment in April. Reform proposals submitted by the MOFTEC were approved in September. The proposals provided for greater management independence from the government of traderelated enterprises and increasing integration of the trade sector with the nontrade sectors of the economy. A fundamental difference between the 1979 reform and 1984 reform was that the 1979 reform was mainly intended to decentralize foreign trade management by empowering local governments and industrial ministries, whereas the 1984 reform sought to make foreign trade enterprises independent of government controls. If the proposed reform package was fully implemented, fundamental changes in China’s foreign trade sector could have taken place. However, this in fact did not happen as priorities changed when the economy overheated in early 1984. In late 1984, the authorities adopted a number of administrative measures to control domestic demand and imports in response to rising inflation and a deteriorating balance of payments. In the process, the policy of decentralization was reversed. The authorities also began a series of devaluations that moved the official exchange rate per US$ in August 1985 to in July 1986 where it remained for over 3 years. The decision to devalue was as much a political promise as it was an effort to make the rate more in line with economic fundamentals. As such, the currency still remained overvalued for most of the period. The foreign exchange swap market really developed out of the foreign exchange retention system and the need to provide incentives for exporters without the fiscal burden of export subsidies. Though this system was a highly plex multiple exchange rate arrangement, it did provide a measure of control of foreign exchange resources outside the central government. Just as significant, as retention ratios increased, the authorities were moving away from administrative measures to control imports and substituting these with tariffs and quotas. From late 1985 to 1986, there were major changes in the official policy toward the foreign exchange swap business. With the overheating of the economy after 1984, the black market rate was at a substantial discount to the swap rate. Therefore, the foreign exchange swap business came to a virtual halt. In December 1985, the authorities terminated the foreign exchange swap business at the BOC. A new foreign exchange swap center was created in the Shenzhen special SEZ that had a more flexible approach to prices. Later on, other were allowed to establish similar foreign exchange swap centers. For a long time, foreign exchange balancing requirements had been one of the most serious problems for Foreignfunded enterprises operating in encourage more capital inflows, the State